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SYNOPSIS
The objective of this thesis is two-fold. First to consider 
the theoretical foundations of fuel policy and secondly to undertake an 
empirical investigation of the impact of the fuel oil tax on the rate of 
contraction of the coal industry.
Chapter One is concerned with the selection of Paretian welfare 
economics as a theoretical basis for empirical work. The restrictive 
nature of the Paretian assumptions is examined and a possible social 
welfare decision rule for the energy sector identified. The construction 
of the rule is postulated to be dependent on the concept of Government 
embodied in the various market adjustment mechanisms which are sufficient, 
although not necessary, to satisfy the conditions for Paretian optimality. 
Two such mechanisms are identified; the Interventionist and workable 
competition adjustment processes. Chapter Two considers a historical 
perspective of the Interventionist adjustment process noting the close 
ties between Government and other power groups.
Chapter Three studies the fuel oil tax and suggests that in terms 
of Paretian optimality an improvement in the efficient use of resources 
could have been obtained by making lump-sum redundancy payments to miners 
rather than imposing the tax. This solution is identified as a workable 
competition alternative, although it is possible that an Interventionist 
policy could recommend the same solution. Chapter Four develops this 
theme by considering, qualitatively, the other policy instruments used 
to slow down the contraction rate of the coal industry. The impact of 
Government price restraint on the C.E.G.B.'s power station plant ordering 
programme is discussed.
Chapter Five critically appraises the theoretical inconsistencies 
of both Paretian welfare economics and workable competition. The arbitrary 
nature of intervention is further examined and in consequence a liberal 
energy policy alternative is discussed along with suggestions for further 
research.
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•INTRODUCTION
The objective of this thesis is not only to investigate the
theoretical basis on which energy policy can be constructed but also to
undertake an empirical test of the efficiency of resource utilisation in
the light of the postulated model.
*
In Chapter One Paretian economics is adopted as a method of 
analysing changes in individual welfare but immediately the restrictive 
nature of the assumptions is noted. Notwithstanding this, an attempt 
is made to identify possible, market configurations which would be 
sufficient to satisfy the conditions for Paretian optimality.
Two such configurations are postulated and an attempt to integrate 
them into the Paretian analysis is found only to.be ’’possible" by 
severing 'the link with the Paretian assumptions and re-introducing 
interpersonal comparisons. By invoking a neo-Paretian social welfare 
decision rule the theoretical integrity of the Paretian model is 
"downgraded" in an ill-fated attempt to preserve the analysis. The 
serious implication of assuming away this restriction is also echoed 
by the need to eliminate the concept of a benevolent, zero-cost and 
instantaneous acting Government designed to remove Paretian defined 
market failures.
Of the two market configurations considered, the interventionist 
case, provides for a Government which formulates policies in a desire 
to maximise its share of the quantity of electoral votes. The other 
conceptof Government used is that embodied in workable competition. 
Intuitively this latter form of Government appears to place emphasis on 
individual welfare through recourse to simulating perfect competition.
The emphasis on rivalry in the market with the Government ensuring a 
multiplicity of buyers and sellers appears to "minimuse" the role of 
Government and allow the "price mechanism" to allocate resources. . This,
however, is a superficial view. Deeper analysis requires the 
exact nature of the Government and its interventionary role to be 
specified.
In endeavouring to isolate two forms of market configurations 
certain restrictive assumptions have to be made. There is no 
guarantee that the degree of intervention recommended by the workable 
competition Government will necessarily be different from that of the 
interventionist case or, more importantly, that the Interventionist 
case designed to maximise the share of electoral votes will always 
recommend a greater degree of intervention. In order to proceed with 
the analysis the assumption has to be made that the workable competition 
Government is benevolent and acts only as a referee in the economy. 
Moreover, it needs to be assumed that all Interventionist allocations 
of resources, designed to maximise the share of electoral votes, will be 
less efficient than the workable competition alternative. Such a 
strong assumption cannot, however, be justified because as shown in 
Chapter Five the nature of the workable competition Government is not 
necessarily benevolent. However, the assumption does place emphasis 
on the role of Government in any market configuration and activity.
The convoluted nature of the theoretical approach serves, therefore, 
not only to expose the restrictive foundation on which Paretian 
economics is built and the "shoring-up" needed to allow the analysis 
to proceed but also to pose questions concerning the nature and cost 
of Government intervention.
With the above restrictions and assumptions in mind the empirical 
section of the thesis seeks to evaluate the impact of the 1961 fuel oil 
tax on the energy sector. It is suggested that an alternative use of 
resources, to the imposition of the tax, would have been to make lump­
sum redundancy payments to miners. This alternative is identified as
a workable competition alternative although the strict Paretian 
framework requires that the costs of Government intervention are 
zero - be it an interventionist or workable competition Government.
The workable competition model indicates, however, other possible
benefits that may accrue from policy decisions not based on a policy
designed to maximize the share of electoral votes. The exact nature
of these "other possible benefits", based on an intuitive preference
for resource allocation by prices rather than by regulation, requires 
the nature of Government intervention to be studied. Accordingly, 
the use of workable competition as an operational tool is eventually 
.rejected.
The exit from the theoretical maze entered by way of Paretian 
economics and on an, a priori, belief that the form of Government 
embodied in a particular market configuration does matter, is found 
by recourse to an alternative theoretical welfare model. In 
describing a liberal fuel folicy alternative the thesis not only comes 
to rest on a universal welfare theory,but serves to illustrate the 
pitfalls that await those who argue for increasing Government intervention 
and those who euphemistically argue for "free competition" through an 
intuitive love of the price mechanism based on a confusion between 
Paretian economics and liberalism.
' CHAPTER ONE.
The Theoretical Foundations of Energy Policy
1.1. Introduction
The identification of Paretian welfare economics as a basis 
for an applied study of U.K. energy policy is related to two factors. 
First, on an empirical level, Paretian analysis provides an economic 
reference model against which various alternative energy policies may 
be considered. Secondly, by pursuing a Paretian analysis of fuel 
policy the theoretical inconsistencies of the model become apparent 
and in consequence an alternative theoretical framework needs to be 
established. This is discussed in chapter five.
1.2. The Paretian Value - Judgements. ‘
The value - judgements used in Paretian^ welfare economics 
-are three in number. The first is that each individual is the best 
judge of his own welfare. This judgement sometimes excludes children 
and madmen in which case the imposition of preferences by one or more 
individuals is at variance with the value judgement itself. The’ 
second value-judgement states that the social welfare of a group of 
individuals is composed of the welfare of each of those individuals. 
Taken together assumptions one and two require that welfare be ranked 
by primacy of individual preferences. • In consequence Governments are 
rejected from any strict social welfare function constructed by 
Paretians. The third value - judgement considers; that "if any change 
in the allocation of resources increases the welfare of at least one 
individual without reducing the welfare of any other individual, then 
this/...
1. V. Pareto, Manual of Political Economy, translation 1971.
this change is treated as improving social welfare". The 
restrictive nature of this value - judgement is such that it rules 
out interpersonal comparisons. Consider, for example, the situation 
in which two individuals prefer one state of society to another;
society being defined as the vector field of all individuals1
commodity and productive service preferences. Let the rest of society, 
however, prefer the opposite situation. In this case Paretian economics 
can make no statement except to say that the alternatives are Pareto
non-comparable. The consequence of this is that welfare changes will
only be endorsed if all individuals, in giving primacy to their own 
preferences, concur with such a change.
Besides these value-judgements Paretian analysis is conditional 
on further technical assumptions. The model itself is static with 
costless and instantaneous adjustment procedures. Each factor of 
production is taken to be homogeneous and the quantities of inputs 
are assumed to be utilized at maximum efficiency. The production 
function used is assumed to .possess convex isoquants with a decreasing 
marginal rate of substitution of labour for capital. Invariance of 
the labour component implies that the size of the working population 
remains constant and that there is no involuntary unemployment.
Moreover, constancy of capital inputs precludes any net investment 
activities and technical knowledge is assumed not to progress. It is 
assumed that business aims are "cost minimisation" and "profit 
maximisation". On the comsumer side the static model implies that 
individual preference maps are invariant. Along an indifference curve 
for any two goods the marginal rate of substitution between the goods 
diminishes for each individual. No two goods are perfect substitutes 
nor perfect complements. Another implicit assumption is that there
15/ . « .
2. S.K. Nath, A Reappraisal of Welfare Economics, Chapter Two 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1969.
is nb non-market interdependence between production units, implying 
that there is no divergence between the private and social valuations 
of economic activities. The utility function for the individual is 
a separable function based on the assumption that the aim of individuals 
is to maximise utility. Moreover, utility functions are assumed to 
be independent of each other.
1.3 Paretian Optimality and the Marginality Conditions.
A Paretian optimum can be defined as that economic state in 
which it is impossible by changing the existing allocation of resources 
or distribution of output among members of the community to increase 
the satisfaction of one individual without reducing the satisfaction 
of any other members. The implication of this is that the marginal 
utilities of any two products, in ratio form, should be the same for 
all consumers. It is required therefore that,
mu. ,/mu. 0 = m.u. ' ,mu. 0  ---- - m:u /m:u. = MRSxl y2 x2 / y2 xn yn
where there are n products and x and y are products, M U  is marginal
.utility and MRS is the marginal rate of substitution. Using the
conventional Edgeworth Box diagram (Diagram 1) in which the assumption
is made that individuals A and B have insatiable desires for both
commodities X and Y the analysis illustrates the interest individuals
have in trying to reach the corner diagonally opposite to their origin.
The indifference set for A is given by I.^  and for B by Ig. Consider
a point R which represents a point of intersection of the two
indifference curves I A and IR-. Clearly a movement onto higher
2 2
indifference curves can be achieved by both A and B through movement 
within the area described by the indifference curve sets until a point 
of mutual tangency is reached. The locus of all such tangencies is 
called/...
called the contract curve, C, and it represents positions mutually 
beneficial to A and B compared to those positions off the contract 
curve. Any move along the contract curve must be disadvantageous 
to one of the participants. A movement towards OA represents a 
loss to'A and an equal arid opposite gain to B . The set of Pareto 
optimal points is that set of joint tangencies T.j,._.., T^, the 
locus of which describes the contract curve.
The second aspect of economic performance that needs to be 
considered is that of technical efficiency. In order that a given 
combination of products be produced as efficiently as possible, it 
must be impossible to produce the same combination of products by 
using fewer inputs. Thus it is required that the marginal physical 
products of any two inputs should be the same in the production of 
all the different commodities which are produced;
Co
mm
od
it
y 
X
Diagram 1. The Edgeworth Box
OA
Commodity Y
. MPPxi/MPPxj = MPPyi/MPPyj =----- -= MPPzi/MPPzj .
where i and j represent inputs x, y and 2 represent different products. 
The final aspect of the problem concerns the optimal allocation 
of resources between different alternative combinations of products.
Given any particular combination of outputs which is being produced, 
the rate at which one good X can be transformed into another good Y 
by shifting resources from X production into Y production is called 
the marginal rate of transformation (MRT). If the optimum is such 
that
MRS '-MRS0 = — -sMRS 
1 z m
then the combination of outputs is distributed among individuals
such that the rate at which any consumer is willing to exchange X
for Y is the same for all consumers. Given the existing combination
of products Paretian optimality requires that the rate at which every
member of the community would be willing to exchange one good for the
■other be equal to the rate at which that good can be transformed into
the other by reallocating resources between the products. Thus for
-any pair of commodities produced and consumed,
MRS1 = MRS2 = —  - -  = MRT.
If all the above three Paretian optimality conditions are met 
then the rate of substitution (common to all individuals) should be 
equated with the rate of transformation for all pairs of goods in the 
economy. This supra-optimum will be the highest level of social 
welfare achievable under the initial distribution of property rights. 
'Having said this the restrictive nature of this optimum must be stressed. 
There are an infinite number of optima each associated with a specific 
distribution of property rights and fulfilling the optimality conditions 
given above. Since interpersonal comparisons are ruled out it iis not 
possible/...
possible to compare alternative efficiency points or make any 
conclusions concerning efficient/inefficient points associated with 
different distributions of property.rights. In order to rank these 
optima an exogenous social welfare decision rate has to be imposed.
1.4 Paretian Optimality and alternative market configurations
Consider a purely competitive market in which producers 
maximise profits. In.order to maximise Utility an individual must 
allocate his income between different goods so that the marginal 
utility of every good consumed is proportional to the price of the 
good. In the purely.competitive market situation the price of any 
good is the same for all consumers and thus the ratio of marginal 
utilities for any pair of goods will be the same for all consumers.
Thus
MU .yj. /MU yi ~—  --- = MU Xn/MU yn = MRS -.
-likewise in the competitive case,
MPPxi/MPPxj ^----   MPPzi/MPPxj
Here,, since the objective function is that of profit maximisation the 
entrepreneur will choose that combination of inputs which will minimise 
the total money cost of producing any given level of output. For such 
a combination, the ratio of the marginal physical products of any pair 
of inputs employed must be equal to the price ratio of the inputs.
But the price of any particular input is the same for all consumers 
and thus producers of different products will employ combinations of 
inputs with identical marginal physical product ratios.
Finally, MRS^ = MRS2 = - - - = MRT, since in pure competition 
individual firms.will produce that level of output which equates the 
marginal cost of producing a particular product with the price of the 
product/...
product. Here the ratio of marginal costs equals MRT and the ratio 
of product prices equals MRS. The competitive general equilibrium 
case is therefore seen to be a sufficient but not a necessary condition 
for Paretian optimality. However, as illustrated in Appendix 1, the 
essential nature of Paretian optimal positions is that prices are 
equated to marginal cost in all markets. Consequently other market 
adjustment mechanisms could provide Paretian optimal solutions. A 
centrally planned economy in which prices were officially regulated 
to equal marginal costs would be a sufficient condition to fulfill the 
Paretian optimality criteria, as would perfectly discriminating 
.monopoly. Any market configuration which contrives to equate price 
with marginal cost will meet the Paretian optimality requirements and
in consequence there is no reason for prefering the perfectly
, 3competitive model to any other.
1.5 Compensation and the Theory of Second Best.
The restrictive nature of the Paretian value - judgement means 
that interpersonal comparisons are ruled out. Operationally, however, 
the method of neo-Paretian analysis is to use interpersonal comparisons 
embodied in some social welfare decision rule and to argue that piece­
meal changes in welfare represent movements towards Paretian optimalily. 
Both of these operational techniques must be considered.
The inability of the Paretian model to provide a method for
4 5
making interpersonal comparisons led Hicks and Kaldor to postulate 
the/..
3. C.K. Rowley and A.T. Peacock, Welfare Economics, A Liberal 
Restatement, Martin Robertson, 197:;
4. J.R. Hicks, "The Foundations of welfare Economics", Economic 
Journal 1939
5. N. Kaldor, "Welfare Comparisons of Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility11, Economic Journal, 1939.
the Compensation Principle. Using indifference curve analysis,
Hicks differentiated between those who wished to move to a higher 
indifference curve, those who move to a lower indifference curve 
and those who remain on the same indifference curve after a change 
in welfare. Consider an economic change which creates a group of 
gainers. If the gainers can restore the losers to their original 
position and themselves move to an indifference curve lower than the 
one they were on after the initial change, but not as low as the 
indifference curve they were on initially, then it can be argued that 
the gainers are still gaining, although it cannot be assumed that 
the actual gain meets consumers' desired gains. Thus overall an 
increase in group welfare will have occurred and it has been 
unnecessary to judge anyone's gain more important than anyone else*s 
loss. However, if the Hicks-Kaldor criterion is applied once more 
to the existing welfare situation then the test may endorse a move 
hack to the original configuration. To free this position of stalemate
g
the concept of the Scitovsky double criterian is invoked. By this 
process the Hicks-Kaldor criterian is applied for a move from an initial 
to a terminal configuration and also for the return move. If the first 
-condition indicates a welfare gain whilst the second does not, then 
the original move is considered a welfare gain under the Scitovsky 
criterion.
The convoluted nature of the Compensation Principle does not 
remove the necessity of making interpersonal comparisons. Even if 
compensation is not paid a knowledge is required of who the losers are. 
If the individuals affected by the welfare change know that compensation 
will not be paid there will be no incentive for them to reveal their 
"true" preferences. On the other hand, if compensation was payable, 
tne/... ............ ....... .........
6 . T. Scitovsky, "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics",
Review of Economic Studies 1941/42.
the rationale for its existence is called into question because if 
transfers of income were costless and the identification of other 
commodity sets on the same community indifference curve were also 
costless, then the usual Paretian adjustment process would secure 
an optimal position.
The second problem in using Paretian analysis concerns the 
situation in which not all of the optimality conditions are fulfilled 
This raises the issue of whether the attainment of an original global 
optimum is still desirable from the viewpoint of perfect efficiency? 
The general theorem of the Second Best^ '(see Appendix II) postulates 
that the pursuit of a piecemeal marginal cost pricing rule in one 
sector may not move the economy nearer to a Paretian optimum. More 
generally it.states "that if there is introduced into a general 
equilibrium system a constraint which prevents the attainment of one 
of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretiaii conditions, although 
-still attainable, are in general, no longer desirable". Thus given 
that one of the Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled then 
an optimum can only be achieved by departing from all other Paretian 
conditions. It follows from this, a prior, that judgement betweenI
various situations in which some of the Paretian conditions are
1 ■
fulfilled while others are not depends on the social welfare decision 
rule used. Moreover, for each Paretian optimum there will be no more 
than one second best solution, the exact number being dictated by the 
number of optimum conditions which need to be fulfilled.
1.6/...
7. R.L. Lipsey and K. Lancaster, "The General Theory of Second Best",
Review of Economic Studies, 1956-57
1.6 Social Welfare Decision Rules for the Energy Sector,
1.61.. The Paretian Background and the Down’s Model
The theory of Second Best has two important implications for
Paretian welfare economics. First, piecemeal changes in welfare in
one sector cannot be said to move the economy towards a Paretian
optimum position. Secondly by discussing second-best situations the
exact nature of the conditions required to meet Paretian optimality
are again made explicit. The value-judgements and technical
assumptions of Paretian analysis are restrictive and even if the
conditions for optimality can be met no statements can be made
concerning the ranking of optimal points along the contract curve
for a given distribution of property rights. To "overcome’1 this and
to allow welfare positions for various permutations of property rights
to be ranked Paretians attempt to construct a social welfare decision
8
rule. As Rowley and Peacock have pointed out the "social welfare 
function approach is anathema to strict Paretians in that it incorporates
judgements that are not desired from individual preferences". i
9 . . . .Bergson, however, considered the manner in which individual
preferences could lead to social alternatives in choice-space represented 
by a real-valued function SW. Subsets of economic and non-economic 
variables were considered, although in the analysis the latter were 
ignored. The social welfare function used was of the type,
SW = SW(U^ ____ _ Un) : n individuals. J
thus stating that individual preferences count in the attainment of the 
social optimum. The actual form of the function is given by 
individuals "demonstrating" their preferences in majority voting,
(see page 13 )
8 . Rowley and Peacock, op cit
9. A. Bergson, "A Reformulation of certain aspects of Welfare Economics"
Quaterly Journal of Economics, February 1938.
• In this connection Arrow considered a social welfare function, 
different in meaning from that of Bergson’s, in so far as it represented 
a social decision process by which a collective choice rule for deriving 
a social ordering from individual preferences could be obtained. If 
such a process is available then the welfare maximising position is 
obtainable by recourse to majority voting. Arrow’s function does not 
consider that if an individual ranks X above Y then this is to be 
considered a preference for some one object X over another object Y, but 
rather to be thought of as a preference for a whole social arrangement 
symbolised as possible social state X over another intricate social 
state symbolised by Y. Arrow took five conditions which a group 
decision rule should fulfill (see Appendix III). Of these the 
inherent Paretian principle is that the group decision rule ensures that 
an outcome is not obtained if there is another feasible alternative that 
everyone prefers according to his preference ordering. If, however, 
^preference intensities change then the rankings of states may change with 
individual orderings otherwise unchanged. As seen from Appendix III the 
axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives requires that the 
social choice made from any set of alternatives will depend only on the 
nrderings of individuals among alternatives in that set. In consequence 
this rules out any new alternative being considered and disturbing the 
ordering of original alternatives. Arrow also required that a social 
ranking is not to be imposed independently of the preference of the 
members of a society and may not be dictatorial. The final axiom, called 
the condition of collective rationality, requires that all possible 
alternative social states should be capable of being ranked and that 
social choice for any particular set of alternatives should be the most 
preferred/...
10. K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, New York, 
Wiley, 1951.
preferred alternative, according to the ordering, in the available 
set.
In terms of majority voting four of Arrow’s conditions are met. 
However, the axiom of collective rationality is not satisfied. Consider 
the case of a group of individuals who vote in a manner by which 
alternatives are thought to be ranked consistently. Arrow has shown 
that even with collective rationality no one public choice rule can 
satisfy simultaneously the axioms, with the exception of a rule in 
which all individuals had identical preference orderings for all states. 
In terms of majority voting the axiom of collective rationality is 
transgressed with the result of. an inconsistent, intransitive social 
ordering.
Alternative A Alternative B Alternative C 
Individual X 1 2 3
-Individual Y 2 3 1
.Individual 2 3 1 2
In pairwise elections, A would be chosen over B and B would be 
--chosen over C. — -But-this implies A would be chosen over C whereas C 
would win an election between A and C. - '
Through consideration of the inconsistencies resulting from the 
Arrow dilemma the mechanisms by which votes are cast for a particular 
preference within society is brought into question. In this context 
Downs^ considered a two-party democracy in which politicians seek to 
maximise the votes cast for their party by offering the electorate a 
-particular matrix of policies. Explicitly his central hypothesis was 
that;/...
11. A. Downs, Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper and Brothers,
New York, 1957.
that; "Political parties in a democracy formulate policy strictly as 
a means of gaining votes. They do not seek to gain office in order to
carry out certain preconceived policies....rather they formulate policies
. . . „12
and serve interest groups m  order to g a m  office . Another key
variable is, therefore, the length of time between elections as non­
zero election periods afford Governments the opportunity to deviate from 
the electorates1 desired policy bundle. The election process is not, 
therefore, confined.to election day but involves the trading of present' 
and future (promised) policies in exchange for potential votes. If 
electoral preferences are relatively fixed on certain issues parties will 
tend to alter their policies to accommodate this view. On the other 
hand in cases where electoral preferences are "weak", policy suggestions 
of both parties will be ambiguous, in order not to deter any votes.
The Downs .approach appears,therefore,to offer a theoretical exposition of 
the methods by which policy prescriptions are adjusted to maximise votes 
for a particular party, within the context of a majority voting 
democracy, (see Chapter Two)..
1.62. The Energy Sector.
Given this theoretical background a general social welfare 
decision rule for the energy sector can be constructed which attempts 
to use Paretian analysis as a standard for comparing alternative 
welfare situations. This rule will contain an array of vectors which 
can be arranged by the Government or some authority to enact a 
prefered' energy policy. In the neo-Paretian case the Government is 
considered to be a benevolent institution acting as a "referee" in the 
energy/...
12. A. Downs, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy",
Journal of Political Economy, April 1957
energy market instantaneously and at zero-cost. The general form of 
the social welfare rule would be of the type,
SW = SW (AiVj) i = 1,_______ m.
where SW represents the social welfare decision rule, V£ the i ^  vector 
from a set, m, identified by authority to rank welfare. Ai represents 
the Government endorsed weightings to be attached to a particular 
variable V^. In consequence the form of the social welfare decision 
rule is essentially arbitrary since the value of the A^s and the selection 
of the V^s will vary from individual to individual.
A possible social welfare decision rule for the energy sector may 
accordingly be identified as follows. This listing does not attempt to 
represent an exhaustive study of all variables which could determine 
energy policy. The resulting form of the equation could be,
SW = SW (E, P, B, SS) 
in which E is a variable representing the level of employment in the 
energy sector and P is a variable representing the relative price ratios 
ranking in the energy market. To meet the requirements of Paretian 
-optimality prices-must be equated with marginal costs in all markets.
B is a factor describing movements in the balance of payments due to 
changes in imported fuel prices and SS is a variable indicating 
Government security of supply considerations designed to lower the cost 
of stock-outs. Other variables such as distribution of property 
rights or long-term research and development objectives could equally 
well be included in the function.
Using the Down’s approach a Government which seeks to maximise 
the quantity of electoral votes will have a prefere'd energy policy 
ranking that may have reference to elements both within and outside the 
energy/...
energy sec tot. For example, the desire on the Government’s part to keep 
employment relatively high in the energy sector may be related to 
political factors outwith the energy sector (see Chapter Two).
Similarly the elements in the decision rule may be correlated with one 
another. Pricing policies pursued by a Government with reference to 
the coal industry may have an objective of stabilising employment at 
some prefered level of contraction. This prefered rate may have its 
origin in some national, employment policy‘and might be contrary to the 
Paretian optimality conditions. In those situations in which the 
Government assigns the weights to the variable in the social welfare 
decision rule in order to maximise the quantity of electoral votes, 
the resulting energy policy is said to be Interventionist. An 
Interventionist market configuration can be a sufficient condition for 
meeting the Paretian optimality requirements although like perfect 
competition it is not a necessary condition. Similarly other market 
configurations exist which can satisfy the essential requirement that 
prices equate with marginal costs in all markets.. By considering 
..workable competition an alternative to the Interventionist social welfare 
decision rule can be constructed, although it is possible that an- 
Interventionist rule could coincide with a workable competition rule if 
that configuration ensured re-election.
1.7 The Concept of Workable Competition
13 ■-
Workable or effective competition is an attempt at extracting 
from the perfect market model those elements on the production, 
consumption and distribution sides which can be translated into "real" 
world economic frameworks and at the same time maintain the market’s 
essentially/...
13. J.M. Clark, "Towards a theory of Workable-Competition",
American Economic Review 1941.
essentially competitive characteristics.
The basic characteristic of workable competition is that no 
seller and no group of sellers acting in concert can have the power to 
choose its level of profits by giving less and charging more. Rival 
sellers, whether existing competitors or new or potential entrants 
into the field act as a counterweight to other sellers offering, or 
threatening to offer, effective inducements so long as the anticipated 
profits are sufficiently attractive in comparison with those in other 
employments, when all risks are taken into account. The result of 
this counterbalancing procedure would be to force the seller who 
sought to increase his profits above a given level by employing a high 
price/limited output monopoly policy either to give it up, or to lose 
ground to his rivals at a rate sufficient to reduce his profits, thus 
defeating his policy. In an effectively competitive market, the 
individual seller cannot control his rivals’ price and output plans and 
this places a boundary condition on his pricing and output decisions, 
since the feedback mechanism is strong. In the long-run he must accept 
market prices determined by changes in supply and demand beyond any 
effect which may be attributable to his own change in price or output. 
These market conditions inflict penalties on high costs or poor services 
To bring this result about, it is necessary that rivals be free in fact 
to compete by lower prices and better services or products and selling 
activities, if they can achieve low enough costs to enable them to do so 
and that no sellers have power to limit this freedom of their rivals and 
thus escape the pressures and penalties which effective competition 
imposes.
The market pressures which effective competition imposes upon
each/...
each seller derive from the self-interested rivalry of competitors.
The essential character of this rivalry is to promote the competitor’s 
economic interestAby offering buyers inducements attractive enough 
to cause them to deal with him, in free bargaining, and in the face 
of inducements offered by rivals. The inducements consist of 
quantity, quality, time and place of delivery, incidental services, 
selling effort and price. The chief enabling condition is efficient 
operation, and this provides that competition may be either aggressive 
or defensive depending on whether the aims are to increase or maintain 
one’s market share.
Competitive rivalry may or may not be capable of developing 
enough force to deny any one seller or group of sellers acting in 
concert effective power to control the price they will charge and other 
conditions of sale. Whether this condition is achieved normally 
depends on the character of the market. Active competition, for 
example, may involve initial moves by one competitor, the responses of 
the buyer and the further responses of rival sellers. In some cases, 
the distinction between effective and ineffective competition may depend 
in part upon the speed of these responses.
To meet the requirements of Paretian optimality workable 
competition must ensure that prices are equated with marginal costs.
Since market mechanisms are dynamic incorporating risk and uncertainty 
it is unlikely that this condition will be met. In order, therefore, 
to argue that workable competition acts in a direction to cause prices 
to adopt a one-to-one correspondence with marginal costs in all markets 
various tests for structure, performance and conduct have been evolved. 
These are listed in Appendix IV and critically appraised in Chapter Five. 
Essentially/...
Essentially the workable competition social welfare decision rule is 
weighted by a Government which attempts to simulate perfect competition.
The main characteristic of this simulation is that rivals are free to 
Compete with one another through self-interested rivalry. Market 
adjustment processes will not be instantaneous but will proceed by an 
iterative method in which buyers and sellers act as counterbalance; 
sellers being unable to control their rivals1 prices.
Given the Interventionist and workable competition social 
welfare decision rules the nationale for intervention in the energy 
market can be made explicit. In the case of the Interventionist 
social welfare decision rule, intervention is clearly designed to 
maximise the quantity of electoral votes. In the.case of workable 
competition the Government’s desire to simulate perfect competition 
involves the enactment of. tests of market structure, performance and 
conduct. Whilst these forms of intervention may or may not be 
conducive to moving the economy towards a Paretian optimum, Paretians 
identify four cases of market failure in which Government intervention 
will be endorsed; externalities, collective goods, monopolies and 
imperfections in information. In this context the Paretian assumptions 
are that Government are benevolent acting as a type of referee in the 
market place, instantaneously and at zero-cost. In the workable 
competition and interventionist cases the nature of Government intervention 
is less easily categorised. It is certainly not a zero-cost and 
instantaneous exercise to intervene in the energy market. The 
Interventionist may sanction a level of intervention greater or less than 
that encountered through workable competition. Moreover since the 
workable competition model endorses Government intervention to enact and . 
apply/...
apply various market tests, the Interventionist and workable 
competition frameworks may or may not endorse the level of intervention 
sanctioned by the Paretian to remove market failures.
1.8 Externalities
An external effect exists whenever due to the nature of the institution­
al framework costs are imposed on others which are only partially paid 
for, or benefits are bestowed on others for which only partial payment 
is received. External effects which arise in a production unit (e®g. a 
factory) and affect another factory ( e®g® a farm) are called producers’ 
externalities on producerso Similarly there are consumers’ 
externalities on consumers. Finally, it is possible to have producers’ 
externalities on consumers and consumers’ externalities on producers® 
Consider two individuals A  and B  who are part of a society, 
which has a population of Z® The commodities (x) and factors (v) which 
belong to A  are written as x ^ ,  v^. for a total population of n goods and 
m  factors® Good j is taken as the numeraire® For the individuals A  and 
B  let their utility functions be of the form:?-
UB V
U A  = M ? A i ’ VAj’ x Bk)
where i = 1.*.j®o,k®®,n 
] = 1*« • • ®m
This last equation is taken to illustrate the presence of an externality 
as it contains an element in A  ’ s equation which belongs to B  ’ s « However, 
assume that commodity x ^  is a course of operations research lessons 
that individual B  gives® Assume B  is employed as a teacher by individual 
A* Assume also that the utility of A. is favourably affected by then
A  \  }  0 forxBk = x Bk1
However, this condition does not automatically imply the existence of an
externality* Since B  works for A., let it be taken that A, a headmaster,
pays B  a bonus for undertaking the course of lessons® Then both
parties may gain from trading x ^  until the price for x^ that A. has to
pay has been equalised with the sum of the amounts per unit of
that A. and B  are willing to pay. Thus mutually beneficial trade occurs
until
5 U A  / ^ B k  + 3 u b  / 0 x Bk = c)T 
^ U A  / ^ xAj ^ U B  / ^ B j  <^T  /«>X j
Where XBk =. XBk2
and where T(X^, . ® * * V^® . ® ® ® • ® *V  ) = 0 is the economy I s ’
production frontier.
The factor on the right hand side of the equation, X. numeraire, shows
3 .
the marginal cost of X^ which under various market configurations, is equal 
to the market price of X^. The above equation therefore expresses a 
situation where the market price of X^ is equal to the sum of its direct 
marginal utility in money terms to B  and the marginal utility in money 
terms to A  of B ’s consumption of X^. This situation is reached because 
A  and B  are able to negotiate that A  should pay B  for the incidental 
benefit he derives from B ’s consumption of X^. Now, 
maX. U a(xA ., vA ., xBk)
for a fixed value of individual B, U_,(x„., vn .) = U„7 B v Bi* Bj' B o
and subject to
Th ere fo re ,
L  = UA ( XA i’ VA f  XBk} + X B  < UB < xB i’ vBj } ~ Vb ) 
+A i ^  XA i + xB i + xC i ) -  X i )
+TT /  (vAj + + vCj > - V j >
T (Xj. 0*o V  . « **ocV^ ) )
whence taking p a rtia l derivatives,
^ L / S xajj: = SuA/3 xAk + JULk = °
D l / 3 * Aj = 3 ua  /S^Aj +M j  = 0
^ L/5xBk =5UA / ^ xBk + X B S u ^ xBk +/A.k = 0
e) L  / 5 xBj. = ABc) V b / £ ) sb - +U. = 0 
= -jm.k H-'OST/OXk = 0 
t)L/<)X. = -JUL H-VdT/dX = 0
J J J ♦
whence,
t>uB /^xBk + ^UA /5xBk = = c)UA f  ^  xAk
^ V ^ B j  ^ UB &  xAj . Vr/DXj 5 UA f t xAj
From this it can be seen that despite the fact that
^ V ^ B k  >  0
the influence of on does not operate outside the market. In other
words, interdependence by itself does not constitute an externality
in our sense. If it is assumed that due to institutional and/or
technological reasons, A  and B  cannot enter into trade regarding
j- then individual B reaches his equilibrium in isolation for which 
Bk
X ™  = x^, and c)u * / 7) X ™  \  O. With individual B  having reached 
Bk Bk^ ■ A  ' v  Bk *
his equilibrium, then
e ) T / 3 x fc - d  u B / 5  ^ Bk = ° /  3 u a/^ x 
3 t / D x .  J u b / ^ b .
Bk
where x£k = x ^
Clearly the necessary condition for Pareto optimality is violated 
Thus a marginal external economy exists when,
^ U A / D *Bk \  0
^ V ^ xAj
for xBk = XBkx and XAj = xAj3 
and
14
c ) T / D x k - 5 u b /^)xBk = 0
forXBk = XBkx
14. For example see J* de V. Graff, Theoretical Welfare Economics 
Cambridge (1957)
P* Bohm, nSocial Efficiency”, Macmillan (1973)
U  . such that the utility of A is favourably affected by any 
change at the margin of BTs consumption of X^ and A does not make an 
appropriate payment to B for this. B. reaches his equilibrium by equa­
ting the market price of with only the marginal utility in money 
terms to himself of his consumption of it. If, however, A and B are
able to trade then there is no externality. The rationale for Govern­
ment intervention is suggested since a Pigovian subsidy immediately en­
ables a Paretian optimum to be reached. . However, this assumes not only 
the validity of the Paretian value-judgements but that the policy-maker
has some way of finding out the value of Q u ^ / ^ x ^ ) / ) for any
specific points of equilibrium, of A and B and that these values are 
x^k = an<* xaj = xAj * t^ iat case a subsidy S granted to indi­
vidual B for the consumption of X^, such that the marginal rate of subsidy
:at any point is aiways equal to the value of the marginal externatily for .
that point,, results -in an equilibrium, for B of
where <)s/SxT
^UA/^xBk
Bk ^ UA ^ xAj 
Similarly a marginal external diseconomy ., exists when
^ V ^ B k  < 0
5 d7/5A'JXBj
for *Bj = ^  and XA j = x Aj 
3i/0xk JuB/«)xBk
j" " D v 5 % j "“ d Sx/i)x. " 0uB/3xBi 0
£or = *Bj
The assumptions mentioned above are not the only restrictions 
on the analysis. Buchanan and Stubblebine^ have argued that the 
model is a partial one considering the producer of the externality 
only. By imposing a new fiscal regime to internalise the externality 
both the producer’s net benefit and the consumer’s net cost valuation 
curves are changed relative to the pre-tax situations. Essentially a 
Pigovian tax imposed by the Government to internalise an externality 
(assuming valuation of the benefit and cost curves), ’’breeds" another 
externality which is then passed iteratively from the producer to the 
consumer with convergence at infinity.
Shibata^ rejects the Buchanan and Stubblebine proposition post­
ulating that the imposition of a Pigovian tax does not alter the tech­
nical production possibility optima achieved under Paretian optimality. 
Shibata suggests that having imposed a tax to internalise the externa­
lity the receipts could then be recycled and given back to the producer 
thereby leaving undisturbed the initial institutional and fiscal frame­
work. In practice it is doubtful whether this could be performed for 
not only must subsidies to an individual exactly equal taxes paid, but 
it assumes that the externality can be clearly defined over time. With 
imperfect information, therefore, the Buchanan and Stubblebine thesis 
suggests that the movement towards Paretian optimality may be of a "cob­
web theorem" variety; iterations towards equilibrium will be increasing 
or decreasing functions depending on the Government’s taxes on producers 
(say) and consumers’ responsiveness to such changes.
15. J.M. Buchanan and W.C. Stubblebine, "Externality", Economica, 1962.
J.M. Buchanan and W.C. Stubblebine, "Pareto Optimality and the
. Gains-from^Trade: A Comment", Economica 1972.
16. H. Shibata, "Pareto Optimality, Trade and the Pigovian Tax", 
Economica 1972.
H. Shibata, "Pareto Optimality and Gains-from-Trade: A further 
Elucidation", Economica, 1974.
1.9 • Collective Goods
Paretians endorse Government intervention in the case of the 
provision of public or collective goods such as streets, lighthouses 
and T.V. transmissions. In the latter case, however, consumers have 
costs in receiving T.V. transmissions although not in using streets. As 
there are no costs involved in serving additional consumers Paretian 
welfare analysis requires that no price be charged for these goods or 
services. But with a zero-price and non-zero production costs output 
cannot be determined in the usual way by market demand and supply. Thus 
in a Paretian optimal position the volume of the public good is\ that vol­
ume for which the sum of the consumer valuations of a marginal increment 
is equal to the marginal cost of producing the good. Intervention by 
the neo-Faretian Government to provide this optimal volume requires that 
these valuations be accurately known. However, the problem remains as 
to determining the "true" demand for a public good. An individual con­
sumer asked how much he would be willing to pay for marginal changes in 
production may tend to answer with an exaggerated demand for the public 
good relative to his true demand if he understands that an increase in 
production will not cause him to pay any noticeable increases in taxes.
On the other hand, if the individual knows that he will really have to 
pay in accordance with his expected willingness to pay and moreover that 
he is one of a great many consumers, he knows that he has complete con­
trol over how much he himself will have to pay but that he has meagre 
possibilities of effecting the total demand. In this situation he may 
take advantage of the expressed willingness to pay. Thus a tendency to 
understate the "true11 willingness to pay for public goods would arise.
1.10 Monopolies
Consider a monopolistic situation in which factor inputs are used
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Diagram 2 .
Welfare implications of a monopolised industry.
as effectively as in an alternative market configuration identified 
either as workable competition or an interventionist framework. Let 
the underlying production function be the same for all three markets.
In this case Diagram 2 shows the market demand curve DDf for a product 
with marginal cost curves for both the monopolist and the alternative 
market structure given by C’C11. To meet the requirements of Paretian 
optimality the latter market needs to equate prices with marginal costs 
at an output OQ^ and a price OC^. A monopolist will, however, charge 
a price OP for output OQ2 , where OQ^>OQz. In consequence under a pro­
fit maximization assumption monopoly results in an unambiguous welfare 
loss of consumers1 surplus ABC by comparison with a market configuration 
equating prices with marginal costs given by C’C". Under the assump­
tion that the Government can place valuations on the respective curves, 
Paretians endorse Government intervention to meet the requirements of 
Paretian optimality,. The form of intervention is usually anti-trust 
legislation.
1.11 Imperfections in Information
The technical assumptions of Paretian optimality usually involve 
perfect information. However the recognition of uncertainty intro­
duces information as a good into the analysis. Two categories of im­
perfect information may be identified; imperfections regarding present 
and expected future prices and imprefections regarding the properties of 
a good, say, fuel. Let it be assumed that the costs of gathering and 
processing information are zero and that all imperfections of information 
refer to fuel B. Diagram 3 illustrates the case for the consumer who 
lacks information about the fact that fuel B is available at a lower price 
than he is actually paying. B^ represents the consumer’s budget line at 
the known price and B? the budget line if he had known the possibility of
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Diagram 3.
Diagram to illustrate effects of imperfect information
about present prices*
purchasing fuel B at the lower price. In the actual situation the 
consumer can reach the indifference curve 1  ^but with full information 
he would be able to reach I2 . The value of missing information is 
therefore shown by the difference between 1^ and 1 .^
• In the case where consumers information regarding the proper­
ties of fuel is imperfect Diagram 4 is useful. The indifference curves 
IQ, 1^ etc. refer to a case in which the consumer has exaggerated expec­
tations with respect to the quality of fuel B and therefore chooses point 
E on his budget line. But with perfect information his indifference 
curves would have been l0f, etc. and he might well have chosen a 
point such as F where the quantity of fuel B is zero. The consumer’s 
real loss due to lack of information in this case is shown by the differ­
ence between Iqt. and 1^' and the shift in the budget line to B' repre­
sents the maximum willingness to pay for additional information.
Paxetians will endorse Government intervention that removes im-
. ‘-perfections in information regarding prices and quality. Requirements
• *
that the fuel industries advertize price and quality characteristics may 
provide a method of doing this.
*
1.12 Cost-benefit analysis
The presence of market failure provides the Paretian with a nece­
ssary and sufficient condition for collective intervention. The Govern­
ment is viewed as an "efficient omniscient and impartial servant of the 
17public good" The nature of intervention, sanctioned by the Government,,
is decided by reference to cost-benefit criteria. Cost-benefit analysis 
is usually based on Paretian value-judgements, the declared objective 
being to increase society's welfare. The restrictive domain in which the 
Paretian value-judgements can sanction policy as a method for increasing
17. Rowley and Peacock, P.103, op.cit.
Diagram 4. Illustration of imperfect information about the
properties of a fuel
Fuel B
F
Fuel A
welfare has already been discussed. The Hicks-Kaldor principle has 
to be used since a neo-Paretian social welfare decision rule, defined
by some individual or group, is needed to allow the neo-Paretian to
rank alternative preference states. The Paretian may go further than 
using an ordinal marking method through postulating that prices partly 
reflect individual intensities. This approach, implies that problems 
regarding valuations of costs and benefits will arise. The distinction 
between intensity and utility does not prevent practioneers of cost- 
benefit analysis assuming that preferences should be weighted by market- 
-power; viz. prices. This assumes that the distribution of property 
rights is optimal in terms of some imposed social welfare decision rule.
Consider the situation in which an individual pays price Py for 
a commodity. Let this be taken to imply a willingness to pay that price 
because otherwise he would have gone without the commodity. At the mar­
gin this willingness to pay provides a benefit such that present benefit = 
willingness to pay = price. In particular the following is stated;
xPxy => Ux (x) > (y)
=>  WTPx(x) > WTP1 (y)
where U(x) equals the utility derived from x and WTP equals willingness 
to pay. Adding up the WTPs is assumed to give the same result as adding 
up preferences exhibited by individuals. Consider then, Diagram 5, in 
which equilibrium occurs at the price-quantity position (P,Q) and PnQ" is 
a downward sloping demand curve. -At (F,Q) consumers pay out an amount 
PDQO for the good. This is their effective payment which is to be disti­
nguished clearly from their willingness to pay for quantity Q of the good. 
The willingness to pay is given by PDQO + P"PD being known as consumers1 
surplus; implying that at higher prices some consumers would have been pre 
pared to pay for the commodity. Now the effect of an investment project is 
to alter the amount of the commodity already in existence. A change in
Diagram 5. Evaluation of Benefits
willingness to pay will occur. Benefits are computed as the
willingness to pay for the increment dQ. Let the change be
O Q ' D ’P" - O Q D P "  = Q Q ’D'D
= change in Q  x new price + E D 1D
dW T P  = d Q . P ' + idPdQ
under the assumption that the demand curve is linear .
d W T P  = dQ ( P* + P - P ’)
■ 2
= dQ (P  + P' )
2 ;
If P = P ' then
d W T P  = dQ2P/2 = dQ.P 
which implies that the ruling market price is an appropriate indicator 
of the willingness to pay per unit of output.
The other concern is the valuation of costs. For every 
expenditure project there is an associated opportunity cost and the 
willingness to pay for a foregone project is equal to the money cost 
-o f 4he chosen -project. Thus net benefits equal 
b.p - c
where b= physical benefit, p= product price and c= the costs of 
supplying the project. Putting all the costs and benefits together 
one can say that the net benefit B(x) of a project x is as follows, 
n
net B(x) = 7 "  ( B (x) - C (x) ) dt
t=0 1
However before becoming too sanguine about cost-benefit analysis it 
is necessary to consider some reasons for supposing that the price 
of the resources used in the chosen project will be an inadequate
guide to the true opportunity cost of the project . There are two such 
reasons:
a) Resource prices may rise because of the transfer of 
resources from one sector to the sector in which the project is to 
take place. Below demand and supply curves are shown for the 
foregone project W.
Diagram 6 . Resource prices and transfers.
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Let investment raise the supply curve from SS to S fS ’. This implies 
that the total loss of willingness to pay on project W  is given by the 
shaded area EFBD. This area represents the proper valuation of 
the opportunity cost of the chosen project. In practice, market prices 
for resources entail a valuation equal to E F B G  such that there is a bias 
equal to D H B  (lost consumers surplus) and H B G  (lost producers surplus).
b) Resources may come from sectors which have imperfectly 
competitive product markets or have imperfectly competitive resource 
markets. The relevant diagram is shown overleaf.
Diagram 7. Imperfectly Competitive Resource and Product Markets.
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The loss in willingness to pay is shown by the shaded area. Usual 
valauation, however, based on market prices of resources would compute 
only the area QfQCD. Thus the "true" willingness to pay is understated 
by DCP*P, which is made up of BCD (the bidding up of resources prices 
effect) and BCPP* (the effect of withdrawing resources from an imper­
fectly competitive situation).
At this stage the introduction of shadow prices is possible.
Given that resources are limited, the use of those resources in one pro­
ject will entail an opportunity cost. The ratio of the two WTPs for 
these alternative uses is given the term shadow price. The shadow price 
can be thought of as the marginal rate of substitution between the outputs 
in question. The shadow price reflects the trade-off between the two 
projects. Shadow prices are not necessarily observed and the precise 
value of the shadow price will depend upon what is being maximised. The 
^shadow prices implicit in Paretian optimality are derived in Appendix^ I.
1.13 The Theory of Protection
Having appraised the Paretian theoretical framework and drawn a 
distinction between an interventionist and workable competition market 
configuration, an applied analysis of the energy sector can be considered. 
Since this will primarily concern the protection of the coal industry a 
brief review of the theory of protection is presented.
Consider an energy market in which there is only one fuel, coal, 
"which is homogeneous. Moreover it is assumed that not only is the home 
coal industry perfectly competitive and vertically integrated but also 
the elasticity of foreign supply of coal is infinite and the elasticity 
of foreign demand for coal is infinite.
Diagram 8. Protection in a One Fuel Energy Market
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On the diagram above the supply curve of inputs is given by S S  *.
O S  represents the free trade price of coal for a given exchange rate. 
The supply curve of domestic produced coal is given by H H ’ . The 
domestic demand curve for coal is D D  ’ and is taken to represent 
the demand for imports of coal and domestic production of coal 
combined. O Q  is therefore the free trade domestic production of 
coal and O Q ” the free trade domestic consumption of coal. It is 
assumed that when the price of domestic coal is identical to the price 
of imported coal, the consumer first takes up all domestic production 
at that price, imports of coal being the residual.
A  tariff at the rate S T / O S  is now imposed and this raises the 
price received by domestic producers and paid by domestic consumers 
from O S  to O.T. The domestic output of coal thus rises to O Q 1 but 
consumption of coal is reduced and imports of coal are reduced Q ’Q ” '. 
The value of imports of coal falls by Q C D Q ’ and Q ^ ’E F Q ”. Five 
effects of the tariff are distinguishable. The production or 
protection effect raises domestic output by Q Q ’; . the consumption 
effect is illustrated by a fall in consumption of Q WQ ” 1. The summation 
of these two effects is termed the import or balance of payments effect 
as imports fall by the value of the 'summation. Customs revenue is 
raised by the area BGDE. Finally there is a redistribution of income 
effect, since the price to domestic producers has risen at the expense 
of domestic consumers. For the domestic output O Q  this redistribution 
is given by STAC. The message which comes through here is that the 
consumer is in fact subsidising output of the home coal industry by S T  
per unit. The total subsidy is STBD. If there had been no tariff but 
instead output of coal had been subsidised directly from the Government
in an amount designed to produce the same degree of protection, then 
the cost of the subsidy would be an amount equal to STBD* But the 
consumer also has another price to pay; he is taxed to yield the 
customs revenue. The consumer tax equivalent here is the area 
S E G T  and thus it can be said that the tariff S T/OS has the same 
effect as a consumer tax ST/OS. Of course the presence of 
subsidies and taxes means that the same degree of protection could 
be-achieved by using either a production subsidy or a consumption tax. 
A  production subsidy per unit of coal output would shift the domestic 
producer’s supply curve downwards. If the subsidy is designed to 
protect to the same degree as the tariff it will raise output to O Q  ’; 
the cost of the subsidy will be S T A C  and the price of coal to the 
consumers will remain at OS. There will be no consumption effect 
and thus the resulting import effect will be less. In the case of a 
consumption tax the demand curve will shift to the left to dd1. If 
it is designed to have the same consumption effect as the tariff it 
-will reduce consumption to OQ" ’ and raise revenue of STEG. The 
price to consumers will be OS, there being no production effect. 
Imports will be squeezed from the consumption side only.
In the real world foreign elasticities are not infinite and thus 
these restrictions must be removed. Consider the following diagram 
as an example of such:-
Diagram 9. Protection with finite Elasticities.
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The foreign supply curve of imported coal is given by S S  ’ and the 
domestic demand for imports is N N 1. This curve is derived at 
each price by subtracting the domestic supply of importable coal 
(see H H T in previous figure) from the domestic demand for importable 
coal (DDT), the demand for imports of coal being the residual. Let 
a tariff P L / O P  be imposed, the tariff-inclusive foreign supply curve 
being T T ’. Before the foreign duty-free price falls, the tariff 
raises the domestic duty-inclusive price to OZ. But the quantity of 
imported coal is reduced resulting from the higher domestic price. 
This causes the foreign price and hence the duty-inclusive price to 
fall. A  new equilibrium is reached at a duty-free foreign price OW; 
a duty-inclusive domestic price of O V  (V/V/OW = PL/OP) and an 
import quantity of OQ. The fall in foreign price implies a terms of 
trade improvement assuming all other prices remain constant. 
Compared with figure (8) the same protection rate yields a lesser rise 
domestic price and hence lesser domestic production, consumption and
redistribution effects and a smaller fall in quantity of imports.
Similar analysis to that above can determine the effects of tariff 
imposition on any pair of foreign elasticity curves.
• Lettus now move from the partial equilibrium model to a simple general 
equilibrium model. In this analysis two fuels are considered; coal 
and oil. It is assumed that both these fuels are consumed in the 
economy. Moreover oil is made an importable good and coal an 
exportable good. There is full employment of factors of production 
and from the two production functions is obtained a production- 
possibility curve. This is shown as H H ’ overleaf. The country 
is also assumed to face a given world price ratio represented by the 
slope of S S  ’. Free-trade production occurs at P  such that there is 
production of both fuels. Now assume that the overall pattern of 
consumption depends only on relative prices and total real income, 
then O Z  is the income-consumption line associated with the price ratio 
given by the slope of S S  ’. At that price ratio consumption has to be 
somewhere on OZ. Given production at P  and price ratio S S  1, income 
is O S  in terms of oil imports and O S  ’ in terms of coal exports. Given 
this income, consumption must be at C: the intersection of SS* and OZ. 
Free-trade production of coal is greater than free-trade consumption 
of coal by BP, while consumption of oil exceeds production of oil by 
BC, the excess being imports.
Diagram 10. General Equilibrium Model for Protection.
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The imposition of a tariff raises the domestic price of oil 
relative to that of coal. The new tariff-distorted domestic price 
ratio is indicated by the slope of G G  ’. The new production point is 
P f* The movement from P to P f is the production effect of the tariff. 
The tariff also raises to the same extent the relative domestic price 
of oil facing consumers and so induces the consumption pattern to shift 
awav from oil towards coal. The income-consumption line appropriate 
to the new domestic price ratio is O Z  1 . The movement from one income
consumption line to another represents the consumption effect. But 
the new domestic price ratio and the new production point mean that 
income appears to be OG in terms of oil and 0Gf in terms of coal, so 
that consumption would appear to be at C*. This is true if the revenue 
obtained from the tariff if kept by the Government. But if it is re­
turned to the consumers and they spend it consumers will move up OZ1 
from C*. The actual consumption point becomes CT. Effectively with 
production at P 1, the trade possibilities are given by the world price 
ratio, implying that the country can trade anywhere along JPfJT. But 
the new tariff distorted domestic price ratio has determined that the 
consumption point must be on 0Zf, which implies that actual consumption 
C1 is reached at the intersection of JPTJf with OZ*. The smaller tra­
ding triangle is the result. Notice that C* and C differ in two re­
spects. First, they are on different income-consumption lines, this 
being the result of the consumption-substitution effect and secondly,
CT is at a lower level of income. This is the result of the production- 
substitution effect of the tariff.
Summary
This Chapter considers a possible theoretical foundation for 
energy policy. The Paretian value-judgements and technical assumptions 
are critically appraised and the conditions for Paretian optimality 
reviewed. Problems regarding interpersonal comparisons and piecemeal 
changes in welfare are considered. It is noted that the Paretian op­
timality conditions can be met by a variety of market adjustment proces­
ses; although the problem still has to be faced as to how alternative 
welfare positions are to be ranked. An attempt is made to achieve this 
by considering a generalized social welfare decision rule for the energy 
sector and suggesting that the weights applied to the variables will de­
pend on the concept of Government embodied in the form of market config­
uration under consideration. Accordingly two market adjustment proces­
ses are considered; the Interventionist market in which the Government 
constructs a rule to maximise electoral votes and a workable competition 
framework which seeks to simulate perfect competition through the Govern­
ment enacting various market tests. Under the assumption that both forms 
of Government wish to meet the conditions for Paretian optimality, Govern­
ment intervention may be rationalised to remove four categories of market 
failure. These are considered and the problems regarding valuation and 
distribution of property rights noted.
The method of evaluating the costs and benefits of Government 
intervention, under Paretian assumptions, is considered as is a review of 
the theory of protection.
Appendix I
Derivation of shadow prices implicit in Pareto optimality.
In chapter one it was seen that the conditions necessary and 
sufficient for a Pareto optimum are:
1. M U  . / M U  .= M U  J  M U  0 = ____= M U  / M U  = M R Sxl yl x2' y2 xn7 yn
2. M P P  './ M P P  . = M P P  ./MPP ,= ....= M P P  ./M P P  .xi' xj yi7 yj zi7 zj
3. MRS, = M R S «  =  M R S  = M R T1 2 n
The notation is as in chapter one. /
For any firm,
M C  = W  / M P P  , = R  / M P P  where l=i aiid k=jx x7 xl x xk °
M C  is taken as the marginal cost of producing x, W  is the wage
in industry x and R^ is the rate of interest peculiar to industry x.
Rearranging this expression gives;
M P P  , = W  / M C  *xl X7 X 
For a consumer in equilibrium 
= V J  Pyl
whence
P 1/ P .  = P , / P ,  = W . . M C / W M C  ____ (i)xl7 yl x27 y2 y x7 x y . ■
having utilised the expression MRS^= M R S 2 . (i) is an expression
where P  and P  are the shadow prices of y and x respectively.
y  x
If price discrimination is not practised the prices to 1 and 2 of the
same goods must be the same and thus
P  / P  « M C  / M C  
x7 y x7 y _
Optimality thus requires that product prices be proportional to
their marginal costs. A stricter result is obtained if factor
supplies are allowed to vary. Consider leisure time. Here the
M R S  between leisure and the goods which would otherwise be
obtained by working must be equal to the M R T  between leisure and
x. Thus MRS, = MRT, where t= leisure. t,x t,x
Now M R T  must be the output which Would be produced if the timev j X
spent in leisure was used for working and so; 
dx/dt = M P P xl
Also M R S  will‘be equal to the ratio of prices. The price of
I j X
leisure is simply the wage rate foregone W . Thus 
W  / P  = M P P  , - W  / M C
X7 X  . xl X7 X -
Whence
P  = M C
x  • X . . •'
If the proper shadow price of final goods is equal to their marginal 
cost, then the shadow price of inputs can be derived.
M C  = W  / M P P  ,
, X X7 xl •
but P  = M C  so that
X X
W = P M P P  . = V M P  V 
X  x xl xl
The shadow price for labour is therefore equal to the price of the
product multiplied by the marginal physical product of labour,
which is termed the value of the marginal physical product.
Appendix II
The General Theory of Second Best.
Consider some function F(x. , ... .X ) which is to be maximised
1 n7
(minimised) subject to the constraint, 0 (x^  ,... .x^) = 0.
The conditions for a Pareto optimum are obtained from the first- 
order conditions derived from the following expression;
F. — a 0. = 0
i ri
where a is the Lagrangean multiplier. Eliminating a gives
(F i / F n ) - ( 0 i / 0 n ) = ° ...(i)
In order to prevent the attainment of at least one of the Pareto
conditions, equation (i) requires the imposition of a constraint
such that,
(F./ F n ) - k (0. / 0n ) - o k ^  1 ...... (a)
Thus we have to maximise (minimise);
F - a ' 0  - b
where )#is expression (ii). Also assuming that k is constant 
yields the new first-order conditions,
F i - a'0. - b ( F nF u  - F iF ni - k .  0n0u -0i0ni)- °
F 2 0 2n rn
which may be written as
(F -/F  ) = k. (0. / 0 ).■ i7 n7 l v/i 7 rn 7
The implication of this is that if an additional constraint is imposed 
of the type (Fj/Fj - (0-/0 ) 4- 0, then the maximum (minimum) of
F  subject to 0 and (F^ /F )-(0./0nJ £ 0 will in general be such that 
none of the still attainable Pareto conditions (F./ F ) - (0. /  0 ) = 0l n i n
will be satisfied.
Appendix III
Arrow1s Social Welfare Function
Arrow defines a social welfare function as a collective choice rule 
for deriving a social ordering from individual orderings. Specifi­
cally, a social welfare function will be taken to mean a process or 
rule, for each set of individual orderings R^.....Rn for alternative 
social states (one ordering for each individual) states a corresponding 
social ordering of alternative social states, R. Arrow’s axioms are 
as follows:
a) Given any three alternatives, no matter what the individual
orderings of these alternatives are, the social welfare function must 
give rise to a connected and transitive social ordering.
b) It is assumed that the social welfare function is such that the
social orderings respond positively to alterations in individual values, 
or at least not negatively. Hence if one alternative social state rises 
or remains still in the ordering of every individual without any other 
change in those orderings, it is expected to rise or at least not to fall 
in the social ordering. -
c) It is required of the social welfare function that the choice made
by society from a given environment depend only on the orderings of indi­
viduals among the alternatives in that environment.
d) It is assumed that any ranking of preferences is not imposed
independently of the preference of the*members of society.
e) It is required that the social welfare function is not to be
dictatorial, in the sense that dictatorship means that social choices are 
to be based solely on the preferences of one man.
Appendix IV
The Attorney-GeneralT s tests for Workable Competition.
Tests of performance:-
1) The physical volume of sales should be the quantities 
that consumers demand at prices which generate no continuing 
excess demand or inventory accumulation.
2) Ratios of economic profits to invested assets should 
reflect enterprises ’ risks.
3) Opportunities to reduce costs and improve on products 
should be exploited.
4 ) Sales promotion should have the quantity and quality that 
-a responsible consumers T group would choose in order to inform or 
otherwise benefit customers.
5) In—attention to uncompensated social costs and benefits 
should not significantly distort allocation or distribution, or create 
serious unnecessary costs.
6) Producers should be effective in the discovery, extraction 
and consumption of exhaustible natural resources.
, 7) Labour-management relations should not be characterised
by ill-will, frequent shutdowns, exploitation or wage increases to the 
neglect of price reductions.
8) Management should have sufficient incentive to strive for 
the most profitable long-term return on equity.
9) Concentrated economic and financial power should have 
positive justification and protection should exist against its abuse.
Tests of Conduct:-
1) Enterprises should not employ against actual or potential 
competitors tactics such as fraud, malicious interference or legal 
harassment.
2) All forms of collaboration should occur among and between
suppliers, customers, and others which promote their or others'
welfare.
3) Minimum and maximum prices at which buyers may resell 
should not be more than suggested.
4) There should be no economic discrimination.
5) Methods of determining terms of sales should be the ones 
most convenient and conducive to favourable performance in the 
market.
6) Profit seeking and aggressiveness in rivalry and bargaining 
should be stronger or weaker than they are if this would tend to 
improve performance.
7) Unless greater or lesser price flexibility has positive 
justification, sellers should disregard insignificant changes in demand 
and cost conditions, but respond to fundamental changes with conclusive 
revisions in their charges.
8) Companies should partly or wholly combine or dissolve 
when such is to their owners’ advantage, but only if this does not change 
the structure of any market in contravention of the norms for concentration, 
integration, diversification or condition of entry.
Tests of Structure:-
1) Entry should be easier or harder than it is if more or less 
actual and potential entry would tend in the net to improve performance.
2) Standardisation, grading and informative labelling should 
be employed or altered if such would tend to improve selection, reward 
quality and reduce costs of production.
3) Informatipn, research, and other services by government 
should be altered if such would fairly and feasibly tend to improve 
performance.
Taken from The Report of the Attorney General*s National Committee 
to Study Anti-Laws, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955,
Chapter Seven. - - -
CHAPTER TWO
FUEL POLICY IN PRACTICE
2.1. Introduction
Chapter One differentiated between Interventionist and workable 
competition energy policies through the form of the Government social 
welfare decision rule imposed on the energy sector. In the case of 
the Interventionist rule the Government’s objective is taken to be to 
secure the maximum number of electoral votes. The workable competition 
framework invokes the concept of a Government attempting to simulate per­
fect competition by enacting various market tests and consequential leg­
islation. Both market configurations can be sufficient to meet the 
Paretian optimality criteria although it is possible that Government 
inspired intervention may provide a form of the social welfare decision 
rule that will transgress the requirements of Paretian optimality. In 
this case the objectives of interventionist and workable competition Gov­
ernment may or may not endorse intervention to remove the four cases of 
market failure identified in the Paretian analysis. Whilst the inter­
ventionist will always consider the electoral vote implications of inter­
vention, workable competition in attempting to simulate perfect competition 
will tend to place greater emphasis on adapting to changing trends in fuel 
price relatives. With this in mind, Chapter Two considers the institu­
tional framework of the energy sector; the relative price movements with­
in that sector since the war and the Interventionist’s response to those 
changes. Finally the rationale for intervention is discussed in terms 
of Breton’s Economic Theory of Representative Government.
2.2, Nationalisation of the Fuel Industries
The Sankey Commission first discussed nationalisation of the coal
industry in 1919, following a period of Government control during the 
1914-18 war, but was divided over the issue. . The Samuel Commission 
reported on the subject again in 1925 and although its recommendations 
fell short of nationalization, the 1926 Mining Industry Act permitted 
the State to acquire the mineral rights to coal. The Second World War 
precipitated further intervention by the Government in order to remedy 
the shortage of coal which developed in the winter of 1941-42. The 
1942 White Paper on coal declared: . "the Government have decided to 
assume full control over the operation of the mines, and to organise the 
industry on the basis of the national service, with the intention that 
the organisation now to be established will continue pending a final de­
cision by Parliament on the future of the industry."V Accordingly in 
1945 the Reid Committee reported to the Government on the technical effi­
ciency of the industry and whilst recommending that the industry be amal­
gamated into units of larger size, it steered clear of giving any opinion 
regarding nationalization.
. 2On the Labour Party coming to power after the war the Government
3 . . •
decided to enact the Party Manifesto which called for nationalisation of 
the coal industry. "Amalgamation under public ownership will bring great 
economies in general and make it possible to modernize production methods 
and to raise safety standards in every colliery in the country." Tradi­
tionally, social and political ties between the mining communities and the 
Labour Party are strong with many Labour M.P.s being sponsored by various 
mining areas (see 2.7 and Chapter Five). Indeed the union approach to
1. Cmnd. 6364, 1942.
2. N. Chester, The Nationalisation of British Industry 1946-51, HMSO.
3. Let us face the Future Together: A Declaration of Labour Policy
for the Consideration of the Nation, 1945.
nationalisation was made clear at the 1929 Annual Labour Conference 
where the view was expressed that an institutional framework was required 
that would "secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits 
of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may 
be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of
production, distribution, and exchange and the best obtainable system
.  .  .  4
of popular administration and control of each industry or service".
Although many years had been spent in discussing the possibility 
of nationalising the mines no draft plans were available. In order, 
therefore, to meet its Manifesto commitment, the Government decided to 
pass a Coal Nationalisation Bill through the House during the First Sess­
ion of Parliament. This meant that the necessary documentation had to 
be raised in under four months. In turn this led to "minor" details 
being disregarded from the draft Bill and it was apparent during the 
second reading of the Bill that the contents were ill-thought out, (e.g. 
•."General policy will, of course, be decided by the Board but administration 
must be based on the individual pit, group of pits and regions yet to be 
defined") .’* Inexactitudes, were also apparent in the financial provisions .
that were laid down. For example, "the revenues of the Board shall be
;
not less than sufficient for meeting all their outgoings properly charge­
able to revenue account on an average of good and bad years".** In conse­
quence it was not the case that the Boards were to make a stated surplus 
or rate of profit. A statutory limit on borrowing of £160 million over 
a five year period was envisaged. Any variation of this limit would need 
to be sanctioned by Parliament.
With regard to gas aiid electricity the 1945 Labour Party Manifesto
4. Clause IV, Section 4, Annual Labour Conference, 1929
5. 418, HC Deb., col. 714.
6 . Re. 5.
stated that ’’public ownership will lower charges, prevent competitive 
waste, open the way for co-ordinated research and development and lead 
to the reforming of uneconomic areas of distribution".^ By that date, 
however, substantial parts of the electricity and gas supply were al­
ready in public ownership. In 1944, for example, nearly 37% of gas 
sales were made by Local Authorities, and they employed 60% of electri­
city industry workers. Moreover, both industries operated under powers 
conferred by statute and were subject to certain obligations and con­
trols. Since 1926 control of electricity generation had been vested 
in the Central Electricity Board. The Act had also set up the nation­
al grid. The generating stations were under the control of the Board 
although each station was owned either privately or by Local Authorities. 
The 1936 McGowan Committee on Electricity Distribution suggested either 
reorganisation on a regional basis under public control or larger units 
"absorbing smaller and less efficient undertakings". The Committee 
rejected the public control alternative because of the "progressive and
enterprising policy shown by many of the undertakings over the previous
9 . .
ten years". The gas industry following the report of the Heyworth
Committee^ adopted the public control option with Regional Boards ac­
quiring all the undertakings in their areas.
The institutional framework adopted for electricity in 1946 
evolved, mainly, from a two-person debate. The Lord President Herbert 
Morrison, declared that the "fundamental purpose of nationalization was 
to secure greater efficiency in the industry"^ and suggested a single
7. Re. 3.
8 . McGowan Report, 1938.
9. Re. 2.
10. Cmnd. 6699, 1945.
11. Re. 2.
national authority for both generation and distribution. The Minister 
of Fuel and Power and his advisers on the other.hand wanted to set up 
autonomous Area Boards for distribution. In many respects the Bill 
that reached Parliament was a compromise solution involving a Central 
Authority with control of generation but not distribution. The Area 
Boards were subordinated to the Central Authority by the financial arr­
angements which gave the Central Authority "general control over tar­
iffs to be charged by the Area Boards and their programmes of expenditure, 
and the creation and management of their reserves and, within limits,
over the application of such reserves and the disposal of surplus re-„ 12 serves .
The structure adopted for the gas industry was based on the Hey-
worth Committee’s recommendation of ten area Boards but with no central
authority. Of note in the drafting stages of the Bill was the change
in the person responsible for fuel and Power from Mr. Shinwell to Mr.
Gaitskell, the latter preferring centralisation less than the former.
In the end twelve Area Boards were set up with boundaries akin to the
electricity industry. Concern was voiced in Parliament regarding the
lack of centralisation in the industry, since this was considered to put
the gas industry in a weaker bargaining position than coal or electricity.
However, the terms of reference of the central body were settled as "main-
13
ly advisory and federal in character".
Essentially the period of nationalisation of the fuel industries 
was characterised by four points. First the Labour Government, with 
its strong pre-coal mining lobby, decided to enact its Manifesto commit­
ment as soon as possible after taking Office. This leads to the second
12. Re. 2 p.426.
13. Second Reading, Nationalisation of Gas Act.
point that the Nationalisation Act was rushed through the drafting 
stages. In consequence a third point may be raised suggesting that 
the form of nationalisation decided for the coal industry constrained 
the form of the gas and electricity Bills. It is also apparent that 
the personal view of the Minister for Fuel and Power played a vital 
part in the form of the institutional framework eventually adopted.
2.3. Phase I. 1947-58/59 •
The period from nationalisation of the coal, gas and electri­
city industries until 1958/59 was characterised by a price ratio in
favour of coal (Table 1). Using the growth of total energy supply as
14a proxy for the growth of total energy demand, Table 2 illustrates 
the rise from 203 mtce in 1947 to over 250 mtce in the late 1950s.
Coal consumption increased rapidly after the war but levelled out to 
about 215 mtce during the years 1954-57. During the equivalent per­
iod the market share of coal in total inland fuel consumption declined 
from nearly 91% to approximately 80% as competition from petroleum ! 
grew. In 1947 petroleum constituted 18 mtce of total inland fuel con­
sumption whilst in 1958 the figure was 47 mtce. Besides the relative ( ■
price shift in favour of oil during the later part of the period the
decline in coal demand was also precipitated'in part by the introduction
15 ■
of smokeless zones,"the recognition of the inefficiency of traditional
fires, the gradual disappearance of the steam engine and the replacement
of rail by road transport".^ Moreover, the coal industry had a poor
image and certain non-price factors such as cleanliness, ease of storage,
14. A. Koutsoyiannis, Theory of Econometrics, Chapter 15 on Identifi­
cation. Macmillan, 1973.
15. Clean Air Act, 1957.
16. K. Allen, The Nationalised Fuel Industries, HEB, 1973.
Table 1. Relative Prices of Coal and Fuel Oil as Used by Industry
During Phase I0
Coal: Fuel Oil
1954 0.75
1955 0.78
1956 0.73
1957 0.75
1958 0.95
1959 1.04
Source:- Compiled from various copies of the Energy Digest, H M S O
Notes 1. A  conversion factor of 1 .7 tons of coal to every 1 .0 ton 
of fuel oil is used. This conversion factor covers all 
grades of fuel oil and is thus an average factor.
The relative price ratios listed are therefore to be 
considered in relation to each other and not individually.
2* These figures relate to the idealised coal equivalent 
tonnage before burning takes place. They do not 
account for the various efficiencies of burning machinery 
experienced in practice. See C. J. Timms, "The 
efficiency of fuel use and the price elasticity of demand 
for energy; an econometric investigation", (forthcoming).
Table 2• Inland Fuel Consumption for the UoK« (Phase i)
Year Coal Petroleum Nat.Gas Nuclear Hydro Total
Million tons 
Total (Tern
1947 ■184.5 18.0 - - 0©7 203.2 203.2
1948 193.9 18«7 - : 0©9 213.5 215.0
1949 195.8 19.9 - - 0©8 216*5 220.4
1950 202.6 22©2 -• 0©9 225.7 225.3
1951 207©8 24© 8 - - ■ 1©0 233.6 232.8
1952 206.8 25*7 - - ■1.0" 233.5 232.2
1953 207© 8 27© 8 - - ■1.0 236.6 238.7
1954 213.8 30 ©9 - - 1 ©3 246.0 245.1
19 55 21 5«2 34© 5 - 1 ©0 250.7 249.8
1956 217© 5 37© 5 - - 1 ©3 256.3 253.5
1957 212.9 36©7 - 0©2 1 ©5 251.3 254.0
1958 202.4 47 ©2 0.1 ■0.1.' 1.5 251.3 251.3
1959 189*4 56.1 0.1 0©5 1 ©5 247*6 252.1
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest, H MSO©
Table 3. Inland Energy Consumption, Share of Total Energy
Consumption (^ ) Phase I
Year Coal Petroleum Nat. Gas Nuclear
1947 90.8 8.9 - •
1948 90.8 8.8 ■ - . * -
1949 90.4 9.2 - . ■ -
1950 89.8 9.8 - -
1951 89.0 .10.6 - -
1952 88.6 11.0 -
1953 * 87.8 11.8 - -
1954 86.9 12.6 -
1955 85.8 - 13.8 ; - - - :
1956 84.9 . 14.6 - . .
1957 84.7 . 14.6 - . Oarl
1958 80.5 18.7 0.1 0.1
1959 76.5 22.6 0.1 0.2
Hydro . 
0.3 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
0*5 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6
Source: Various copies of the' Energy Digest, H M S O
handling etc. counted against coal.
Postwar demand for energy could not be fully met by coal output,
and in 1950 the N.C.B. published its "Plan for Coal"^ which envisaged
a £635 million programme of capital investment over the period 1950-65
and output of 24 million tons by 1965. The lead time required to enact
this programme prompted the Government to take what it considered to be
a short-term measure to increase oil imports. In addition, a programme
to convert seventeen power stations, completed or under construction, to
oil or dual-firing was announced in 1954. In consequence the buildup
of oil consumption in the U.K. accelerated in 1957/58 following a period
in which petroleum consumption had increased by approximately 2-3 mtce
a year during the previous five years. This was in spite of the short-
run interruption of petroleum supplies in 1956 during the Suez affair.
Indeed the Suez crisis prompted the. Government to concern itself with
long-run energy supplies and it hurriedly upgraded the First Nuclear
Power Programme from a planned installed capacity of 1500-2000 Mw to
5000-6000 Mw by 1965.
The First Nuclear Power Programme was itself a response to the 
18so-called "energy-gap" of 1954 when nuclear power was planned to pro­
vide a long-run energy complement to indigenous energy supplies. Dev-
19elopment of new reactor systems lay with the Atomic Energy Authority 
who had the monopoly of making the fuel necessary for reactors. At the 
time of drawing up the first Nuclear Power Programme the C.E.G.B. were
17. Plan for Coal, N.C.B., October 1950.
18. See: A,Fuel Policy for Britain, PEP Report 1965.
K.L. Stretch, A Power Policy for Britain (Ernest Benn) 1961. 
E.S. Simpson, Coal and Power Industries in Post-war Britain, 
1966.
19. D. Burn, The Political Economy of Nuclear Energy, IEA, 1967.
not.consulted but they would have preferred a smaller programme than the 
one announced in 1957. Speaking for the C.E.G.B. Lord Hinton stated that 
"it is a mistake in policy for a research organisation to launch out 
into expensive prototype work without taking their main potential users 
with them".^ The Government’s answer to this was that authority should 
lie with those who "know", in this case the A.E.A. "If the Authority 
did not exercise a strong central guidance and control the limited resour­
ces of the nation could ea.sily be dissipated".
For the period 1954-57 the relative price of coal to oil remain­
ed steady at approximately 0.75. Relative fuel prices shifted towards 
petroleum in 1958 following a period (as shown in Table 4) in which world 
oil production rose rapidly as a result of the large oil fields in Saudi 
Arabia and the neighbouring Middle Eastern countries coming on stream.
This large increase in production led to the oil companies offering un-
. . . 21official discounts and price cuts on their refined products. Although
. 22
posted prices do not reflect the actual prices paid for petroleum the
general trend in the late 1950s was for posted prices to fall. This
reflects partly the large supplies of oil coming onto the market from 
the oil fields in Saudi Arabia and Libya but more importantly the deci­
sion of the U.S. Government to impose voluntary import controls on oil 
in 1957 and making these compulsory in 1959. The removal of such a 
large market from the energy arena led to the advent of "cheap oil". For 
the U.K. this occurred at a time during which the price of coal was rising. 
In 1954 the price of coal as used by industry was £3.80 per ton, whilst
by 1958 it was £5.30 per ton, a rise of nearly 26% over a five year period.
'20.
21. 
22.
Evidence to Select Committee, 1957.
S.H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East, Second Edition, 0UP, 1961. 
Posted prices are a reference point for tax purposes.
Table 4. Annual Oil Production By Countries
Millions long tons
Middle East (l) World Total (2) (0 /(2) *
1947 41 .76 415.0 10.1
1948 56o91 465.0 12.2
1949 70.15 465.0 15.1
1950 86.60 518.0 16.7
1951 96.19 582.0 16.5
1952 104.44 605.0 17.3
1953 119.50 650.0 18.4
1954 135.10 679.0 19.9
1955 159.80 763.0 20.9
1956 169.50 830.0 20.4
-1957 . 175.10 875.0 20.0
1958 211.60 900.0 23.5
Source: Oil in the Middle East f So H. Longrigg
This was primarily in consequence of a rising wage bill (see Table 8) 
and despite increases in new capital investment and repair - expenditure 
due to the programme of mechanisation initiated in 1950.
On the secondary fuel front the period is characterised by a 
continuous growth in electricity consumption and a contraction in the 
market for town gas. The relevant statistics for electricity consump­
tion are shown in Table 5. Total consumption stood at nearly 36000 Gwh 
in 1947 and at about 84000 Gwh in 1958. This growth was a consequence 
both of an increase in the number of consumers from 11.9 million in 1947 
to 16.8 million in 1958 and an increase in average consumption from 2895 
kwh in 1947 to 4893 kwh in 1958. Coal consumption for electricity gen­
eration increased during the middle-fifties but climbed strongly from 
1955 onwards, reflecting in part the shortage of coal and later the de­
creasing price of oil relative to coal.
The gas industry statistics in Table 6 illustrate the decline 
in the domestic market for gas over the period-1390 million therms in 
1947 to 1306 million therms in 1957. The industrial market, however, 
increased its consumption of gas from 416 million therms in 1947 to 770 
million therms in 1958. Table 7 shows the raw material input for town 
gas. The inability of gas to retain its market share in the secondary 
fuel sector lay in the fact that gas manufacture was based on old- 
fashioned technology using coal which was becoming a high cost fuel.
Coal for carbonisation was becoming scarce and more costly not only be­
cause suitable coal could only be found in limited geographical areas but 
because it had to be graded, cleaned and screened at the pithead. The 
carbonisation process also had high capital costs as well as high running
costs and unless load factors were very high, economic efficiency fell off 
23 .
considerably. As Table 7 illustrates, the decline m  coal consumption
23. G.F. Ray and D.T. Jones, "The Innovation Process in the Gas
Industry", NIESR, August 1975, p.47-56.
Table 5* U 0K. Electricity Consumption (Phase l)
G W h
Year
1
Domestic Commercial Industry Public Lighting 
& Traction
Tota]
1947 12728 3973 17606 1551 35858
1948 13576 4469 19121 1655 38821
1949 13657 ' 5035 20445 1782 40919
1950 14911 5765 22920 1878 45474
1951 16939 6354 25350 1870 50513
1952 16869 7115 26068 1898 51950
1953 17691 7948 28000 1921 55568
1954 19075 8746 31553 2027 61401
1955 21146 9545 34635 2097 67423
1956 23755 10337 37224 2204 73520
1957 24850 10733 39348 2287 77218
1958 28227 12057 41241 2344 83869
1959 30487 12837 44695 2485 90504
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest, H M S O
Table 6„ Selected Statistics for the. Gas Industry0 (Phase i)
Gas Sold Gas Available Million therms
Domestic Industry Town Natural Gas
1947 1390 416 2308 -
1948 1363 .474 241 5 -
1949 1352 517 2490 -
1950 1357 580 2616 -
1951 1389 628 2706 -
1952 1363 646 2754 -
1953 1346 648 2721 -
1954 . 1360 704 2830 —
1955 1364 742 2901 ' -
1956 1349 ' 760 2933 -
1957 1306 770 2836 -
1958/59 1308 770 2839 _
Source: Ministry of Fuel and Power Digest, 1967, H M S O ,
Energy Digest 1975
Note: Figure for 1958/59 relates to Statistics year ending 31st March.
Table 7* Raw Materials used in the Gas Industry* (Phase i)
Million tons of coal 
equivalent®
Coal Oil
1947 22*5 1 d
1948 24.4 0.8
1949 25.2 0 o8
1950 26.1 0 o9
1951 27.2 0.8
1952 27.7 0.8
1953 27.0 0.7
1954 27.3 0.9
1955 27.9 0.9
1956 27.9 0.8
1957 26.4 0.7
1958/59 24.2 1.1
Source: Table 104, Ministry of Fuel and Power Digest, 1967
H M S O  and Energy Digest, 1975, H M S O
*  For natural gas see Tables 2 and 6 . L P G  is not tabulated as it 
is not a raw material.
Table 8. Wage Costs in the Coal Industry .
£ million
Year Wages (1) Total Costs (2) (1)/(2)?S
1950 297.3 459.3 64.7
1955 427.7 699.1 61.2
1959 456.1 793.1 57.5
1960 432.6 775.7 55.8
1961 431.9 793.8 54.4
1962 427.9 817.6 52.3
1963/64 422.9 818.4 51.7
1964/65 419.51 811.8 51.7
1965/66 368.7 805.0 45.8
1966/67 360.5 810.0 44.5
1967/68 353.9 796.3 44.4
1968/69 312.7 739.1 42.3
1969/70 297.4 727.3 40.9
1970/71 308.1 773.5 39.8
1971/72 306.6 855.2 35.9
1972/73 392.3 994.9 39.4
1973/74 355.6 971.7 36.6
Source: Table 24, Energy Digest, H M S O ,  1975 and Table 35
Ministry of Power Statistical Digest, 1967*
Note: From 1963/64 onwards statistics are for year ending 31 st March*
by the gas industry began in 1956/57 having been at a plateau rate of 
about 27-28 million tons for the early 1950s. The decline in coal 
consumption after 1957 was taken up to some extent by oil acting as a 
substitute fuel input but was also partly explained by the stagnation 
in gas consumption in the late *1950s.
2.4. Phase II, 1959-72
For the period 1959-72 relative prices quickly moved in favour
2 A
of oil with the exception of 1968 and 1971. Inland oil consumption 
continued to rise rapidly being 56 mtce in 1959 and over 158 mtce in 
1972 (see Table 10). This was accompanied by an increase in market 
share from nearly 23% in 1959 to nearly 48% in 19/2 (see Table 11). Al­
though the relative price ratio began to move towards coal in 1971, Phase 
II.is extended to 1972 in order to differentiate between this period and 
the post-1973 situation (see. Table 9) . The increasing market share 
for petroleum was accompanied by a decreasing market share for coal 
which accelerated during the latter half of the 1960s. In 1959 coal 
consumption stood at 189.4 million tons whilst in 1972 it was 120.9 
million tons. The markets for coal in the iron and steel industry and
I .
other manufactures underwent contraction during this period as is shown
in Table 12 with petroleum becoming the main fuel input. Both gas
works and railways were freed from dependence on coal by technological
developments, in the case of gas by the gasification of oil and then the
introduction of offshore natural gas and in the case of railways by
changing from steam to electric and diesel traction. Only in the case
25
of the electricity industry is there a strong upward demand for coal.
24. In 1968 the Middle East war pushed prices up and 1971 marked the 
beginning of the Teheran agreement.
25. Chapter Four will illustrate that some demand was "artificial”.
Table 9. Relative Prices of Coal and Fuel Oil as used by- 
Indus try During Phases II and M .
1959
1960 
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Source: 
Notes o
Coal: Fuel Oil
1.04 
1.11 
1.25 
1.16 
1.23 
1.32 
1.41 
1.36 
1.13 
0.99 
1.02  
1.22  
0.98 
1.10  
1.18
0.54 
0.66^
Compiled from various copies of the Energy Digest, H M S O .  
See Table 1
1. - Derived from Energy Trends, April 1976. Department of Energy
Table 10o Inland Fuel Consumption for the U.K. (Phases II and III)
Year Coal Petroleum Nat. Nuclear Hydro
Million tons c.e, 
Total Total
1959 189.4 56.1
Gas
0.1 0.5 1 .5 247.6
(temp ad 
252.1
1960
✓
19607 65.6 0.1 0.9 1.7 264.9 266.3
1961 191*8 71.0 0.1 1.1 2.1 266.1 268.6
1962 191*2 78.6 0.1 1.5 2,1 273.5 269.0
1963 194.0 85.3 0.2 2.5 1.8 283.8 277.3
1964 187.2 93.3 0.4 3.2 1 .9 286.0 285.9
1965 184.6 102.8 1.3 6.0 2.3 297.0 294.4
1966 174.7 111.7 1.2 7.8 2.4 297.8 297.5
1967 163.8 119.3 2.1 8.9 2.7 296.8 298.0
1968 164.5 125.9 4.7 10.1 2.2 307.4 306.5
1969 161.1 135.7 9,2 10.5 2.0 318.5 316.1
1970 1 54.4 145.6 17.6 9.4 2.6 329.6 329.3
1971 138.7 147.3 28.4 9.7 1.8 325.9 327.7
1972 120.9 157.6 40.3 10.5 2.0 331 .3 330.7
1973 131.3 159.4 43.5 9.9 2.0 346.1 346.6
1974 115.9 149.0 52.1 11.9 3.1 331 .0 331.4
1975 120.3 132.9 54.5 10.8 2.0 320.5
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest HMSO
Table 11 * Inland Energy Consumption, Share of Total Energy
Consumption (fo) (Phases I I  and I I I )
Year Coal Petroleum Nat. Gas Nuclear Hydro
1959 76.5 22.6 0.1 0.2 0.6
1960 74*3 24.7 0.1 0.3 0.6
1961 72.1 26.6 0.1 0.4 0.8
1962 69.9 28.7 0.1 0.5 0.8
1963 68.4 30.0 0.1 0.9 0.6
1964 66.2 32.1 0.1 1 .O 0.6
1965 63.0 34.1 0.4 1.8 0.7
1966 . 59.6 36.9 0.4 2.4 0.7
1967 56.2 39.6 0.7 2.7 , 0.8
1968 54.1 40.7 1.5 3.0 0.7
1969 51.0 42.5 2.9 3.0 0.6
1970 46.9 44.4 5.4 2.6 0*7
1971 42.6 45.4 8.7 2.8 0.5
1972 36.4 47.9 12.2 2.9 0.6
1973 37.7 46.5 12.6 2.7 0.5
1974 34.8 45.4 15.9 3.3 0.6
1975 37.5 41.5 17.0 3.4 0.6
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest HMSO
Table 12. Fuel Consumption in Various Industrial Sectors,
All Phases.
Million tons
Year Iron and Steel Electricity Other
Coal Coke^ Oil Coal Oil Coal Oil
1947 8.7 8.42 0.85 26.0 0.05 31.0 0.4
1950 8.1 9.92 2.55 31.7 0.07 36.5 6.1
1955 6.1 12.29 4.59 41.9 0.4 39.3 9.4
1960 3.8 13.00 4.14 50.6 9.0 31.1 12.7
1961 3.2 12.06 4.78 54.1 9.1 29.4 15.7
1962 2.6 10.59 5.24 59.7 9.4 28.2 18.0
1963 2.4 10.49 6.32 66.0 8.1 2 6 . 7 20.0
1964 2.1 11.83 7.33 67.2 9.0 25.9 22.2
1965 1.8 11.90 8.18 68.7 9.8 25.5 24.9
1966 1.3 10.60 8.01 67.4 11.1 23.9 27.6
1967 0.9 9.94 8.02 66.3 12.6 21.9 29.9
1968 0.8 10.77 8.33 73.2 10.9 21.8 31.8
1969 0.86 10.65 9.08 75.9 14.1 20.5 33.8
1970 0.75 10.62 9.49 76.0 21.1 18.5 36.1
1971 0.55 9.27 8.86 71.7 24.5 1 5.1 36.1
1972 0.33 8.83 8.43 65.6 31.5 11.2 37.0
1973 0.36 9.81 8.35 75.6 28.4 11.5 37.1
1974 0.36 8.24 6.73 66.0 28.8 10.6 34.0
Source: Energy Digest, 1973 and 1975. Ministry of Fuel and Power 
Statistical Digest, 1967.
Note 1 • For use in blast furnaces.
During this period of contraction in the coal industry output
26per manshift increased from 26.9 cwt. to 41.9 cwt. ‘an increase of just 
over 1 cwt. per annum. Much of this increase can, however, be attri­
buted to the closing down of the less economic pits which suffered from 
a low OMS. Also, after 1957 the rate of technological change accele­
rated with the introduction of power loaders and supports. Coupled with 
the decline in coal markets was a build-up of undistributed stocks of 
coal held by the NCB. In 1959 stocks stood at nearly 36 million tons 
and remained at 20 million tons or above throughout the 1960s. With 
the lowering of production targets in the 1970s, the miners’ strike of.
1972 and the fluctuation of the price ratio between coal and oil these 
stocks reduced to approximately 10 million tons during the period 1970-72. 
(See Table 15.)
Besides the continued growth in oil consumption, there was also
27
a "transition" from a two-fuel to a four-fuel economy during this phase.
1957 saw nuclear power coming on stream and although it contributed only
0.2 mtce to total fuel consumption in 1957, by the early 1970s it was
contributing about 10 mtce or about 3% of total inland fuel consumption.
As Table 16 shows, installed capacity was 709 MW in 1963/64 and 4482 MW
in 1972/73. Maximum output capacity increased throughout the period
except for the year 1970/71 when, due to the corrosion of various Magnox
stations, repairs had to be carried out which led to their withdrawal from 
28service.
26. M. Posner in Fuel Policy: A Study in applied Economics, decomposed
the increase of 9.6 cwt. in OMS between 1965 and 1970 as follows:
From closures 3 cwt. From mechanisation 4 cwt.
From reconstruction 1.5 cwt. General progress 1 cwt.
Total 9.5 cwt.
27. See White Paper on Fuel Policy 1967, Cmnd. 3438.
28. See'D. Burn, The Political Economy of Nuclear Energy, IEA, 1967 
W.C. Patterson, Nuclear Power, Penguin, 1976.
The repairs mentioned in the text required that the stations be "de­
rated", i.e. nuclear reactors operated at a lower temperature.
able 13 Selected Coal Statistics.
Y ear OMS % Coal Power Number of p it*
c w t. Loaded . closures
1947 21.5 2.4
1948 22.3 2.5 -
1949 23.4 3.2 28
1950 24.2 3.8 11
1951 24.5 4.2 5
1952 24.2 4.9 16
1953 24.6 6.0 5
1954 24.9 7.4 8
1955 24.7 9.9 17
1956 24.8 15.5 10
1957 24.9 23.1 18
1958 25.6 27.8a . 29
- 1959 26.9 31.3 56
1960 ' - 27.9 37.5 •- 39
1961 28.9 47.7 29
1962 31.2 58.8 .53 .
1963/64 33.3 68.4 36
1964/65 34.7 75.0 35
1965/66 36.1 80.7 54b
1966/67 36.6 85.7 47
1967/68 39.1 89.7 62
1968/69 42.5 91.8 59
1969/70 43.4 92.3 19
' 1970/71 44.2 92.2 7
1971/72 41.9 92.2 3
1972/73 45.8 93.0 8
1973/74 42.3 22
1974/75 45.0 _ 13
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest, HMSO.
Notes: a. Prior to 1958 the figures are based on pit head output
b. From 1963 figures relate to financial years ending in 
March.
Table 14. Selected Coal Statistics.
Deep mined 
Output from 
N C B  mines 
(million tons)
184.7
195.5
200.7
203.3
209.9
212 .2
210.5
211.8  
207.8 
207.2
207.4 
201.8
192.5 
183.8
179.6
187.6
187.6
183.7
174.1
164.6
166.1
153.0
139.8
133.3
109.2
129.8
97.0
115.0
Employment at Opencast Coal
N C B  mines (million tons)
(thousands)
707 
720 
716 
683 
692 
714 
701 
700 
695 
698 
704 
681 
634 
583 
561 
536 
505 
477 
436 
410 
365 
319 
296 
286 
274 
264
Year
1.947
1948
1949
1950 
t951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961 
1962 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75
1 . 0  
2.1 
3^1
4.7 
8.6
9.0 
8.2 
3.9
2.3
6.7
5.5
6.3
5.8
4.8
7.5
6.3
5.0
7.3
16.4 
14.3
11.5  
10.0 
10.0
Source: N C B  Report and Accounts for various years.
Table 1 5 Coal Stocks
Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960 
1961 
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Undistributed
1.4 
2.6 
2.6 
1.7
1.4
4.5
1.9 
1.1 
2.2
2.9
8.6
19.7
35.7 
29.2
21.4 •
25.4 
21.1
20.4
21.5
18.5
27.6
23.0
18.5
7.1
10.2
10.9
10.7
5.9
10.5
Distributed
16.4
14.6
14.7
12.4
16.2
16.1
17.4
15.5
18.3
18.0
18.8
17.5
14.4
13.4
15.7
15.1
10.9
17.3
16.6
18.4
18.6
17.1
15.4
14.4
20.9
21.9
16.8
15 .6
20.2
Million tons 
Total
17.8
17.2
17.3
14.1
17.7
20.7
19.4
16.7
20.5 
21.0
27.3
37.2 
50.0
42.6
37.1 
<40.5 
32.0
37.7
38.1
36.9
46.2
45.1
33.9
21.5
31.1
32.9
27.5
21.5
30.7
Source: N C B  Report and Accounts for various. years.
Table 16. Selected Nuclear Power Statistics.
Installed Max.output Number of .Under E lec tric ity
Capacity Capacity New Plants constr. Supplied
Y ear (thou.kW) (thou.kW) or (mill.kWh)
planned
1963/64 709 576 - 11 3102
1964/65 1349 1076 2 10 3865
1965/66 2823 2341 . 5 6 11091
1966/67 3086 2626 1 . 6 14331
1967/68 3314 2816 1 7 17516
1968/69 3654 3138 1 7 19843
1969/70 3654 3138 - 8 18871
1970/71 3820 2606* - 10 16803
1971/72 4621 3251 2 8 . 19464
. 1972/73 4487 3446 8 20111
.1973/74 4780. 3446 - 8 19346
1974/75 4821 3462 — * .14 23137
Source: The E lectric ity  Council, Statement of Accounts and
/
Statistics. Various years .
*T h is  drop, as explained in the text, was a consequence of 
de-rating Magnox stations due to corrosion.
Natural gas was discovered in 1959 at Groningen in Holland and
subsequent exploration activities in the Southern sector of the British
North Sea resulted in B.P. making the first commercial find in October
1965. ' Estimated reserves were put at 25 trillion cubic feet in 1967
and by 1972 had risen by some 10 trillion cubic feet. The pricing
30
arrangements for gas coupled with a Government desire to build up gas 
production to 4000 million cubic feet per day by 1975 led to the energy 
market share of natural gas increasing from under 1% in 1967 to over 12% 
in 1972, representing an increase of nearly 50 mtce on the 1967 figure 
of 2.1 mtce of imported Algeria gas.
Table 17. Estimated Recoverable Reserves of Natural Gas for U.K.
. 1012c.f.
25 1973 36/37
27 . 1974 41.5
29 1975 44.4
30 1976 50.5
about 32 1977 51.0
about 35 -
Source: Energy Digest 1975, H.M.S.0. and 1974-77 copies of ‘'Development
of the oil and gas resources of the U.K.", Dept, of Energy.
In September 1969 oil was discovered in the northern North Sea 
by the BGC/Amoco Group in Block number 22/18, This was followed by 14 
fields being declared commercial to April 1976 along with 32 significant
29. See C. Robinson and J. Morgan, "Economic Consequences of controll­
ing the Depletion of North Sea oil and gas", TRPC, 1976 especially 
section one.
30. See 1967 White Paper on Fuel Policy Cmnd. 3438 and The Exploita­
tion of North Sea Gas, 1969, Cmnd. 3996.
1967
1968 
3.969
1970
1971
1972
oil discoveries being announced by the end of 1975. Although it is 
difficult to draw up a time series of estimated U.K. North Sea oil re­
serves, since they are related to underlying price and cost conditions
. . .  . 31for the individual fields concerned, it is considered useful to record
here the data which has been published. (See Table 18.)
In the secondary fuel sector electricity saw a continuation of 
the growth rate it had sustained during the 1950s reaching 206370 GWh in 
1972; nearly three times the 1958 figure. The number of consumers grew 
from 16.8 million in 1958 to 20.9 million in 1972, with sales per consumer 
rising from 4893 kWh to 9881 kWh. The- upward trend in coal consumption 
for electricity consumption was continued reaching a peak of 76 million 
tons in 1970 and declining to nearly 66 million tons in 1972. However, 
this last figure must be treated with care since the miners1 strike of 
1971/72 necessitated voltage reductions, as well as disconnections, in 
the power network in order to maintain supply. This period also saw 
a continuous rise in fuel oil as an input to electricity generation which 
accelerated strongly from 1968 onwards increasing by 12.2 million tons 
of petroleum over the period 1968-72 to 18.6 million tons of petroleum.
Finally mention is made of the town gas industry and its decline 
following the introduction of North Sea gas. As can be seen in Table 
20, by the late 1950s sales of gas had stopped increasing* The first 
was the Lurgi process for the gasification of coal. This had the ad­
vantages of using low grade cheap coal, which was gasified under pressure, 
thus reducing distribution costs. Its disadvantages were that it had to 
be sited near low-cost areas, it produced noxious effluent and the gas 
produced was lean. Eventually two Lurgi plants were built,, the Gas
31. C. Robinson and E. Crook, "Is there a World Energy Crisis", 
National Westminster Bank Review, May 1973.
Table 18. . Changes in U .K . Oil Reserves.
Million tons.
Proven Probable Possible Possible Total
Commercial
1974-75 +100 -75 +35 +60
1975-76 +5 +10 -65 -50
1976-77 +70 +10* +10 +90
Non-appraised
discoveries
1974-75 +65 -15 +140 +190
1975-76 +185 +265 -10 +540
1976-7 7 -40 -20 +180 +120
Expected from
1 • •
future finds
1974-75 - : +200 -300 -100
1975-76 - -520 +120 -400
1976-77 (2) -30 -170 -200
Total existing 
licences
I. • ' '
.1974-75 +165 +110 -125 +150
1975-76 +290 -245 +45 +90
1976-77 (2) +30 -40 +20 +10
Source: Table 47, Energy Digest, 1974 and 1975 , 1976 and 1977 copies
of "Development of the oil and gas resources of the U.K.",
Dept, of Energy, HMSO.
Note: (1) Future finds from further work under existing licences.
This estimate is based on the success ratio previously 
attained and a knowledge of those areas not yet tested and 
must be regarded as very tentative.
(2) Including Fifth Round.
Table 19. U.K. Electricity Consumption (Phases II and III)
G w h
Year Domestic \ Commercial Industry Public Lighting 
and Traction
Total
1959 30487 12837 44695 2485 90504
1960 35270 14526 49991 2576 102363
1961 39968 15809 51740 2715 110232
1962 47628 18284 53529 2916 122357
1963 54475 20263 56106 3006 133850
1964 54411 21321 61604 3038 140374
1965 59421 23427 65040 3183 151071
1966 61961 24796 66732 3442 156931
1967 64365 26254 • 67446 3599 161664
1968 68810 28687 72724 3704 173925
1969 74256 31002 76304 3861 185423
1970 78987 32628 78300 3990 193907
1971 82693 33815 78840 4095 199442
1972 88821 34997 78486 4066 206370
1973 93279 37773 85412 4127 220591
1974 94545 34470 80733 4140 213888
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest, HMSO. 
1 • Includes Farms.
Board recognising that the process exhibited significant economies of
scale. Because Lurgi gas was lean the industry decided that by import-
32m g  liquefied Algerian natural gas the gases could provide a desired 
mixture. In 1964 Algerian gas was brought to the U.K. in the liquid 
state, thus cutting transport costs. The utilisation of this gas re­
quired the Board to build a grid of high pressure mains.
The second innovation came from ICI, who announced in 1962 the 
sucessful development of. a process involving the steam-reforming of 
naphtha at pressure. ICI were interested in this as a source of hy­
drogen but it was also a means of producing large volumes of lean gas.
By 1963 the Gas Council had adopted methods of enriching these lean 
gases to produce gas at pressure. The oil-gasification process had 
the advantages of a capital cost per therm one-fifth to one-sixth that 
of a Lurgi plant and could produce gas at a competitive price. The 
process was very much more flexible than previous processes in that 
production cost was much less sensitive to changes in load factor, which 
made it suitable for meeting peak demands. There were no effluent 
problems and the plants were small enough to give a large choice of 
sites. The Gas Board, therefore, stopped the introduction of the Lurgi 
process and began to invest heavily in oil gasification plants.
The immediate result of the adoption of the oil-gasification pro­
cess was a shift in the industry's use of raw materials. In 1955/56 the 
gas industry used 27.8 million tons of coal, but the amount declined slow­
ly as more efficient carbonising plants were introduced and fell rapidly 
with the spread of oil-gasification. In 1968/69 only 9.2 million tons 
of coal were used (See Table 21), In contrast the amount of oil used in 
gas making increased from 850,000 tons coal equivalent in 1955/56 to 
9.7 million tons in 1968/69. For the period 1960 to 1970 there was a
32. The contract being for 350 million therms per year.
Table 20. Selected Statistics for the Gas Industry (Phases II and III)
Gas
Sold
Gas
Available Million
Domestic Industry Town Natural Gas
1959/60 1268 819 2837 -
1960/61 1291 852 2891 -
1961/62 1345 857 . 2983 -
1962/63 1493 852 3206
. ~
1963/64 1554 861 3263 -
1964/65 1727 915 3521 -
1965/66 2006 928 3840 -
1966/67 2267 908 4114 -
1967/68 2652 915 4624 13
1968/69 ^3011 976 5005 160
1969/70 3.362 1159 5010 737
1970/71 3653 1704 . 4583 2157
1971/72 4045 3070 3845 4904
1972/73 4603 4530 3020 8151
t
1973/74 5035 5299
r—00CM 917 9^)
(1) = for 1973
Source: Ministry of Fuel and Power, 1967, HMSO, Energy Digest,
1975.
Note: From Digest 1958/59 onwards statistics from March 31 st.
Table 21 . Raw Materials used in the Gas Industry
(Phases II and III)
Coal Oil
1959/60 22.3 1.3
1960/61 22.0 1.3
1961/62 22.2 1.5
1962/63 22.2 2.1
1963/64 21.8 2.2
1964/65 19.6 3.0
1965/66 17.4 4.3
1966/67 16.0 6.3
1967/68 13.6 8.4
1968/69 9.3 10.1
1969/70 5.9 7.8
1970/71 3.4 4.6
1971/72 1.1 2.6
1972/73 0.6 2.4
1973/74 0.4 2.4
1974/75 0.1 2.1
Million tons of coal 
or coal equivalent,
Source: Table 104, Ministry of Fuel and Power Digest, 1967, H M S O .  
and Energy Digest, 1975, HMSO.
significant rise in domestic sales of gas reflecting successful adver­
tising campaigns, more stable prices, changes in the design of gas
appliances, and a very sharp increase in the number of gas central heat-
33
ing units which were sold.
The impact of North Sea gas on fuel consumption has already been 
considered. Suffice it to say that the technological developments of 
the Lurgi and oil-gasification processes provided not only some of the 
resources (distribution network) needed for natural gas distribution but 
the attitude to adapt to further changes in technology.
In concluding this phase it is perhaps wise to remember the 
following five points:
a) the period 1959-72 was characterised by a growing dependence
on oil in all sectors and relative prices remaining in favour
of oil. This continued even with the oil price rises in 1971.
b) Although coal prices as used by industry remained fairly
stable during the period this did not serve to prevent tradi­
tional coal users being attracted towards bil both on relative 
price and non-price characteristics.
c) The emergence of nuclear power and more importantly natural
gas as expanding contributors to total inland fuel consumption -
i.e. the "four-fuel" economy.
 ^d) The discovery of North Sea oil in 1969 with the forecasts of
oil coming on stream after 1975.
e) On the secondary fuel front the CEGB increased its "take"
of coal production. The town gas industry gave way to the 
natural gas industry.
33. 13,000 in 1960/61 and 370,500 in 1970/71.
2.5.. Phase II; The Government Response
In this section, having discussed the trend changes in the main 
economic indicators for the energy sector, the Government response is 
considered. The approach used is merely to note the various policy 
prescriptions used during the period. The rationale for intervention 
is considered in Section 2.7, in which the period from nationalization 
to the present is appraised.
2.51. Ad Hoc Policy
Government intervention in the fuel sector during Phase I has 
been seen to fall into two areas. The first Nuclear Power Programme 
set up in 1954 was envisaged by the. Government to provide a long-run com­
plement to indigenous coal supplies. The timing and size of the pro­
gramme was influenced by the N.C.B.'s inability to maintain output at a 
level to meet domestic demand at the prevailing Government controlled 
price. In addition the Government considered that as a short-term mea­
sure, until the coal industry could increase output, seventeen power sta­
tions should be converted from coal to oil firing. By 1957/58, however, 
consumption of petroleum was growing at a rate which began to erode the 
traditional markets for coal. The Government response was again short- 
run. Fine-tuning of the energy sector was to be achieved by refusing 
to award any import licences for coal and, in 1959, terminating the con­
version programme of selected power stations from coal to oil-fired. 
Indeed the Government went further and proposed that preference be given 
to building new coal-fired power stations. Imports of Russian oil were, 
in addition, banned.
Besides these ad hoc policy measures designed to preserve tradi­
tional markets for coal, the Government also had to re-think its nuclear
power programme. The first Magnox plants took longer and proved 
more costly to build than were forecast. By 1962 the C.E.G.B. esti­
mated that nuclear stations were still twice as expensive, on a gene­
rating cost basis, as coal-fired plant. The reason for this was pri­
marily that increases in efficiency of coal-burning stations had occur­
red. In 1960, therefore, the Government decided to reduce the nuclear 
power programme. Instead of 5000-6000 Mw being built by 1965 one new 
power station would now be ordered each year and aggregate capacity was 
expected to reach 5000 Mw by 1968. In 1962 the C.E.G.B. went further; 
it would not commit itself to ordering even one nuclear station before 
1965. Clearly the increasing competitiveness of oil coupled with the 
Government1^  desire to preserve the traditional markets for coal promp­
ted a downgrading .of the nuclear power programme^which itself was expe­
riencing technical difficulties.
The other aspect of piecemeal policy during-, the period to 1965 
‘ was the imposition of an excise duty (2d per gallon) on fuel oil and 
other oil products in the energy market (see Chapter Three). This was 
originally presented in the 1961 Budget as a revenue duty; not a mea­
sure to protect the coal industry. But in 1963 the Chancellor of the
Exchequer admitted that it did act as a protection instrument and he
. . 35
would keep it m  force for precisely that reason. The tax was dis-
crimatory between oil used for electricity generation and that used for 
gas-making, since.methane and oil for gas making were exempted.
Besides ad hoc energy measures the Conservative Government of the 
period also attempted to re-define the financial obligations of the
34. W.C. Patterson, Nuclear Power, Penguin 1976, especially Chapter 
Two •
35. A Fuel Policy for Britain, P.E.P., 1965..
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nationalised industries. The 1947 dictum that "revenues should, on 
an average of good and bad years be not less than sufficient to meet
all items properly chargeable to revenue, including interest, depre-
. . . . 37ciation, the redemption of capital and the provision of reserves,"
mitigated against comparisons with the private sector. The 1947 Labour 
Government argued, unconvincingly, that a lower rate of return on capital 
was acceptable on Government projects because the risk element of return’ 
was marginally lower than its private sector counterpart. Likewise it 
was argued that nationalisation had changed consumers’ expectations to 
the belief that the products and service of nationalised industries should 
be provided cheaply, independent of cost considerations. The Conserva­
tive Government, however, considered that in making the rate of return
-exogenous there was the possibility that "too much of the nation’s re-
• . 38sources will be diverted into the nationalised industries". In con­
sequence under the 1961 White Paper nationalised industries were expected 
to make a substantial contribution towards the cost of their capital de­
velopment out of their own earnings. Since the rate of return on in­
vestment is primarily related to earning power, reserve requirements and 
technological development, the Government decided to set the rate of 
return individually for the industries. The constraint was that the 
Treasury would hope to earn a higher rate of return than the cost of the 
money to the Government.
On capital account the procedure for investment decision-making 
was codified. In the long-run the Government wished to be kept informed 
of the extent to which projects would be undertaken with an expected low 
rate of return. For the medium term the Government committed itself to
36. The Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised
Industries, Cmnd. 1337, 1961.
37. Re. 36,
38. Re. 36.
discuss each year, with each of the nationalised fuel industries, the 
general limits for its plans for development, and capital expenditure 
over the next five years. Given such discussions the Government 
would then fix an upper limit each year on the amounts to be spent on 
investment by the undertakings during the two years ahead. The appro­
val of borrowings would be determined on the basis of an annual reasoned 
estimate submitted by the undertaking.
The 1961 White Paper^whilst detailing the financial objectives 
of nationalized industries more thoroughly than the Nationalization Acts^ 
had many faults. The ultimate test of performance was declared to be 
"if a surplus on Revenue Account was not achieved over five years then
the Government would have to propose specific measures for righting the 
39
situation". Moreover, the White Paper gave no guidance as to the 
evaluation of investment projects nor on the pricing policies they should 
pursue.
2.52. The 1965 White Paper on Fuel Policy
The change from an ad hoc fuel policy to an attempt to co-ordin­
ate and plan national fuel policy took place when the Labour Party was 
returned to power in 1964 with its policy commitment to devise and en­
act a National Plan for growth. A national fuel policy was seen by 
the Government as an essential prerequisite for its National Plan; the 
Government "must be concerned about the pattern of fuel consumption in
relation to security of supply, long-term costs and the balance of pay- 
40ments". To this rationale for creating a national fuel policy was 
added the qualification that the Government "had to ensure that national
39.
40.
Re. 36.
Fuel Policy, Cmnd. 2798, 1965.
considerations which individual consumers would not (otherwise) take 
into account in their choice" be reflected in the consumption and pro­
duction for coal. Indeed the Government'went further and noted the.
social costs arising from a decline in coal consumption. Whilst "con- 
41flictsof policy" between different fuels are "bound to arise from
time to time, these should be capable of more ready and orderly solu-
/ 2
tion against the background of a coherent fuel policy".
The overriding objective of energy policy was. to meet the re­
quirements of the National Plan in that "the fuel sector should make
its full contribution to the strengthening of the economy and the bal-
43
ance of payments." This was then decomposed into five objectives, 
each not necessarily carrying the same weighting:-
"a). adequate and continuous supplies of fuels of suitable
quality should be available to sustain the desired rate 
. of growth in the economy.
b) the price.of fuels should be such as to enable them to 
play their part in making the UK economy .as a whole compe­
titive particularly in relation to other countries of 
Western Europe.
i ■
c) the fuel industries should be technically progressive 
and viable.
d) imports pf fuel, particularly of.oil, which on any reckon­
ing will grow fast, should be in the form that is least 
costly in terms of foreign exchange.
e) .Consumer freedom of choice, apart from being desirable
in itself, is an essential guide to the efficient planning
41. Cmnd. 2798 op.cit.
42. Cmnd. 2798 op.cit.
43. Cmnd. 2798 op.cit.
of supplies, provided that the prices paid by consumers
44
fully reflect all the relevant costs." .
Discussion of these objectives is undertaken in section 2.7 and 
in Chapter Five but it should be noted that these general outlines for 
fuel policy were qualified by a policy devised for protecting the coal
industry. In the Government’s view " it is clear that indigenous coal
. . .  . . 45
will remain a m a m  primary fuel". The case for protection was based
on five points:
a) the coal industry is a large import saver.
b) it was considered that the "fullest economic use should be
made of the large investment already made in the coal
industry".
c) coal supplies are secure.
d) although oil was cheaper than coal it was thought that "this 
situation might change in the long-term".
e) the rate at which colleries could be shut-down was considered
to have "practical limits".
Discussion of these points is left until section 2.7.
The implementation of policy for the coal industry was conceived
as concentrating on deep-mined coal production through closing "gross
46losing pits that have no prospect of moving out of that category", 
leading to a forecast output of.some 170-180 million tons of coal in 1970. 
The electricity industry was to give preferential treatment to burning 
coal but the gas industry was held ready only as a marginal market for 
coal due to the cheapness of oil-based processes. It was also decided
44. Cmnd. 2798 op.cit.
45. Cmnd. 2798 op.cit.
46. Cmnd. 2798 op.cit.
to continue .to favour the use of coal in public buildings subject to 
a periodic review. Pit closures were considered to be the pressing 
problem of the N.C.B. and necessitated assistance in the form of social 
finance. Further assistance was needed to overcome "the legacy .of the 
past". • The resulting unemployment from contraction of the coal in­
dustry was considered to be of a temporary nature since the manpower 
required for execution of the. National Plan would have absorbed unempl­
oyed miners. During the period of "frictional" unemployment and re­
training programmes the Government was to provide funds to remove the 
difficulties that arose in regional development areas. ^
On the financial side the Government wrote off "about £400
million out.of £960 million of the Board’s capital, debt to the Exche-
48quer at end March 1965". In order to slow down contraction of deep- 
mined output it was decided to keep opencast production at around 7 
million tons a year. . Thus, although the marginal cost of getting open- 
.-cast , coal would almost. certainly have been less than the deep-mined coal, 
which was preserved the fact that employment in opencast mining per unit
of output is much lower than in deep mining was apparently the dominant
. 49 '
consideration.
j.
The policy for oil consisted of two main points, securing ade­
quate and continuous supplies in a way which the Government thought would 
maximize security of supply and minimising the apparent cost to the bal­
ance of payments. In the first case this was achieved by stockpiling
oil and encouraging the oil companies to diversify supply sources. As
47. Pit closures tended to be heaviest in development areas. See
Chapter Four.
48. Cmnd. 2798, op.cit. para* 49.
49. Pricing policy was considered over the long' term as making each
coalfield self-supporting, but the burden "of debt arising from
past investment", constrained the Board to hope for only reducing 
the degree of cross-subsidisation between pits.
was noted at the time "substantial discoveries of oil or gas in the 
North Sea would, of course, improve the security of our supplies and 
the Government is taking the necessary measures to ensure that explora­
tion is vigorously p u r s u e d " . O i l  imports from Communist countries 
were banned for strategic reasons, although it is difficult to think why 
imports should have been zero and not, say, 5% of the market. Imports 
from noii-communist countries were encouraged without "discrimination 
between companies or source of supply". Discrimination in favour of 
oil companies with U.K. interests was considered inappropriate since 
"it would be contrary to our international obligations and general com­
mercial p o l i c y " . L i k e w i s e  imported oil-based products and home- 
refined products were not differentiated, although the Government ann­
ounced that it was aware that discrimination in favour of one group could 
be practised. Home-refining represented a means of keeping down the 
cost of oil imports and avoiding dependence on refineries in foreign 
countries. Moreover the construction of refineries attracts foreign in­
vestment and orders for plant which creates a multiplier effect on the 
economy. Of course, the array of oil-based products produced in refin­
ing activities meant that the U.K. had a comparative advantage in some 
spheres but not in others. Thus imports of products would remain nece­
ssary. The Government, therefore, set as its objective "that home re-
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fining should suffice to cover inland demand and bunkers in total".
To reach this objective the Government declared that it would "press the 
. . .  . 53
oil companies to provide capacity" and expected "newcomers to the U.K.
market to refine here as soon as their share of the trade can justify
54
doing so, either alone or m  combination with others".
50. Cmnd. 2798, para. 60.
51. Cmnd. 2798, para. 61.
52. Cmnd. 2798, para. 63.
53. Cmnd. 2798, para. 65.
54. Cmnd. 2798, para. 65.
With regard to nuclear power it was concluded that "on balance 
of payments grounds and on grounds of security of supply, nuclear power 
stands closer to home-produced coal than to imported oil11.'*'* However, 
the optimism of the 1950s was downgraded since the Government decided 
that the construction should be limited to the extent that one power 
station a year should be commissioned over the years 1970-75. The'.pro-'
56
gramme was to be based on the Advanced Gas-Coded Reactor but was to 
remain "flexible and subject to review in the light of new information"."*^ 
The gas industry received preferential treatment as compared with 
electricity since the Government considered that technological develop­
ments in the gas industry required a movement towards fuel oil. Moreover, 
uneven treatment in the context of the hydrocarbon oil tax meant that the 
imports of-Algerian methane required by the gas industry along with oil 
feedstocks did not bear the oil tax which was levied on burning oils. The 
rationale for this preference was found in the belief that the oil-gasi­
fication process as used by the gas industry promised "advantage to the 
community of expected economies in capital and current costs of production 
of fuel".'*^
2.53. The 1967 White Paper on Fuel Policy
The 1967 White Paper held to the objectives listed in the 1965
59
Paper but considered that the emergence of a four-fuel economy necessi­
tated a review of the balance of policy. Moreover, new forecasts were 
considered to be desirable in the light of the estimated decline in coal
55. Cmnd. 2798, para. 67.
56. W*C. Patterson, op. cit.
57. Cmnd. 2798, para. 71.
58. Cmnd. 2798, para. 76.
59. Nuclear power and natural gas.
production. . The Paper undertook a detailed study of the market, mak­
ing assumptions about the relative quantities and prices of fuels and 
assuming that GDP would grow at about 3% p.a. The result of the fore­
casts are shown below.
•From this statistical work five postulates were drawn:
a) by 1975 nuclear power and natural gas might be producing 
25% of total energy requirements.
b) a continual decline in coal consumption.
c) "in order to alter relative prices in favour of coal suffi­
ciently to slow down its decline significantly, it would 
be necessary to protect it at a level which would lead to 
misuse of resources and would put British industry at a
• disadvantage with its competitors".^
d) contraction of coal output could only be reversed, by delaying . 
the introduction of nuclear energy and natural gas.
e) the rate of increase in oil consumption was expected to 
decline. ' - : ' “
Clearly these postulates recognise the continual contraction of the market
for coal but did not wish to slow down that contraction at the expense of
1 '
new, indigenous primary fuels. Rather it was thought that with oil 
consumption rates "slowing down", the market for coal could be preserved**^ 
to a degree compatible with the declared overriding objective of "cheap 
energy". This was a marginally different objective from that declared 
in 1965 when attention was placed on the fuel sector making its full con­
tribution to the strengthening of the economy and the balance of payments.
The White Paper divided policy into two camps: long-term policy
and transitional fuel policy. In the longer term natural gas was to be
60. Cmnd. 3438, Fuel Policy, 1967, para. 75.
61. M. Posner, Fuel Policy, op.cit. states that after 1967 the 
objective was to close down pits at the fastest possible rate.
Table 22. Forecasts of Energy Consumption.
mtce
1966 1970 1975 1975
(actual) (1) (2) (3)
Coal 174.7 149 128.5 110.5
Oil 111.7  132 162.5 121
Nuclear & 10 .2  17 37 36
Hydro.
N at. gas 1.1 14 27 77
Total 297.7  312 355 344.5
Source.: Cmnd. 3438.
(1) N at. gas — 1000 mcfd and oil tax at 2d/g*
(2) Natural gas = 2000 mcfd.
(3) Natural gas = 6000.mcfd.
Table 23. Final Accepted Plan for Fuel Sector 1967.
mtce
1966
(actual)
1970 1975
Coal 174.7 152* 120*
Oil 111.7 125 145
Nuclear & Hydro. 10 .2 16 35
N at. Gas 1.1 17 5°
Total 297.7 310 350
Source: Cmnd. 3438.
*  Exports of coal estimated at about 2 m. tons.
Assumptions. (1) North Sea would support a production ra te  of
approx. 4000mcfd with a price such that 
quantity would be sold.
(2) No conversion of coa l-fired  stations to o il.
(3) The Second Nuclear Power programme would 
be fu lfilled .
(4) Oil tax at 2d /g all.
(5) No coal imported.
(6) GDP increases at 3$ p .a .
introduced rapidly into the economy with most of it going to the pre­
mium markets. This would displace oil. However, it was accepted 
that some gas would go to the bulk market and displace some coal and oil. 
The belief that natural gas consumption be stepped up rapidly obviously 
meant that depletion policy required a fast extraction rate. Such a 
policy required gas appliances and the distribution system to be conver­
ted so as to take North Sea gas which was to expand four-fold between 
1967 and 1975. *
With regard to oil the following statement was made "the Govern­
ment have decided, particularly, in the light of the current balance of
payments position, that it is right to continue to favour indigenous
62
fuels against oil". This meant in effect a decision to continue pro­
tection for coal thereby slowing down the rate of contraction. The con­
traction rate that was considered manageable for the transition policy 
to 1970 was 35000 men per year. In order to create a market for coal 
-the Government desired to Increase coal consumption in electricity gene­
ration and perhaps in the gas industry. At the time the two industries 
envisaged that together they could burn an extra 6 million tons per year 
up to 1970.^ The cost of such action was not to be carried by the sec­
ondary fuel user, as was the case under the 1965 White Paper, but was to 
be carried by the taxpayer. Deep-mined coal production was to provide a 
larger share of total output by the Government refusing to give "further 
authorisations for opencast production except in special cases where, be­
cause of quality or location, the coal to be produced is not in competi-
63tion with coal from deep mines".
Much of the policy statement of 1967 was devoted to refining the
62.
63.
Cmnd. 3938, para. 100. 
Cmnd. 3438, para. 119.
social and regional measures that were to be undertaken to offset the
Governments calculated costs of the contraction of the coal industry.
"Natural wastage will continue to account for the major part of the
expected rundown and there will still be some scope for redevelopment
within the industry so that the number of redundant miners remaining
unemployed for any length of time should continue to be a relatively
64small percentage of the total reduction". Many colliery closures
were in existing development areas and so already received various bene’- 
65fits. However, special assistance was to be given to coal mining 
areas in decline and suffering increasing unemployment problems. . Extra 
inducements were to be offered to firms to set up production in these 
areas and the infrastructure (mainly roads) was to be improved. It was 
envisaged that younger miners would eventually be absorbed into employ­
ment, preferably near the area containing the closed pits. Older men, 
however, were singled out for special assistance since their employment 
opportunities were considered more limited. A scheme was designed "where­
by mineworkers who are 55 or over and who become redundant after that date 
through colliery closures will have their incomes supplemented for a per­
iod of three years, subject to an age limit of 65, so that they can adjust
66themselves to their new circumstances". The supplement was to be based on 
previous earnings in the NCB and would be payable only if a minimum num­
ber of years had been served in the industry. It was expected that app­
roximately 26000 miners would benefit under the scheme with a total esti­
mated cost of £35 million up to March 1971.
The 1967 White Paper differed from the 1965 White Paper not in
64. Cmnd. 3438. para. 122.
65. These are documented elsewhere.
66. Cmnd. 3438, para. 126.
its .objectives but rather in the weighting placed on each objective. 
Whilst the 1965 White Paper considered a two-fuel economy with a de­
sire to slow down the contraction of the coal mines, the 1967 Paper 
increased the social benefits paid to miners and at the same time en­
dorsed a contraction rate of some 35000 men per year between 1967 and 
1971. This desired contraction rate was due in part to natural gas 
and nuclear power coming on stream but was also a.recognition that 
even if the past rate of expansion of oil consumption slowed down, 
the market for coal could not be supported as envisaged by the 1965 
White Paper without substantial resources from the Exchequer.
2.54. The 1967 Einancial Obligations White Paper
The Labour Government considered that the change from a two-
fuel to a four-fuel economy provided justification for the 1967 White
Paper, ^  on the financial obligations of the nationalised industries.
It was further argued that technological changes and discoveries of
new natural resources had "led to a scale of investment which was un-
68foreseen six years ago". This, the Government argued, required in­
creased Government involvement to measure the calls upon scarce resour­
ces of manpower and capital and to assess priorities and to allocate
69
resources upon an "economically and socially rational basis". On 
the investment side the Government decided to remove one of the inade­
quacies of the 1961 White Paper and accordingly advocated the use of 
discounted cash flow techniques". The Government expects the national­
ised industries to use the best possible method of investment appraisal. 
Discounted cash flow techniques are recommended for all investment pro­
jects. By taking account of the timing of cash outlays and receipts,
67. A Review of Economic and Financial Obligations, Cmnd. 3437, 1967.
68. Re. 67.
69. Re. 67.
these techniques enable comparison to be made between alternative pro­
jects. They can be applied in different ways, and the industries are 
free to adopt whatever method suits them best, but the Government will 
-expect projects which are submitted to it for approval to be expressed 
in present values by the use of a test rate of discount11. ^  For selec­
tion of the test rate of discount, the Government laid down that it must 
be sufficient to ensure that resources are efficiently used and repre­
sent the minimum rate of return to be expected on a marginal low risk 
project undertaken for commercial reasons. The Government decided that 
8%, and later 10%, was a reasonable nominal figure to use.
On the pricing side the Government's basic aim was that the 
nationalised industries should normally cover their accounting costs in 
full, including the service of capital and appropriate provision for its 
replacement. The aim of pricing policy was that consumers should pay 
the true costs of providing the goods.and services consumed, "where 
-.“these can sensibly be identified".^ The recommendation was that pri­
cing policy should be related to long-run marginal cost, although if 
there existed either spare capacity or excess demand prices should either, 
respectively, be lowered to short-run marginal costs or increased, as a 
rationing device. From the dynamic viewpoint it was considered that if 
long-run marginal cost was reduced because of technological advances, 
then prices should be brought gradually into line and discontinuous large 
changes in prices avoided. Where indivisibilities made it difficult to 
allocate costs while covering accounting costs, two part tariffs might 
be used or prices could be set proportional to marginal costs.
The third part of the 1967 White Paper dealt with costs. On the
70.
71.
Cmnd. 3437, op.cit.
Cmnd. 3437, op.cit.
labour side it was noted that management and workers should strive to
increase efficiency and productivity and thus to "meet the cost of pay
increases while ensuring that the community as a whole benefits from
72
higher productivity". The change in attitude in the 1967 Paper is 
noticeable - with the emphasis on prices and investment - and is summed 
up by the following statement: "the system of financial objectives has
proved its value in practice: it cannot provide a perfect formula for
the resolution of all pricing and investment decisions, but it also .
. . . . 73
gives a framework within which such decisions can be reached". In
the 1967 Paper pricing and investment questions received separate treat­
ment indicating a belief by the Labour Government that the same set of 
financial principles should underlie each nationalised fuel industry 
and that modification should occur in the face of considerations of re­
turns on new investment, social obligations, and prices and incomes poli­
cies.
2.55. North Sea Licence Allocations
The transition from a two-fuel to a four-fuel economy was the 
result of exploration and development activity in the North Sea. Acti­
vity is controlled by the Government allocating exploration and production 
licences to companies if certain Government specifications are met. In 
section 2.7 the alternative method of auctioning blocks is considered but 
immediately below attention is confined to the nature of Government inter­
vention. In 1964 the Continental Shelf Act based on the 1958 Continental 
Shelf Convention was signed. The Act stated that the rights exercised 
by the U.K. outside territorial waters with respect to the seabed and
72.
73.
Cmnd. 3437, op.cit.
Cmnd. 3437, op.cit.
subsoil and the associated natural resources were to be invested in the 
74state. The Act incorporated the earlier legislation found in the 
Petroleum (Production) Act of 1934 by which the state had the power to 
grant licences to people, on suitable terms to "search, bore for and 
get petroleum".^ The terms were to be decided by the Board of Trade 
and Treasury. In consequence the allocation of licences was very much 
in the hands of the Government. Thus in the first licensing round in 
September 1964 the criteria for satisfying the .Government were four-fold:
a) that the firm involved promoted "rapid and thorough explora­
tion and economical exploitation of petroleum resources in 
the Continental Shelf".^
b) that the firm involved was to be incorporated in the UK and 
thus liable for taxation in the UK.
c) that the firm had to submit a work and exploration programme 
to the Government.
and d). that the firmfs past and present contributions to the energy 
market’s development were to be considered.
On these heads applicants were judged suitable or otherwise to 
take up licences. For this round only North Sea blocks were issued.
As can be seen from Table 24 only 394 out of the 960 blocks offered were 
applied for with eleven companies being refused exploration licences.
The initial rental payment for a block was £6250 rising in the seventh 
year to £10,000 with a maximum of £72,300 p.a.^
The Second licensing round in November 1965 covered the North Sea,
74. With the exception of coal deposits.
75. Petroleum Act, 1934.
76. M. Lovegrove, Our Islands Oil, Witherby and Co., 1975.
77. The duration of a licence for exploration and production is 46
years and statutory relinquishment terms have been incorporated 
into the licences providing for at least half of the original 
area to be given up after 6 years.
Irish Sea and the Channel, although no blocks were taken up in the last 
category. This time 1102 blocks were offered, of which only 127 were 
applied for. The heads regarding suitability for blocks were as before 
with the following additions:
• a) the Government was interested in the firm* s facilities for 
disposing in the UK of any oil or gas discovered,
b) the Government would take into account any proposals, which 
allowed participation by public enterprises. The financial 
arrangements for the second round remained the same as the 
first.
The third licensing round in June 1970 took place after five large 
gas fields had been discovered. This time Channel blocks were not for 
offer but the Orkney/Shetland basin was offered. Of the 157 blocks 
offered, 117 were applied for and 106 were granted. ' In terms of crit­
eria, the Government, placed the emphasis more strongly on British inter­
ests in participation, stating that in the Irish Sea all applicants must 
provide for participation by the British Gas Council or the NCB and in 
particular the Government would welcome the Gas Council setting up its
own operation in the North Sea. The financial arrangements were, only
/
marginally greater than that of the second and first rounds. (See Table 
26.)
The fourth licensing round took place against the background of
the 1970-71 Ekofisk, Forties and Brent finds. In December 1971 and
March 1972 the Government offered 436 blocks, fifteen of these, however,
were to be auctioned. All of these were taken and out of the remaining
421 blocks offered for discretionary award, 271 were applied for but only
78267 were allocated. In this round the Channel blocks were excluded.
78. For Fifth Round see Section 2.61.
Table 24. Petroleum Production Licences
Licences ____ ________ _
Round Area Nos. Nos; Nos. Nos. blocks Nos. Nos. Nos.
Blocks App. Comps. Applied for awarded Comps. Blocks
1 North 960 31 61 394 53 51 348
(1964) Sea
2 North, 1102 21 54 127 37 44 127
(1965) Irish,
Celtic
Seas
3 North 157 34 54 117 37 ; 61 106
(1970) Irish 
Seas &
Ork/Shet.
4 North, 421* 92 228 271
(1971/ Irish, 118 213 282
1972) Celtic 15* 31 73 15
• Seas &
Ork/Shet.
5 As Round 4 71 53 133 51 Licences yet to be
(1976/ plus Eng- formally awarded.
1977) lish Channel
and West of Scotland
Source: "Development of the oil and gas resources of the U.K.:
A Report to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Energy", 
April 1976 HMSO.
*421 for discretionary award and 15 for tender bid.
Table 25. Licensed Areas of U.K. Continental Shelf (July 1973)
Location Nos. of licenced 
Blocks
Areas of Blocks 
sq. kilo
A rea as % of 
overall licenced 
A re a .
North Sea
Ir is h  Sea & 
Cardigan Bay 
& Celtic Sea
479
64
83536
16057
74.3
14.3
West of Shetlands 64 12880 1 1 .4
Source: North Sea Oil and Gas: A Report to Parliament 1973.
Table 26. Licencing and Financial Arrangements.
Round Application In itia l Annual Rental per av. block Royalty 
Fee Payment
per av. 7th Y r .  Increase p .a . Max. 
block of 
250 s .k .
1 £200 plus
(-1 964) £5 fo r each
block over 
10
£6250 £10000 £6250 £72500 12.5%
(well-head
value)
2 "
(1965)
3 t.
(1970)
£7500 £12500 £7500 £87500 "
4
(1971/
1972)
£11250
5*
(1976) £1000 for  
production 
licences 
£500 for 
exploration  
licences
£20,000 £50000 £50000
fo r .iirs t  (eighth
four y r . year)
period
£30,000
fo r next
three y r .
period
£750000 "
(tax
value)
Note: F o r Fourth Round the Government was negotiating m ajority
state participation in commercial fields under existing licences 
on a financially "no better, no worse off" basis.
F o r the fifth  Round participation was set at 51%.
^Licences awarded for an in itia l period of four years, a fter which 
not less than one-third of area must be surrendered. A fter a fu rther  
three years another one-third of te rr ito ry  must be surrendered. 
Licensees can then hold remaining one-third for a further 30 y rs . For 
previous rules see R ef. 54.
Source:’ Development of the oil and gas resources of the UK 1976, op .cit, 
& Dept, of Energy Press Notice No. 136, May 27, 1976.
2.6. Phase III, 1973 onwards
The final phase which is considered is dated from 1973 at the
time of the four-fold increase in oil prices. However, whilst 1973/74
did not witness the "first" rise in oil prices - these were experienced
in 1971 - the degree of price rise is considered to warrant a study of
the U.K. fuel market from 1973 onwards. As can be seen from Table 9
(the price relatives between coal and oil), coal remained much cheaper than
oil in the period 1973 - early 1975. But by Spring 1976 some CEGB fuel
oil was considered to be cheaper than coal in certain power stations.
"The electricity industry believes that oil will be the cheaper of the
79two. fuels after April (1976) if oil prices continue to be depressed".
The main reason for this lay in the rising wage bill of the NCB (see 
Table 8).
The beginning of the period, was characterised by a rapids and not 
80altogether- unexpected rise in oil prices as is detailed below, which 
led to a fall in petroleum consumption to 149 mtce in 1974. (See Table 
10). In 1975 and 1976 this figure was further reduced due to the re­
cession precipitated by the oil price rise as well as other firm’s
81adjusting to oil price rises over a longer period than one year. Over­
all total inland energy consumption, on a temperature corrected basis, 
fell to 331.4 mtce in 1974 a reduction of over 15 mtce on the peak year
figure of 1973. Figures for the coal industry, see Table 14, are not
82
strictly comparable for 1974 due to the miners’ strike of that year.
Again it is noted that oil consumption has tended to decline in industrial
79. F.T. 29th Jan. 1976.
80. Robinson & Crook op.cit.
81. For example the decision for households to change their form of
heating may be taken only after some years rather than months.
82. J. Hughes and P^. Moore, A Special Case, Penguin 1972.
use over the years 1974-76 as has coal consumption. On a market share 
basis, both coal and oil had reduced shares at the expense of North Sea 
gas during the period, although care must be taken in drawing any firm 
conclusions from this since the recession initiated by the oil crisis 
may have made some coal and oil burning equipment temporary idle. On 
average nuclear power’s contribution to fuel consumption remained at 
approximately 10-11 mtce over the years 1972-74, although as the market . 
size declined nuclear power’s market share increased from 2.9% in 1972 
to 3.3% in 1974. (Table 11.)
The first oil from the North Sea was landed from the Argyll field 
in May 1975 with an expectation that the landed quantities of oil in the 
future will be as shown in Table 27. By early 1977 seven fields were 
on stream with the forecast that by 1979/80 UK production of oil should 
cover consumption.
Finally brief mention is made of the electricity industry. The 
oil price rise led to a relative increase in coal consumption but the 
consequence of the miners’ strike in 1974 followed by the price rises 
in coal which were passed onto the generating industry, have raised the 
price of electricity (see Table 28). Moreover, the recession in the 
economy has augmented the reduction in demand for electricity so that 
by 1974 consumption was over 7000 Gwh (3%) less than in the previous year.
In summary the main points to be considered during this period
are:
a) the rapid rise in oil prices in late 1973 to 1974.
b) the rise in coal prices bringing some coal and fuel oil to
the same price level for some power stations in Spring 1976.
c) the continual growth in consumption of North Sea gas.
d) the bringing on stream of seven oilfields by the Spring of
1977 with the expectation that the U.K. will be self- 
sufficient in oil by 1979/80.
e) the reduction in electricity consumption caused by rising
inland coal and oil prices in the first instance and then
83compounded by the recession of 1974-77.
2.61. Phase III, the Government. Response
With the rise in oil prices in late 1973 and early 1974 the 
Government was faced with a redistribution of relative price levels 
which clearly favoured coal. The rise in oil prices was not completely
unexpected following a period in which expectations of substantial price
. 84increases for raw materials had emerged. However, such price rises
in petroleum did not remove for long the competitive edge which oil had
over coal, since labour costs had begun to rise in coal-getting due to
Trade Union pressure. The two major strikes of 1971/72 and 1973/74 in
support of higher wages made it clear that supplies'of coal were not as
secure as had previously been thought. In such circumstances, with
relative prices still in favour of oil, the market for coal continued to
contract, with the exception of electricity generation. . -
The four-fold increase in oil prices between October 1973 and
January 1974 prompted the Government to call for a reappraisal of the
coal industry’s production schedules, under the terms of reference. ,!to
consider and advise on the contribution which coal can best make to the
country’s energy requirements and the steps needed to secure that contri- 
85bution”. The Plan recommended investment sufficient to provide over 
40 million tons of new capacity by 1985 through extending the life of 
existing pits; increasing the output at existing pits by major projects
83. See Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1976. .
84. See C. Robinson and E. Crook, op.cit. and C. Robinson, Energy
Depletion and the Economics of OPEC, Henley Centre for fore­
casting, Occ. Paper No. 1, 1975.
85. Interim Report, Plan for Coal, June 1974,. N.C.B.
Table 27. Estimated Oil Production Levels off the U.K.
Production level ’OOOb/D 
1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
Comm
Fields. 23 354 840 1341 1616 1892 2018 1845
E s t. oil prod.
from U .K . -  -  -  25 280 795 1580 1873
probable finds
Total UK prod. 23 354 840 1366 1896 2687 3598 3718
In ternal (* )
UK consumption 1580 1540 1540 1580 1600 1640 1700 1800
Source: J . Morgan, North Sea Policy Study, Working paper NSPS 24. 
2 /4 /7 6 , and Wood, Mackenzie(* ) .
Table 28. Electricity Prices
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974 J-M  
A -J  
J -S  
O -D
16.76
16.67  
17.43
18.05  
18.49
18 .87
18.87  
19.16 
21.13  
21.59
21.68
25.05  
25.02
27.07
32.08
Pence/therm .
Source: Table 86, Energy Digest, 1975.
and. by opening new collieries. The most important aspect of these 
proposals was the decision to open up a new field at Selby where the
coal "is of good quality and clean, varying between 6 ft. and 10 ft. in
87 . . . . . 88
thickness. This field is not typical of deep-mined coalfields in
that the project "will be planned on the basis of a single drift mine
89outlet for the full output of the field. It is envisaged that pro­
duction will commence in the summer of 1979 and build up to 10 million 
tons per annum by the mid-1980s. This expansion of coal production is
to be achieved by not allowing "the industry to be at the mercy of short-
. 90
term fluctuations m  the prices of competiting fuels". At the same
time the assumption was made that "sufficient output can be achieved with
assured continuity of supply at a cost which can meet the long-run com-
. . 91petition from other sources of energy". The Final Report endorsed
the Interim Reportfs financial calculations that output would be raised
from nearly 120 million tons in 1974 to 150 million tons in 1985 at a
cost of £1400 million, although by 1977 the N.C.R. had re-valued this
92
estimate at £2440 million.
The increase in coal consumption expected if price relatives 
retained their 1974 levels was.seen by the Government as being at the 
expense of oil. However, as the 1967 White Paper pointed out, nuclear 
power and natural gas were both growing primary energy alternatives.
The success of the second Nuclear Power Programme - the AGR programme -
86. A new drift mine had been started in South Wales in June 1974
and there were plans for other developments in the Midlands and 
Yorkshire.
87. Final Report for Coal, para. 14.
88. But see D. Ezra, The Rediscovery of Coal, NCB.
89. Final Report, para. 14.
90. Final Report, para. 16.
91. Final Report, para. 10.
92. Coal for the Future, Progress with Plan for Coal and Prospects to 
the Year 2000, Dept of Energy, 1977, para. 15.
had not been up to the 1965 and 1967 forecasts, and the 1974 policy
statement took this into account. "It would be unwise to place further
93orders for AGRs before evidence of successful operation". In July 
1974 the Government announced that orders for up to 4000 MW of nuclear
power based on the British designed SGHWR were to "be placed by the
. . .  - 94
British generating Boards over the next 18 months", at an estimated
cost of £1200 million. This.decision simultaneously blocked the option 
of buying ready-made American LWRs and was criticized by the GEC and the 
CEGB. The SGHWR was favoured on the grounds'of its small lead time, 
its safety in operation and the fact that it would offer scope for UK 
nuclear technology# Consideration was given to design faults and engin­
eering problems by planning a "relatively modest - not more than 4000 MW
95 'over the next four years" programme so as to gain experience. In 
paragraph 16 of the White Paper the Government stated "the present deci­
sion will dictate the pattern of nuclear and fossil plant ordering over 
the next three-four years", and it may be argued that in fact the causa­
lity at work here was the other way round. A desire to maintain a mar­
ket for coal may well find expression in limiting the expansion of nuc­
lear power# Recent experience has shown that the short-ordering time
envisaged by the Government in 1974 has proved totally unrealistic due to
96technical problems. The Nuclear Power Company has now set 1978 as a
97
target date for starting work on the Sizewell B site. Moreover, the 
Department of Energy, under a new Minister, has intimated that such sta­
tions would be built if they could compete with coal. However, if coal
93. F.T. July 11th 1974, Gov. White Paper on Nuclear Reactor Policy.
94. Re. 93.
95. Nuclear Reactor Policy, White Paper, July 1974.
96. "Vital Nuclear Plans Struggle for Life", Sunday Times, May 2, 1976.
97. Re, 96.
appears cheaper, options may be exercised to build coal-burning sta­
tions which carry a lower capital cost, no technical problems and some 
strong political considerations.
Policy statements on the North Sea oil and gas reserves were 
prolific from 1974 onwards. On 11th July 1974 a White Paper on UK 
Offshore Oil and G;as Policy was published which took as its terms of 
reference the Labour PartyTs election promise "to ensure not only that 
the North Sea and Celtic sea oil and gas resources are in public owner­
ship, but that the operation of getting and distributing them is under
98full Government control with majority public participation". On the 
question of Government take and participation two objectives were de­
clared. The first concerned a desire "to secure a fairer share of pro-
99fits for the nation and to maximise the gain to the balance of payments" 
and the second "to assert greater public control" as a device for safe­
guarding the "national interest". These objectives were to be imple­
mented through a taxation system, participation in existing and future 
licensing arrangements exercised through the British National Oil Corp­
oration (BNOC) and the Government extending their powers to control phy­
sical production and pipelines. The taxation system which was finally 
implemented focused on a 45% Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) rate on off­
shore production in addition to Corporation Tax and royalties with a 
number of provisions intended to lessen the impact of the tax on smaller 
fields and to provide a floor in case of oil prices d e c l i n i n g . C o m ­
panies are allowed to recover 175% of their investment before becoming
98. 1974 Labour Party Manifest.
99. U.K. Offshore Oil and Gas Policy, Cmnd. 5696, para. 5.
100. A discussion of the inadequacies of these arrangements are given
in J. Morgan and C. Robinson, "Depletion Policy and the Profit­
ability of North Sea Oil", Energy Policy Sept. 1976 and C. Robin­
son and J. Morgan, "World Oil Prices and the Profitability of 
North Sea Oil", Petroleum Review, April 1976.
liable to tax. Moreover, fields will be exempted from the tax for 
a basic one million tons of production a year and provision is made 
for escaping tax if the pre-tax return on a field should fall below 
30% in a year. The overall estimate was of a Government revenue stream 
of between £3-£4 billion from 1976-80 based on 1976 prices. The taxa­
tion regime represented a less severe system than that previously en­
visaged. It should be noted that gas contracted to the British Gas 
Corporation before mid 1975 was exempted from any taxation arrangements 
following representations from the oil companies "that the application
of PRT on gas could make development of further gas reserves unecono-
. „ 101 mic" •
With regard to depletion policy the Petroleum and Submarine 
‘ . 102
Pipelines Bill gave extensive powers to the Minister. in its orig­
inal form the Bill envisaged that the Energy Secretary could have in­
sisted, on the grounds of conservation in the national interest, to 
.cut production to any level. Moreover, he could have done this to 
any extent during the development of a field. Amendments, however, 
moderated this requiring that when the programme for the development of 
a field is settled between operator and Government, the extent of such 
limitation will be specified. If production needs to be stepped up 
through a Government demand, although past emphasis has been on reducing 
production, the operating companies will not be expected to invest more
101. F.T. Feb. 20, 1975.
102. C. Robinson and J. Morgan, "Economic Consequences of Controlling
the Depletion of North Sea oil and gas", Trade Policy Research
Centre, Guest Paper No. 3, Jan. 1976, and J. Morgan and C. Robin­
son, "Depletion Policy and the Profitability of North Sea Oil",
Energy Policy, Sept. 1976.
103than the cost of one new well.
The Submarine and Pipe-line Act also provided for a national 
oil corporation (BNOC) to be set up. The exact form and objectives .
of BNOC are far from clear, although on its own admission it sees its
. . 104role as a tool for enacting Government oil policy. The Corpora­
tion has acquired a 51% stake inmost off-shore licences and has taken 
over all NCB concessions along with Burmah's interest in the Ninian 
field. At present the main activity of BNOC has been to negotiate 
majority State participation in existing commercial licences and to 
play a major part in the.fifth licensing round. .
The fifth licensing round was originally due in 1973-74 but 
the Government decided to delay the allocation of exploration blocks 
and review licensing arrangements. In May 1976 the Department of 
Energy published a Consultative Document on the fifth round terms^^ 
in which it was proposed to allocate 50-60 blocks under a "more order­
ly licensing strategy aimed at maintaining activity at a reasonably
stable level in the future through the licensing of smaller amounts
106of territory at more frequent intervals. The ground rules for
judging applications were more stringent than in previous rounds and 
based partly on companies* past records in voluntarily entering into 
participation agreements and partly on allowing U.K. suppliers of equip­
ment and services the opportunity to provide goods for North Sea operations.
103. See Appendix II for a note on the "Variety Guidelines".
104. BNOC, Annual Report and Accounts, June 1977.
105. "U.K. Offshore Petroleum Production Licensing - Fifth Round.
A Consultative Document", Dept, of Energy, May 1976.
106. Re. 105.
It was also stated that companies taking up licences would have to
agree to trade union access to employees on offshore installations*
BNOC1s position in the issue of licences is that of a 51% partner in
every l i c e n c e . O p e r a t i n g  agreements between BNOC and other corn-
108panies had to be settled before the issue of licences with BNOC. 
being liable for its shore of expenditure, including exploration and 
appraisal activities. Any stake which BGC has in the fifth licensing 
round counted towards 51% state participation.
Finally mention is made of the 1976 Energy Act. Through this
legislation ministerial powers were further increased. The Minister
for Energy now has powers, in times of "emergency" to control the
production, supply and acquisition or use of crude oil, natural gas,
petroleum products, electricity and any other fuel "whether for the
109propulsion of vehicles or for any other purpose". The Secretary
of State also has powers to regulate the price of crude, natural gas 
or petroleum products. These powers last for twelve months from the 
declaration date of an emergency and can be reviewed for a further 
twelve months with ParliamentTs approval.
/ '
107. Participation is supposed to leave companies financially "no 
better or worse off",
108. Amoco was excluded from the Fifth Round because a participation
agreement had not been signed. _
109. Energy Act, Nov. 1976.
2.7* The Rationale for Intervention in the Fuel Sector
2.71. Breton1s Model of Representative Government
In Chapter One the Down1s model was discussed and the postulate 
was adopted that Governments construct policy is an attempt to maximise 
their share of electoral votes. It was stated that for the cases in 
which electoral preferences are clearly defined the Government will 
adopt those preferences in its policy matrix. Where electoral pre­
ferences are weak Government policies on those issues will be ambigu­
ous. Groups opposed to the Governments policies may arise during 
the periods between elections, in which case the Government values its 
policies at a lower rate-of-time discount than the electorate.
To incorporate these.aspects of Government behaviour, Breton1s 
"Economic Theory of Representative Government"^^ is explained below.
In essence Breton considers a two-party system in.which the Government 
can ignore electoral preferences to a greater or lesser degree depending 
on the decision - rule used to elect the Government; the length.of the 
election cycle and the range of policies the Government puts on offer to 
the electorate. A  wide policy array permits a relatively greater 
breadth of policies which may be at variance with electoral preferences. 
Viewing the trading of policies as taking place in a political market, 
the demand for public policies will be related to money income, tax pri- . 
ces and the participation costs accruing to individuals who wish to vary 
a particular policy formulated by the Government. Political participa­
tion may take various forms each incurring a different participation cost. 
Social movements, clubs, pressure groups, personal participation or poli­
tical activity all represent various options which change the electorate^ 
demand for the flow of expenditure type policies. .
110. A. Breton, The Economic Theory of Representative Government, 
London, MacMillan, 1974.
On the supply side the axiom of self-interest underlies the 
politician1s decision to maximise his chances of political survival. In 
consequence the utility function for a politician will primarily depend 
on the probability of re-election, pecuniary gain, personal power, image 
and ideology. As elections approach the desire to be re-elected will 
cause Government policies to be valued at the same rate-of-time discount 
as the electorate1s value. Political survival will also depend on 
minimising political rivalry in terms of other groups participating in 
the political process. In this case the Government may decide to enact, 
or promise to enact, various policies which remove lobbying power groups 
from the political market place. This may be achieved by widening the 
promised policy bundle so that it contains a variety of policy options, 
or by persuading the electorate through advertising to be "satisfied" 
with a promised bundle of policies.
Finally, Breton suggests that the power of the politician will 
be related to that of the bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are considered to 
maximise their utility in terms of the size of their bureaus and,
accordingly, will favour Government intervention that requires greater
. . ... in
administrative responsibility. Breton argues that on the supply side
of the public sector, the dominant force in shaping the pattern of 
expenditure policies and tax prices is the relative power of politicians 
and bureaucrats. The supply of Government policies will also be related 
to the vector of tax prices.
Equilibrium in the political market place will be met according 
to the level of participation costs. If these are low then the 
Government will be able to discern which policies are prefercd since 
relatively more of the electorate will make their preferences known than 
required by the decision rule. If. the politicians are more powerful
111. C. Robinson, A Policy for Fuel, IEA, Occ. Paper 31.
than the bureaucrats then commitment to these policies will enable them 
to be re-elected. If participation costs are high then an interative 
search procedure will be enacted to effectively lower participation costs 
and reveal electoral preferences. It may well be the case that search 
procedures can take the form of advertising in which case a correlation 
may exist between Government desired policies and (imposed) electoral 
preferences.
2.72. Government Intervention in the Fuel Sector
The Breton model provides a number of key parameters through 
which Government intervention in the energy sector may be analysed.
Those of particular interest are, perhaps, participation costs and money 
income. In the discussion below the latter variable will be taken to 
represent the proportion of disposable income spent on energy.
In the U.K. decision-making among politicians tends to be made 
on a coalition, rather than an individual, basis. A group ordering of 
policies will only be achieved through the trading of individual policy 
preferences. However, coalitions may also involve non-politicians.
The Labour Party, for example has its origins in the trade union 
movement and in consequence the two power groups have strong social, 
historical, political and ideological links. In particular various 
mining unions sponsor Labour M.P.s and many Labour Ministers for energy 
have been ex-miners. Consequently policies that do not accord with the 
preferences of the mining union may result in various M.P.s re-evaluating 
their utility functions designed to enable them to be re-elected to 
Parliament by their constituents. The same type of connection may be 
made between the Conservative Party and private industrial and commercial 
interests. In essence the simple point is made that"both political
parties in the U.K. maybe identified with power groups within the 
economy that may or may not agree with Government policy or the 
preferences of the rest of the electorate. Moreover, the political, 
social and historical links between these groups may require 
Government policy to place a premium on these particular preferences 
in order to ensure re-election.
Given these relationships the historical perspective of energy 
policy discussed above can be re-considered*. It was seen that the 
nationalisation of the fuel industries was proceeded by a period of 
Government control and the pre-war contraction of the mines. The trade 
unions had advocated nationalisation of the coal mines in 1919 and this 
was later endorsed by the Labour Party. After the Second World War 
electoral preferences were also in favour of nationalisation so that 
the Labour Party clearly identified nationalisation as a key election 
policy. However, the'inability of the N.C.B. to produce sufficient coal 
-to meet domestic demand at the price determined under the Governments 
general price controls, coupled with the fact that the fuel sector had 
been nationalised removed the nationalisation issue from future policy 
preferences of the electorate. -
During the rest of the 1950s, as expenditure on energy as a 
proportion of disposable income fell, changes in energy policy were 
considered of lesser importance than macroeconomic and other policies - 
with the result that electoral preferences regarding energy became 
unclear. The Conservative Government responded to this situation, as 
the Breton model suggests, by introducing an ad hoc energy policy that 
dealt retrospectively with relative price fluctuations between coal and 
oil. Even the upgrading of the first Nuclear Power Programme in 1956, 
which was designed to make the U.K. self-sufficient in energy in the 
long-term, may arguably be a facet of the Conservative Governments
policy to promote the nationalistic side of economic independence 
during the Suez crisis. Similarly the termination of the conversion 
programmes of coal stations to oil-fired and the termination of import 
licences for Russian oil, were both policy decisions designed to 
preserve the traditional markets for coal on "nationalistic11 grounds. 
However, the importance to the Government of a lower cost energy 
source and its impact on the balance of payments was not ignored. As 
the Government concept of independence in the international economy 
concerned itself with foreign and balance of payments policies, a shift 
towards the latter led to a downgrading of the first Nuclear Power 
Programme. The ad hoc nature of energy policy was further exemplified 
by the introduction of the fuel oil tax in 1961. In this case the 
Government introduced a policy package explicitly designed to improve 
the balance of payments position.
As the price of oil fell in the early 1960s a period of cheap 
energy was encountered and the electorates1 demand for energy policy 
remained unclear. The resulting Government ambivalence was characterised 
by Mr. Richard Woodfs statements on fuel policy in 1962.
"I should not like to indicate to customers what fuel should
be best for them. Guaranteeing a certain target for the coal industry
would have a very bad effect, and complete freedom of fuel use would
also have very serious consequences. Nor am I at all sure that the
solution of allowing everybody to use the cheapest fuel they want is
the right one. If we become too dependent on foreign supplies we
113endanger our own security - we have to take the middle course."
112. -H.G. Johnson, Economic Nationalism in Old and New States,
G. Allen and Unwin, 1968.
113. Steel and Coal, 25th May 1962.
. The emergence of the Labour Party as the victor of the 1964 
General Election required them to implement their electoral promise of 
a National Plan for Growth. Part of this plan involved a "co-ordinated" 
plan for the energy sector and in 1965 a White Paper to this effect was 
published. The objectives of the White Paper stressed the importance 
of access to cheap and continuous supplies of fuel and consumer freedom 
of choice in fuel use. These objectives were, however, qualified by a 
protection policy for the coal industry. Using Bretonfs analysis this 
qualification would reflect not only the consequences of coalition 
within the Labour Party but the importance of the agreement of the 
trade union movement in general, and the miners in particular, to any 
Labour Government policy. Alienation of these groups may have impaired 
the possibility of re-election in a situation where the Government only 
had a three seat majority. Thus the introduction of a "planned" coal 
industry protection policy parallels a widening of the bundle of policies 
designed to lower participation costs among those groups who could have 
brought the Government down. Whilst the contraction of the mining 
industry required some form of Government intervention to remove the 
externality of unemployment (see Chapter Three), the arguments for 
protection in the 1965 White Paper on Fuel Policy were further 
rationalised on the basis that "coal supplies are secure"!^ There is, 
perhaps, following Johnson^"* a nationalistic argument here suggesting 
that the U.K. derives a psychic income from possessing indigenous coal 
reserves. This aspect of policy may, however, not only be at variance 
with the objective of cheap energy but also ignores the possibility of 
miners going on strike. Similarly the suggestion that indigenous coal
114. Cmnd. 2798, op. cit.
115. H. Johnson, op. cit.
is a large import saver ignored the indirect effects on manufactured
exports of access to cheaper energy supplies. The commitment of the
Government to the miners is illustrated by the 1965 White Paper
objective that in the longrterm coal would be cheaper than oil and so
116the industry had to be protected.
By 1967 the Labour Government had been returned to power with a 
large majority and the influence of the M.P.s sponsored by mining unions, 
although still, strong, was of lesser magnitude than in .the previous 
administration. In consequencej whilst the energy policy preferences of 
the electorate remained weak, the Government could attempt to change 
energy policy within a bundle of policies on offer. In 1967 another 
White Paper on Fuel Policy was published on the grounds that the North 
Sea had emerged as a gas and possibly an oil province. The balance of 
payments was the main macroeconomic policy issue of the time and 
Government policy was-accordingly to obtain cheap energy supplies. In 
-consequence, although protection of the coal industry was still endorsed, 
the contraction rate for the coal industry during the "period of 
transition"^^ was increased to 35000 men per year. The mining unions 
"accepted" this trend with the Government arguing that reduction in 
manpower in the coal industry would be taken up through the expansion 
envisaged under the National Plan.
Labour Government policy with regard to the NorthSea was based 
on the overriding policy to bring the balance of payments into surplus 
in order to ensure re-election. Government policy was also nationalistic. 
From the first to the third licensing rounds the Government increasingly 
encouraged more British companies (preferably with public enterprise 
backing) to apply for licenses. These two policies were not completely
116. Cmnd. 2798, op. cit.
117 Cmnd. 3437, op. cit.
compatible and because only foreign companies had the technology to
undertake drilling activities in the North Sea most blocks were bought
by those companies. The Government desire for fast exploration of
the North Sea led to the granting of licences to the highest "bidder"
in terms of the intensiveness of the proposed work schedule. The
118
Government continues to argue that the allocation of licences 
enhances the Financial arrangements for blocks since "excessive pricing 
arrangements" (i.e. auctions) are thought to add unfavourably to firms* - 
cash-flow positions in the early years of exploration. This approach 
not only underestimats exploration companies* financial acumen but also 
illustrates the ill-conceived nature of Government intervention in the 
allocation of licences.
Once gas deposits were identified in the North Sea the 
Government was faced with the prospect of removing a proportion of the 
economic rent which accured to the exploration companies. The low gas 
price agreed between the Gas Council and the oil companies was an attempt 
to remove some of the producer*s surplus. The Gas Council has, in 
effect, monopoly powers to purchase gas, with the licensee being required 
by law to offer gas to be used for fuel for sale to the Gas Council at
119
a reasonable price. For the oil companies* part, low prices
necessarily meant high take-off rates from the North Sea gas fields in 
order to improve discounted cash-flow returns. The "reasonable" prices 
that were set were low relative to other fuel prices and this continuation 
in low prices has probably depressed further exploration work in the 
South North Sea for gas (see Table 29).
118. "U.K. offshore Petroleum Production Licensing - Fifth Round", op.cit,
119. C. Robinson, A Policy for Fuel, IEA and Competition for Fuel,
IEA, Supplement.
K. Dam, "Oil and Gas Licensing in the North Sea", Journal of Law 
and Economics, October 1965.
K. Dam, "The Pricing of North Sea Gas in Britain",
Journal of Law and Economics, April 1970.
Table 2 9. Exploration Wells drilled  Each Year 1964-75 
East of England
1964 1
1965 10
1966 20
1967 35
1968 30
1969 34
1970 12
1971 7
1972 8
1973 7
1974 4
1975 2
Source: Development of the oil and gas resources of the U .K
1976, op. c it. Appendix 1.
Table 30. Percentage of Licensed Territory held by British Interests.
Round Gas NCB HM Gov. Total public Private Total B ritish  
Council *  . sector B ritish  interests
interests
**
1 4 .5  2.1 2 .6  9 .2  13 .5  22 .7
2 7 .6  4 .5  3 .4  15.5  18.1 33 .6
3 10.1 4 .5  5 .4  20 .0  16.5 36 .5
4 2.1 6.2 1.7 10.0 10.0 20.0
Auction
Discretion
- 3 .0  2 .3  4 .3  9 .6  25.1 34 .7
A ll 5.-0 3 .0  4 .0  12 .0  .2 0 .0  32 .0
*  Calculated by taking Government’ s share of BP shares as 48.6%
* *  Taking Shell as '40% ’ B ritish .
/’
Source: F irs t Report from the Committee of Public Accounts,
North Sea Oil and Gas, (1972-73).
Auctioning of blocks, on the other hand, would allow any rent 
accruing from the auction to go to the Government. Such a system would 
not, however, automatically allow for the declared Government policy to 
have British interests play a part in North Sea operations (see Table 30) 
unless such groups are successful in their bidding activities. The 
1970-74 Conservative Government did attempt a limited auction of blocks 
in the Fourth Licensing round which proved very successful.
At this time (1970/71) Government general macroeconomic policy
had undergone a number of changes from previous years. The balance-of-
payments had swung into surplus, oil prices remained steady and the
pro-coal mining lobby was to exercise influence on the Government until
the 1971/72 miners1 strike. Electoral preferences for energy policy
remained relatively unclear and the Conservative Government accordingly
gave little attention to energy policy. However, the rate of inflation
(earnings and price) began to increase above the levels experienced
during the 1960s. Increased pressure for wage rises was exhibited by
unions although this does not.necessarily imply they were the cause of 
121
inflation. Various strikes by the power workers and the miners occurred
culminating in the 1971/72 miners* strike. In addition, between this 
strike and the miners* strike of 1973/74 oil prices started to rise. 
Consequently the rising price of coal and the OPEC price rises of 1973/74 
re-established energy policy as a main constituent among voter*s 
preferences. Accordingly as the proportion of disposable income going 
to energy increased, the demand for energy policies also increased.
The Government responded with the 1974 energy policy statements.
120. K. Dam, Oil Resources, Who Gets What How? Chicago Press, 1976
121. Do Trade Unions Cause Inflation, C.U.P., 1973
• Although the Plan for Coal envisaged increased Coal output
to 150 million tons by 1985 the Government stressed that it would
guarantee the industry against "short-term fluctuations in price".
Similarly, although the Government was unable to nationalise the oil
industry, it set up BNOC which would "secure the benefits of North
122Sea oil and gas reserves to the national interest". Moreover,
the combination of the commitment to an expanding coal industry; the 
possibility of self-sufficiency in oil by 1980 and the future increase
in offshore gas supplies, led to a hiatus in nuclear power development.
. . . ' 123
This has been supplemented by growing environment concern among
various lobby-groups over the SGHWR and fast-breeder reactor programmes.
122. Cmnd. 5696 op.cit.
123. Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Chairman Sir Brian 
Flowers, Sept. 1976, HMSO.
SUMMARY
Chapter Two provides a historical perspective of energy policy 
since the passing of the Nationalisation Acts. The evolution of the 
energy market is discussed with reference not only to the varying price 
ratio between coal and oil but also to the Governments response to 
changes in that ratio. The rationale for Government intervention 
in the fuel sector is analysed with reference to Breton’s model of 
Representative Government. In;consequence Government energy policy is 
seen as a series of retrospective measures designed to maximise the 
quantity of electoral votes. Policy is formulated not only with respect 
to the demand for energy policies by the electorate but also with respect 
to various power groups such as the pro-mining lobby; the strength of 
bureaucrats relative to politicians and electoral demand for 
macroeconomic policies> It is unlikely that the orderings of policies
.among these groups will be identical in which case Government energy 
policy can only be formulated through some mutually acceptable trading 
procedure.
Appendix I : The Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised
Industries.
The action the Conservative Government took was to re-define 
the obligations of the Nationalisation Acts under three headings:
Revenue Account, Capital Account and Prices and Costs. On Revenue 
Account the Government considered that:
"a) Surpluses on Revenue Account should be at least sufficient
to cover deficits on Revenue Account over a five year period;
in arriving at the surpluses and deficits for each year there
should be charged against revenue the items normally so 
chargable (including interest and depreciation on the 
historic cost basis).
b) Provision should also be made from revenue for;
i) Such an amount as may be necessary to cover the excess
of depreciation calculated on replacement cost basis 
over depreciation calculated on historic cost as in (a)
'■ above.
ii) adequate allocations to general reserves which will be
available inter alia as a contribution towards their
capital development and as a safeguard against premature
obsolescence and similar contingencies."
Source:- The Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalized
Industries, Cmnd. 1337, 1961.
Appendix II
Refinery Policy and Disposal of North Sea Oil
The following is taken from a written answer in Hansard 
6 December 1974, and althoughthe statements do not represent legal 
constraints they are taken as guidelines for policy.
Refinery Policy
1 . Up to two-thirds of North Sea oil is to be refined in 
the U .K . depending on the level of production.
2 . Refinery capacity is to be upgraded so that lighter 
fractions of the b arre l w ill substitute for "costly 
im ports". a
Depletion Policy
1. No delays w ill be levied on the development of finds 
made or finds made up to the end of 1 975 under the 
existing licence agreements.
2 . No cuts w ill be made from finds already in existence or 
those made before the end of 1975 under the existing
' licensing rounds" until 1982 at the 'earlies t or until
four years after the start of production, whichever is 
la te r" . a
3 . There is to be no cuts in any fie ld  found after 1975 
under existing licences "until 150% of the capital
Slinvestment in the field has been recovered!’ .
4 . Any-cuts in production w ill be limited to a maximum of 
20% of existing (at time of proposed cuts) production 
leve ls .
5. Postponing development of or lim iting production from  
oil fields w ill have repercussions on the offshore 
supply industry and the Government gave notice to 
consider this aspect of depletion policy.
Note: Quotations marked with the prefix 'a ’ are taken from
Hansard, Written Answer, .6 .12 .74 . Cols. • 648-650.
/
CHAPTER THREE
THE FUEL OIL TAX
3*1. Introduction
Chapter One has drawn a distinction between Interventionist and 
workable competition social welfare decision rules for the energy sector. 
Chapter Two developed the Interventionist approach and considered that 
Government policy is retrospective and seeks to maximise the quantity of 
electoral votes in order to ensure re-election. Workable competition, 
on the other hand, provides a role for Government^ through the con­
struction and enactment of various tests.of market performance, struc- ' 
ture and conduct designed to simulate the conditions of perfect compe­
tition.
This chapter provides an empirical test for the distinction be­
tween the efficiency with which resources would be utilized under an 
Interventionist and workable competition social welfare decision rule.
As discussed in Chapter Five, whilst it is possible that an interven­
tionist policy could be similar to a workable competition policy, the 
objective function of the respective Governments remains distinct.
3.2. Rationale and Chronology of the Fuel Oil Tax
The fuel oil tax was imposed as part of the budgetary measures
2announced by the Chancellor m  April 1961. The passage concerning the 
tax is worth quoting at length:
"My third proposal for obtaining extra revenue relates to the 
hydrocarbon oil duty.... Heavy oils used as fuel in road vehicles pay 
the same rate as the petrol they displace, both with minor exceptions,
1.
2.
See Chapter Five.
Budget Statement, 17 April 1961, Hansard, pp. 791-843.
chiefly lubricating oils....all other heavy oils have been free of. 
duty since 1947. The duty on them of Id was then (i.e. 1947) with­
drawn, at a time of acute shortage of coal and when every inducement 
was being offered to get people to change from coal. The same condi­
tions do not exist today and I consider that for revenue reasons heavy 
oils should now bear some duty. I propose, therefore, to reinstate 
the duty at the rate of 2d a gallon, on heavy oils, at present free of 
duty, that is fuel oil, gas oil and kerosine. I estimate the yield at 
£48 million in the present financial year and £50 million in a full year.11
The tax was not a measure specifically born out of fuel policy 
considerations but rather an attempt at "fine tuning" of the economy 
against a background of a deteriorating balance of payments situation 
coupled with growing economic activity. The fiscal package was in­
tended to dampen home, demand for imports, thereby relieving the balance 
of payments whilst keeping to a 2-3% real GNP growth target for 1961/62.
In 1960 there had been a persistent inflow of funds which were sensi- 
. 4
tive to speculative outflows. The revaluation of the DM and Guilder 
in February 1961 caused heavy pressure on sterling but was defused by 
the authorities* mobilising substantial central bank support for ster­
ling. However, the pressure on the pound persisted with reserves con­
tinuing to fall even though the balance of payments on current and long­
term capital accounts showed signs of improvement. With a confidence 
crisis hanging over the country the Selwyn Lloyd budget was geared 
towards restraining the rise in personal consumption. Above all the
3. C.V, Brown, Principles of Applied Economics.
4. A.R. Prest, The U.K. Economy: A Manual of Applied Economics,
Weidenfeid and Nicolson, Third Edition.
"confidence and integrity in the pound sterling both at home and 
abroad""* had to be maintained.
6The passage regarding the imposition of the.tax quoted above 
is worthy of further inspection. The statement that "the same condi­
tions do not exist today’1 was a reference to the surplus coal being pro­
duced at that time. In the same sentence the Chancellor maintained 
that for "revenue reasons" the fuel oil tax would be imposed. One can­
not deny, therefore, that the Government was aware that the tax would 
have an effect on the demand for coal and the various resulting substi­
tution effects. Indeed one may go further and recognise a Government 
desire to remove the coal surplus by means other than reducing the scale 
of NCB output. Overall the Government was aware of the NCBfs problem 
but did not instigate the fuel oil tax primarily for this reaison. The 
tax was principally a response to the position of sterling and the bal­
ance of payments situation and represented a means of. raising revenue 
and dampening consumer spending.. It seems therefore that Government 
energy policy was only a derived policy; a residual discussed only when 
fiscal policy had been satisfied. The over-riding concerns were the 
macro-variables in the economy. In this context the fuel oil tax is 
seen as a measure designed to improve the balance of payments situation 
and although it affected the energy market, the costs of a higher energy 
input were ranked lower than the cost of not using this variable to
5.
6.
Budget Speech, p.802, op.cit. 
p.3.
restore confidence in sterling.
One other point of interest here is that the fuel o il tax was not
imposed on oil used in gasification processes and accordingly the gas
8industry was afforded a degree of protection. The decision to 
allow gas exemption from the tax was based on the belief that with a 
declining market fo r town gas, oil gasification provided a re la tive ly  
low er cost production process for gas. As sales increased, the 
Government’ s rationale was that the price advantage of gas should not 
be eroded through an increase in fuel o il prices to the gas industry.
The Tables below (31 and 32) illustra te  the changes in the fuel 
oil tax and relevant percentages for fuel o il prices as used by the 
CEGB. The variations in the tax rate  were undertaken via the 
regulator during exercises in ’’fine tuning” the economy. The immediate 
direct impact of the tax was to ra ise  pre-tax  fuel oil prices by over 3 6 $ . 
Throughout the period until 1970 o il prices were raised between 30$ and 
38$  by taxes. The pre-tax  oil price rises  in the 1970s meant that the 
contribution of taxes — which remained at 1 p/gallon a fter 1969 -  to the 
post-tax price declined and Table 32 shows that by 1 974 the ra tio  of the 
fuel oil tax to p re -tax  prices was 8 .3 $ . Of course, the higher prices
7 . It  should be mentioned that the tax could be varied under the
"regulator ” . Under this the Government was empowered by 
Parliament to vary , by up to 10$ either way, the rates of purchase 
tax and excise taxes on drink, betting, tobacco and petrol as w ell 
as heavy o ils .
8 . A Fuel Policy for B rita in , PEP., 1966.
fo r oil may be looked upon as additional "OPEC taxes" and in that case 
the assertion is being made that the fuel oil tax declined in importance 
as the other "p ric e -ris e"  taxes increased.
Table 31: Effective Rates of Duty on Fuel Oil 1961 -76.
p per gallon
17 A p ril 1961 0 .833
26 July 1962 0.9*17
9 A p ril 1962 0.833
21 July 1966 0 .917
22 Nov. 1968 1.003
15 A p ril 1969 . 1.000
Source: Digest of Energy Statistics, HMSO, 1972.
Table 32: Oil Fuel Prices and Taxation in the CEGB.
£ per ton coal equivalent
P rice  fuel Tax P rice  T a x /(1 ) T a x /(2 )
o il plus Fuel
tax (1) Oil
(2)
1960 3.95 — 3.950 -  .
1961 4 .56 1.209 3.351 26.5 36.1
1962 4.65 1.152 3.498 24 .8 32 .9
1963 4 .6 4 1.152 3.488 24 .8 33 .0
1964 4 .66 1.152 3.508 24 .7 32 .8
1965 4.31 1.152 3 .158 26.7 36 .5
1966 4 .42 1.209 3.211 27.4 37 .7
1967 5.29 1.271 4.019 25 .0 31 .6
1968 5.55 1.271 4.279 22.9 29 .7
1969 5.05 1.382 3.668 27 .4 37 .7
1970 6 .47 1.382 5.088 21 .4 27 .2
1971 6 .74 1.382 5.358 20.5 25.9
1972 6.43 1.382 5.048 21.5 2 7 .4
1973 7.65 1.382 6.268 18.1 22 .0
1974 . 18.12 1.382 16.736 7 .6 8 .3
Source: Energy Digest. HMSO 1972.
Tables 33 and 34 delineate the receipts from the hydrocarbon 
duty by year from 1961 to 1973/74 and by sector from 1968 to 1974.
1961/62 383*
1962/63 431
1963/64 461
1964/65 529
1965/66 660
1966/67 724
1967/68 664
1968/69 781
1969/70 908
1970/71 965
1971/7 2  1011
1972/73 1090
1973/74 1118
£ million
Fuel oil and 
burning oil
5 6 .0 *
60.0  
68.0
73.0
80.0
n .a . 90.0
212 93.0
246 100.0
285 116.0
298 133.0
299 133.0
323 142.0
336 133.0
Table 33: Net Receipts from Duty on Hydrocarbon Oil.
Light oils D erv.
(gasoline)
n .a .  
n .a .  
n .a .  
n .a .  
n .a .
Source: Energy Digest for various years and Highway S tatistics, 
Department of the Environment 1970, Table 46, p. 79.
*  fo r years 1961-1966 data is Jan.—Jan.
F o r other years A pril-M arch . 
n .a . Data not available fo r these years.
Table 34: Duty on Hydrocarbon oils by Sector.
£ million
1968 1969 1972 1973 1974
Domestic 5 5 10 10 10
Iron & Steel 10 15 10 10 10
Other In ds . 40 50 55 55 45 .
A ir  T rans . 5 10 5* 5 10
Public Service 15 15 20 20 20
Power Station 15 20 45 40 40
Agriculture . 0 0 0 5 5
Source:* Various copies of the Energy D igest. Transport fuels <vcv<5^  
Motor fuel duties excluded.
The 1965 White Paper on Fuel Policy explicitly stated that 
the fuel oil tax was to be used to protect the coal industry:
"This duty was initially imposed for revenue reasons but its protective 
effect on the coal industry was one of the factors taken into account in 
deciding to retain it."^
Retrospectively, therefore, the rationale for the fuel oil tax was laid.
Paradoxically, the Government makes the statement "on fuel 
policy grounds alone, a reduction in the oil duty, and hence of the cost' 
of fuel to industry, is in principle desirable. Although in the present 
circumstances of the coal industry there is no early prospect of such a 
reduction, the Government will keep the question under review. Such
a statement implies that the higher cost of fuels due to the imposition 
of the tax is justified in that it slowed down the contraction rate of 
the coal industry to an "acceptable" level as defined by the Government.
On the issue of the degree to which the fuel oil tax slowed down 
the contraction rate of the coal industry attention is drawn to Table C 
of the 1967 White Paper on Fuel Policy (Cmnd. 3438), in which estimates 
of inland energy demand on varying assumptions are given. The main 
assumptions are as follows: V
9. op. cit.
10. Cmnd. 2798, para. 17.
11. Cmnd. 2798, para. 44.
a) GDP would grow at an average rate  of 3% p .a . measured 
from 1964.
b) ” the re la tiv ity  between coal and oil prices in competitive
12sectors would remain unchanged apart from any tax changes” .
c) 10% of the total natural gas from the North Sea would go 
to power stations.
The relevant figures for the statistical analysis carried  out by the 
M inistry of Power are shown in Table 35, fo r which
I  = assumed immediate removal of the fuel oil tax.
I I  = oil tax at 2d/gallon throughout with no special preference for 
coal at power stations.
I I I  = oil tax at 4d/gallon but 6d/gallon for power station use.
The Table illustra tes , that on the assumptions made, in 1970 the fuel 
oil tax was forecast to support extra coal consumption in industry 
by 5 .5  million tons at a tax rate  of 2d/gallon and by 15.5  m illion tons 
at 4d/gallon with power stations paying 6d/gallon. Demand fo r oil 
declines accordingly so as to keep overall total energy demand at 
approximately 31 2 million tons. As is  seen from the coal and oil 
figures, power stations and industry would be the markets that would 
increase coal consumption under the various cases. F o r the 1970 
forecast, the difference between no tax and a 2d/gallon tax represents  
a 3 million ton extra burn for coal in power stations with a
12. Cmnd. 3438, op. c i t . ,  Appendix I ,  para. 8.
concomitant.decline in oil consumption. The industrial sector under 
the same conditions would burn 2 .5  million tons more coal.
Table 35: Demand Forecasts for the Energy Sector.
Million tons coal equivalent
Assumption 1970 1975
Natural Gas 1000 2000 6000
(Million cubic feet daily)
O il Tax I n in I
Total Inland 
demand for 
energy.
Coal 143. 5 149 1.59 124.5
Oil 138 132 122 165.5
Nuclear 
& Hydro., 17 17 17 37
Natural
Gas 14 14 14 28
Demand 
fo r Coal
Power
Stations 69 72 78 71
Industry 16. 5 19 21. 5 9
Domestic 21 21 21. 5 15
Demand 
fo r Oil
Power
Stations 18 16 11 25
Industry 43 41 39 50
Domestic 4 4 4 5
n m i i i  m
28.5 150.5 105 110.5 127
62.5 141 .5 127 121 .0 103
37 37 35 36 36
27 27 77 77 77
74 91 60 63 76
10 14 3 5 8
15.5 16 14.5 14.5 14
25 12 24 21 9
48.5 45 .5 25 23 20
5
•
5 4 4 4
Source: Appendix I, Cmnd. 3438, 1967.
The 1975 forecasts were "eight-year” forecasts and were  
therefore treated with greater circumspection than the 1970 one.
The difference in natural gas coming on stream was assumed to be 
mainly at the expense of oil so that in the case of 2000 mcfd of natural 
gas a tax of 2d/gailon meant another 4 million tons of coal were burnt 
while fo r 6000 mcfd the extra burn would be 5 .5  million tons. Again 
most of this increased burn was through power stations.
3 .3  Impact of fuel oil tax on fuel oil markets.
3.31 Introduction.
The following section considers the qualitative evidence that 
exists fo r the impact of the fuel oil tax on fuel oil markets. The 
period under study commences in 1958/59 in view of the ban on oil 
imports by the U .S .A . in that year. This ban led to excess supplies 
of crude oil and products in Western Europe thereby sharply 
differentiating the post 1958/59 period from the pre-1958/59 one. The 
end of the period is drawn with the publication of the 1965 White Paper 
on Fuel Policy and its attempt to establish a "coherent" fuel policy fo r  
the U .K . In qualitatively assessing this period attention is mostly 
confined to the period p rio r to the tax. Following the imposition of 
the tax i t  becomes more and more subjective to argue that deviations 
from previous years ' consumption figures were directly  attributable to 
the tax. In consequence the information given below does not attempt 
to draw firm  conclusions but ra ther presents a background against 
which quantitative analysis can be undertaken. **
Although the fuel oil tax was levied on gas, diesel oils and heavy 
fuel o ils , attention is  confined to the last with the impact of the tax on 
fuel o il markets being considered on a short (one year) and a medium 
(greater than one year) term basis with division into various consumption 
groups.
Table 36 illustrates that from 1947 to 1958 the proportion of fuel
o il to total petroleum products doubled -  symptomatic of the substitution
of fuel o il for coal. From  1960 to 1970 the proportion of fuel oil to
total oil production remained approximately constant at around 4 0 $ .
This reflected the major shift of industrial fuel consumption from coal to 
13oil . The decline in the lighter fractions of the b a rre l was due 
prim arily  to the demise of naphtha (after 1967 because of declining use 
fo r gasification once North Sea gas was. available) and e a rlie r  to declining
consumption of aviation.sp irit (which was substituted by je t fue l), wide-cut
1 4 *1 5gasoline and trac to r vaporising oil (a derivative of kerosine). The
figure fo r 1975 illustrates that consumption of fuel o il has decreased at
a faster ra te  than total petroleum products in response to the price rises
of 1973 and 1974 as coal has become more competitive.
13. See Table 67 for share of coal in CEGB output.
14. In favour of kerosine due to safety reasons.
15. Because of the change to diesel engines.
F irs t differencing of the fuel oil series (Table 37) shows the 
reduction in the rate  of increase of consumption to 1379 thousand 
tons in 1960/61 compared to 3626 thousand tons in the previous year 
(1959-60). The rate  of increase of consumption rose again in 1961-62, 
fe ll back in the following year and again rose a fter 1963-64. F irs t  
differences of fuel oil prices as used by industry are also shown in 
Table 37.
Table 36: Fuel Oil as a Proportion of Total.Petroleum Products.
Thousand tons.
Fuel oil (1) Total
Products (2) (1 ) /(2 )  $
1947 1936 12126 16 .0
1950 3093 15277 20 .2
1955 5384 23237 23 .2
1958 10582 31066 34 .0
1959 13812 37514 36 .8
1960 17438 42695 4 0 .8
1961 18817 46015 40 .9
1962 21329 50900 41 .9
1963 22704 55692 4 0 .8
1964 24805 61122 40 .6
1965 27296 66921 40 .7
1966 29095 72519 40.1
1967 30608 78145 39 .2
1970 37975 95337 39 .8
1973 42026 114338 36 .8
1974 40022 111217 36 .0
1975 32711 93579 35 .0
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest.
Table 37: Fuel Oil Prices For Industry.
Fuel P rice  
To Industry 
(after tax, 
£/ton)
Change in Fuel 
Oil P rice  to 
Industry 
(a fter tax)
Change in Fuel 
Oil
Consumption
(tons)
1958/59 5.59 -0 .4 7 +3230
1959/60. 5 .12 -0 .2 4 +3626
1960/61 4 .88 -0 .4 1 +1379
1961/62 '4.46 +0.53 +2512
1962/63 5.00 -0 .2 9 +1375
1963/64 4.71 -0 .3 0 +2101■ * ■
1964/65 ; 4.41 -0 .2 9 +2491
1965/66  . 4 .1 2  : +0 • 23 +1799
1966/67 4 .35 +0.71 +1513
Source: Compiled from Energy Digest.
The hypothesis that a r is e  in fuel oil prices w ill lead to a 
decline in the quantity of fuel oil demanded, ceteris paribus, cannot 
of course be evaluated from the above tab le . However
the following points can be noted. Non-price effects were sufficiently  
strong in 1961-62 and 1965-67 to outweigh any pr5ce r is e  effects on fuel 
oil consumption. Moreover, if  the existence of a lag of approximately 
one year is postulated between price rises and the ir effects on fuel o il - 
demand, then some degree of correlation exists between the ra te  of 
change of fuel oil prices and the ra te  of change of fuel oil consumption.
Z.32 Short-run impact of the fuel oil tax .
The graphs overleaf illustrate  the time profile of demand fo r oil 
in  various industries over the period 1958-75 which may be classified  
into four groups as follows.
a) Immediate reduction in fuel oil consumption.
The imposition of the tax on steel (Graph 1), engineering 
(Graph 4) and chemicals (Graph 3) is characterised by a decrease in  
the ra te  of increase in fuel oil consumption following the imposition of 
the tax . This effect is  marked for steel with a 1 5$ growth rate  over 
the years 1958-60 and 3 .5 $  fo r 1 960-61 , which implies a 500,000 
million tons coal equivalent reduction in the increase of oil consumption 
from the 1960/61 figure (see Table 38). F o r engineering and chemicals 
the reduction in the increase of the growth rate  is smaller: fo r chemicals 
a 44$ growth rate over the years 1958-60 becomes 10$ for 1960-61 or a 
reduction in the increase from the 1960/61 figure of 150,000 m .t .c .e .
and for engineerings 25$ growth rate  over the.years 1 958/60 becomes 
13$ in 1960-61 or 110,000 m .t .c .e .  reduction in the increase from the 
1960-61 figure. The years 1961-62 are characterised by an acceleration  
in the growth rate  fo r fuel oil consumption such that by 1963 growth rates  
had resumed their p re -tax  rates in a ll cases except engineering. As 
Graph 5 shows, however, an increase in the growth rate  to 1 0 .5 $  took 
place in the engineering sector in 1964/65. Tentatively it appears that 
the tax generally acted as a tw o-year ’’discontinuity." in an underlying 
upward trend in the demand fo r fuel o il. This upward trend in the 
consumption of fuel oil by a ll sectors was a consequence, p rim arily , 
of the falling re a l price of fuel o il. This in turn was a consequence 
not only of additional supplies of crude oil coming onto the market but 
also to the American ban on oil imports (see Chapter Four ) . As the 
economy expanded fuel oil not only took a proportion of the expanding 
share of the market but also captured some of the market which had 
traditionally belonged to coal.
Table 38: Growth Rates of Fuel Oil By Sector.($)
Steel Chemicals Engineering
1958-59 11 63 29
1959-60 29 25 21
1960-61 3 .5  10 13
1961-62 8 ;4  .17 .7  ‘ 10.1
1962-63 20 .4  23 13 .6
1963-64 16 .0  11 3 .0
Source: Compiled from Energy Digest, 1972.
b) No discernible effect on fuel oil consumption.
The cases of food (Graph 4), textiles (Graph 5), 
bricks (Graph 6) and timber (Graph 7) are interesting although 
inconclusive in that in each case the year 1960-61 shows a sharp 
upturn in oil consumption. It is possible in the case of food, 
textiles and timber that the consequences of the tax were felt 
with a lag or that the upturn in the economy in 1960-61 over-rode 
any decrease in consumption due to the tax. In the case of 
bricks rising demand in the economy could exhibit itself in 
greater building and construction activity with a concomitant 
increase in the demand for bricks.
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e) The secondary fuel industries.
The case of the CEGB is discussed fully in Section 4 .4  
and attention here is drawn to the town gas industry. Fuel oil 
consumption, which has always been very small in the gas industry 
which used coal and la te r naphtha as gas-m akingm aterials, was at its  
maximum in 1965 at 600,000 m .t .c .e .  The gas industry was unaffected 
by the tax by virtue of its exemption (see*3 . 2 above). .
d). The Central Heating Sector.
The series fo r central heating shows no discernible change 
from trend following the imposition of the fuel oil tax, this may be 
partly because the capital cost of installing central heating represents  
a major consumer spending decision in which fuel prices may appear 
comparatively unimportant and partly because oil prices s till remained 
relatively, cheaper than coal. In the years 1 961-64 consumption of 
fuel o il increased by nearly two million tons coal equivalent -  a 75% 
increase on its 1961 leve l. Data fo r pre-1961 is not tabulated due to 
inconsistencies in the series . • .
i
3.33 Long-run impact of the fuel oil tax.
In considering the long-run effects of the tax two problems have 
to be faced. The firs t is  that as the period for analysis is further away 
from the date of imposition of the tax it  becomes more and more difficult 
to disentangle the various economic strands. Secondly, minor changes 
in the tax under the regulator, are not sufficiently "strong” to allow  
disentanglement of various economic shocks. Thus the long-run cannot 
be considered in detail apart from making the following very general 
comments:
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest, 
All. Central Heating
National and Local Government B uild ings -
—
a) After a period of approximately two years all sectors - 
ignoring for the present the C E G B  - appear to have resumed their 
pre-1961 rates of growth for fuel oil consumption and
. b) as time went on the dominant effects on fuel oil consumption 
shifted to other variables such as the level of aggregate demand or 
later still a rise in crude oil prices.
3.4 Impact of fuel oil tax on coal markets..
3.41 Short-run impact of the fuel oil tax on coal markets.
As with Section 3.2 the following treats the information taken 
from various price and consumption series in a qualitative manner. The 
price series for coal to industry is shown in Graph 10 and shows the 
rising price trend for coal during the period 1954-61... Thereafter 
prices remained steady at approximately £5.80 per ton Until 1966. Some 
decline in price occurred in 1967 and 1968 but this was followed by a 
rise of 58$ in prices to £8.70 per ton over the period 1968-72. On
the consumption side only food and engineering (see Graphs 1 to 9)
show any indication that contraction rates chang-ed significantly in the 
period following the imposition of the tax.
Table 39: Rates of Change of Coal Consumption by Sector ($)
Chemi- Engin- T e x - T im -
Steel Food cals eering tiles Bricks ber Gas
1958-59 -11 .0 -3.4 -2.3 -8.7 -5.8 -6.6 -2.4 -9.2
1959-60 -1.3 - 1 . 2 -2.7 +1.3 -7.6 +3.3 -0.9
1960-61 -14.8 +0.5 -2.9 -6.3 +12.8 -8.0 -3.0 -0.4
1961-62 -18.9 -6.3 -3.4 +2.0 -6.8 -5.3 -3.5 -0.4
1962-63 - 8.8 — 1.0. -5.2 -4.3 -5.8 -10.2 +0.1 0.0
Source: Compiled from copies of the Energy Digest.
tot*.
Such changes in growth rates must be handled carefully since they must 
carry the influence of other economic variables - such as the level of 
aggregate demand in the economy. Moreover, there is nothing to 
compare the contraction rates with] In talking of a contraction rate 
of 3'*fo one is discussing it in terms of historical contraction rates and 
not with reference to the contraction rates which would have occurred 
without the tax. Thus the most that can'be done is to note that growth 
rates were negative implying that at best-the fuel oil tax may have 
slowed down the contraction rate for coal consumption. Even if this were 
so and the evidence.for food, engineering and perhaps bricks is extremely 
slender on this point, throughout, the period 1960-63 contraction rates 
remained, on a historical basis, relatively high. Only in the case of 
gas did the coal burn remain stabilised at approximately 22 million tons. 
However this stability was evident in 1959-60 and thus is not attributable 
to the fuel oil tax. The explanation is rather to be found in the . 
stagnation in the demand for gas along with the technology used. The 
advent of oil-gasification and liquefied natural gas after 1963 led to a 
sharp depline in coal consumption by the Gas Corporation.
3.5 Collective Qualitative Evidence on the Fuel Oil Tax.
The preceding statistics indicate some points that need to be 
re-emphasized before proceeding. First, the change in the market 
environment following the American ban on oil imports and the increased 
supply of oil (see Table 4) need to be noted. This fundamental change 
in the oil and energy markets produced a decrease in the real price of 
oil which gathered momentum during the late 1 950s and early 1 960s.
The imposition of the fuel oil tax took place against a declining trend of 
oil prices. The dynamics of the pricing system need to be stressed 
here , for whereas the tax raised the fuel oil price level ’’overnight” , 
the dynamics of the system allowed the decline in fuel oil prices to 
proceed over time in a sim ilar manner to that before the tax was 
imposed.
Faced with the tax the share of fuel oil as a proportion of total 
petroleum products did not decline nor did the absolute consumption of 
fuel oil over a ll sectors (ignoring fo r the moment the CEGB). The 
tax appears to have had some effect on growth rates of fuel’ oil in various  
sectors, although the degree to which this was so is hard to determine 
from the data. Extension of the sample periods would not help in this 
matter since it  is impossible to judge post 1958/59 figures against 
previous ones. V ery  loosely what evidence there is suggests that in 
the case of the consumption of fuel o il, the food, textiles , bricks and 
cement and timber sectors saw an upturn in consumption due to growth 
in the economy. The steel, engineering and chemicals sectors saw an 
aggregate decrease in oil consumption of approximately one million tons 
coal equivalent on the p re-tax  consumption leve l. Within one to two 
years of the imposition of the tax pre-tax  growth rates were resumed. 
The evidence for a change in the ra te  of decline of coal consumption is 
also slender. Rates of decline remained approximately constant before 
and a fter the tax in a ll sectors with the possible exception of food and 
engineering.
3.6.' Impact of the fuel oil tax on the C.E.G.B.
3.61. Introduction.
The difficulties associated with measuring the impact of the fuel 
oil tax arise from two sources. On the one hand industries may not 
adjust immediately to price changes so that the impact of the tax is 
associated with a lag of unknown length. The second difficulty is that
the longer the length of the lag the more likely it becomes that other
economic variables impinge on the system, with lags of their own, so 
that the effects of the "shock" variables interfere with each other.
In such circumstances it becomes difficult to draw any quantitative 
conslusions about the fuel oil tax. One is usually left, as was seen in 
Section 3.3 and 3.4 in making very general qualitative statements based 
on slender evidence.
The impact of the tax on the sectors mentioned in Section 3.2
may only be assessed through the use of a much larger data base along
with econometric analysis. However, these two ingredients do not 
automatically make for "better" analysis.
In order to overcome these objections one needs to study a sector 
in which the response mechanism to the tax is immediate and, moreover, 
can be isolated so that the qualitative effect on individual variables may 
be measured. Such a unique system is to be found in the e lectric ity
supply industry . .
16Graph 11 overleaf shows the fuel consumed in CEGB operations 
fo r the period 1952 /53-1974 /75 . Immediately noticeable are the 
continual growth of fuel consumption in the e lectric ity  sector until the 
early  1970s and the introduction of fuel oil into the fuel mix from  
approximately 1 955. Consumption of fuel oil rose from 0 .5  m .t .c .e .  in 
1956 to nearly 10 m .t .c .e .  in 1960. The growth rates of fuel consumption 
are shown in Table 40. P r io r  to the tax being imposed in 1961 the ra te  
of growth of oil supplies was re la tive ly  high. In the year following  
the tax consumption remained steady at just over 9 m .t .c .e .  There  
was a recovery of sqme 0 .5  m .t .c .e .  in  1961 /6 2 -6 2 /6 3  (growth ra te  
6 .1 ^ ) followed by a drop in consumption in the next year which lasted  
until 1963 /64 -64 /65 . This reduction appears to have been due to the
contraction of overall demand in the economy. The figures fo r coal
/ *
do not imply that growth rates accelerated due to the imposition of the 
tax; indeed they appear to suggest the reverse. In the la te r period  
the effects of a lower level of aggregate demand are to be discerned.
16. The CEGB cover the areas of England and Wales. Scotland and 
Northern Ireland have their own Authorities.
Table 40. Growth Rates for Fuel Consumption in the CEGB (^ )
Coal Oil
1958 /59-59 /60  4 .3  40 .6
1959/60-60/61 10.2 20.0
1960/61-61/62 10 .7 0 .0
1961 /62-62 /63  8 .9  6.1
1962 /63 -63 /64  5 .7  -1 9 .9
1963 /64-64 /65  4 .3  19.2
Source: Compiled from various copies of the Energy Digest.
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The graphed series of fuel prices including tax (Graph 1 2) illustrates  
the manner in which oil prices fe ll until the advent of the tax a fter  
which prices held steady until 1964/65. In the case of coal prices  
the period 1957-64/65 is  characterised by re la tive ly  stable prices  
to the e lectric ity  industry. The fuel oil tax was increased by 0.074p  
in  1966 but the upturn in the series cannot be d irectly  associated with 
this since the 1967 Seven Day War raised freight rates and ultimately 
fuel o il prices. Small alterations in the tax rate  become difficult to 
decipher when viewed against other la rg e r changes in price term s.
Fuel o il.prices (see Table 32) were increased by £0^61 per ton 
in 1961 compared to the pre-tax  value of £3.95 per ton and it appears 
that because of competition among oil companies a significant part of 
the tax was "absorbed", so that the difference of £0.60 per ton was 
recouped in a lower purchase price of fuel oil by the C EG B . That 
oil prices were falling  as a resu lt of increasing supplies of fuel oil 
reaching the market is not in doubt. Compounded with th is, however, 
is  the point that the atmosphere of price competition in the fuel oil 
market at this time may have resulted in  long-term  contracts being 
placed by the CEGB fo r fuel oil on re la tive ly  favourable term s.
Moreover, the contract terms by which the CEGB buys oil from the oil 
companies may have been such that the oil companies absorbed a proportion  
of the tax. The CEGB would have passed on the entire tax to the A rea  
Boards so that it  is like ly  that the A rea Boards followed suit. The price  
series for e lectric ity  to industry (see Table 41) shows that whereas 
electric ity  prices fe ll in 1959 and 1960 they rose in 1961 . The efficiency  
figures for power stations show that in 1959 and 1960, when e lec tric ity  
prices were fa lling , the average yearly increase in thermal efficiency of
Table 41: Electricity Prices to Industry.
E lectric ity  Change in Average Change in
. Prices E lec tric ity  Thermal Average
Pence per Prices Efficiency(^) Thermal
kWh Efficiency
1954 0 .482 23.83
+0.011 +0.52
1955 0.493
+0.032
24.35
+0.58
1956 0.525
+0.020
24.93
+0.58
1957 0.545
+0.011
25.51
+0.59
1958 0.556
-0 .0 2 4
26.10
+0.43
1959 0.532
-0 .0 0 9
26.53
+0.26
1960 0.523
+-0.028
26.80
+0.52
1961 0.551
+0.011
27.32
+0.12
1962 0.562
+0.010
27.44
+0.23
1963 0.572 27.67
-0 .0 0 3 , -0 .1 8
1964 0.569
+0.026
27.49
-0 .2 0
1965 0.595 27.29
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest, HMSO.
power stations also declined. With constant fuel costs it would be 
expected, ceteris paribus, that a greater change in efficiency would 
lead to a lower price fo r e lec tric ity . This was not the case in 1961 .. 
An increase of 0.028p/kW h represented an increase of 5 .4 $  on the
1960 price for e lec tric ity . This increase cannot be wholly attributed  
to the tax since coal prices rose in that year by approximately lOp/ton  
(oil prices rose by about 60p/ton). The CEGB estimated that fo r ,
1961 /6 2  higher fuel charges along with the fuel oil tax increased
17the ir expenditure on fuel by about £13.5 m illion, with nearly £9 
million of that accruing from the oil duty. Thus nearly tw o-th irds of 
extra expenditure was derived from the tax. Using this ra tio  as a 
guide it is  possible that the 1961 rise  in e lectric ity  p rices, d irectly  
attributable to the tax, was of the order 0 .02  p/kWh. However, by 
calculating the fuel oil tax in p/kWh, under the assumption that the tax  
was passed on from the CEGB to the Area Boards at 100$, the value 
obtained was 0.0086p/kW h. The difference in the two figures would 
suggest that either prices, and expenditure do not move in a linear-type  
relationship or that the price r is e  in e lectric ity  in 1961 was in excess 
of that derived from the fuel oil tax alone.
17* para. 2 , CEGB Annual Report and Accounts, 1961/62.
Table 42: CEGB Fuel Oil Duty.
-1961/62 8 .9
1962/63 11 .8
1963/64 10 .8
1964/65 10.5
1965/66 11 .6
1966/67 13 .2
1967/68 12 .04
1968/69 18 .7
1969/70 24 .7
1970/71 3 1 .5
1971/72 35 .2
1972/73 4 4 .6
1973/74
£ million
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest and CEGB Annual 
Report and Accounts fo r various years.
3.62. The Merit-Order System
The flex ib ility  of the CEGB system to fuel cost changes is 
accomplished through the m erit-o rder system. This system has the 
advantage of being very responsive to such changes so that problems 
regarding lags no longer are of concern. The basis fo r organising the 
system lies in the fact that a ll power sources ( i .e .  generation stations) 
and power sinks ( i .e .  distribution points) are interconnected by means 
of transmission w ires of various voltages. (132kV and 400kV). This 
interconnection makes for lower aggregate generation and distribution  
costs since stations do not have to be built near specific demand a rea s . 
M oreover, economies of scale are reaped as individual power stations 
do not have a ’ confined’ distribution boundary. In addition transport 
and environmental costs may be considered in the form of siting  
arrangements, -  fo r example, coal stations near coalfields and nuclear 
power stations near estuaries. The existence of the G rid  is  the pre­
requisite lo r the operation of the m erit-o rd er system.
Consider a typical annual demand curve for e lectric ity  calculated  
through the summation of daily demand curves as shown below.
m m
Load Duration
. f(z)
Time
Diagram 1 1 x Load Duration and Demand curves for the CEGB.
The load duration curve is constructed from the demand curve 
through graphing those periods of time when demand exceeds or is  equal 
to any level of demand Z .  C learly  the duration of a load may be w ritten  
f(Z ) and the inverse Z = g(t) represents the demand level which is  
exceeded or equalled fo r a given period t .  Total demand is simply 
w ritten as
D =
I
max f(Z)dZ
0
or for intermediate points
Z ,
D * = j f(Z )d Z  where Z.i >  z i> zr zi >
Z.
1
If  the strong assumption is made that running costs of generation costs
18 19are  independent of capacity utilisation rates ( i .e .  load factors) 9 
then total output w ill be distributed among various stations depending 
on the ranking of running costs. Thus fo r two plants with running 
costs r^ and r 2 , ^  r 2 > total output w ill be w ritten as
Z , Z . + Z 2
f(Z )dZ
Z 1 Z 1 
D = J f(Z)dZ + j
0
where Z^ , Z^ are the capacities of stations (1) and (2) respectively.
If  n plants are considered the following schedules are available in  
year t .  .
Running costs: r^ (1) ^  r  (2) ^  #  ^  ^ ^ r t (n)
Capacity: Z t (1 ), Z t (2), ................ . . . . Z t (n)
I: By tabulating running costs against cumulative system capacity
the marginal cost of introducing additional units of capacity into 
generation is graphed.
18. This may be w ritten Z^ + Z 2
^  f(Z )dZ  . 100 /  tZ 2
Z 1
1 9 . In rea lity  running costs are proportional to the load factor and 
thus stations may have a lower marginal cost than other stations 
before maximum load is reached.
Diagram 1 2: The Merit-order System.
r t (n)
Running
Costs
\(1)
Z t(1)
Total Cumulative system capacity.
Z t(»)
Diagram 1 2 represents the m erit-o rder system and from it total system 
running costs can be derived. Approximating the histogram in the 
diagram by the curve r^ = ty (Z) where Z  is total cumulative system 
capacity and r^ . is running cost in year t of unit of plant at point Z  in
the merit order, the load curve is given as f^(Z) and thus total system 
running costs in year t are
(Z)ft (Z)dZ.
0
In practice the setting up of a merit order curve - the marginal 
generating cost schedule of additional units of plant - is undertaken for 
values of t of various duration. On a daily basis four time periods are 
considered of six hours duration each, which are further subdivided as 
shown below.
Time Sub-periods
0«r6 2
6-12 2
12-18 3
18-24 3
In each of these sub-periods the merit-order profile is re-optimised. 
There are, however, constraints on the system. The first of these 
may be classified as technical limitations. The use of steam turbines 
requires that they be continually used at some minimum load. Also 
large generating plants cannot be run up and put on load quickly and 
thus in the night time ’’trough” period, considerable spare capacity 
is carried, in order to have the plants ready to meet peak demands in 
the morning periods. To be balanced against this constraint is the 
fact that a drive to ignore this condition would result in an increase 
in station failure rates. Flexibility is, however, found in gas turbines 
(which are expensive to run), pumped storage and hydroelectric power
i
X ,max,t
Rt = I rt
stations which can be run up in two or three minutes. Another set of 
boundary conditions arises from the daily demand estimates which are 
made and used as a basis for provisional plant programmes, which 
may be changed up to three hours before the demand period in question. 
As these estimates will be in error from the actual due, for example, 
to abnormalities in the weather, the merit-order must reflect a degree 
of slack appropriate to some subjective error judgement. Thirdly, 
servicing of stations along with failures and other contingencies 
requires a risk premium in the form of spare capacity. The monitoring 
of the merit-order system is undertaken through the maintenance of 
electricity frequency at 50 = 0.2 Herz. A falling frequency implies 
the need to increase output and vice versa. An increase in output 
can stimulate a re-optimisation of the merit-order.
For the C E G B  the optimising procedure used in ranking marginal
20 ’costs has been of three kinds
a) Pre-1963. The cost data used were those actually incurred 
at stations in a preceding three months periods. Average cost of fuel 
was used if supplies were received from different sources.
b) Station Marginal Costing (1963-74) . Here marginal cost was 
defined as the cost of the dearest fuel which would be rejected by 
reducing the demand on a generator by one unit of electricity. The 
planning horizon was three months.
20. S.J. Morley, The Operation of the C E G B  System, The Institute 
of Fuel, The O.R. Society, 15/16 April 1975.
c) System Marginal Costing (from 1974). This method 
determines the value of plant to the whole system on a monthly basis. 
The system marginal cost of a generating set is the cost to the system
machine. The fuel from a given source used at one station may deprive 
another station with the result that some other, more expensive, source 
may have to be used.. The net system cost attributable to the firs t  
station is , thus the higher source cost, not the one actually supplying 
the station.
3.63. The Market Share Model. .
The m erit-o rder is changed as re la tive  costs and availab ilities  
change and consequently the model used here to assess the impact of 
the fuel oil tax makes use of a market share econometric approach.
This approach centres on the a p rio ri belief that changes in fuel inputs 
can be satisfactorily explained by changes in re la tive  fuel prices and 
that the total quantity of fuel input is related to the e lectric ity  generated
as a whole of allocating an additional unit of consumer demand to that
/.
by a simple linear engineering relationship of the form
Qj = a +- bE
g (1)
where Q, is the total quantity of fuel used by the CEGB, E is the total
e lectric ity  generated by the CEGB, ”b” represents the thermal 
efficiency of generation and "a" is a constant. Relating equation (1)
to a share model the following constructions may be used.
in which Qc/Q^ is the share of coal in the total quantity of fuel consumed, 
Pc/ p 0 is  the price ratio  of coal to oil and P^/P^ the price ratio  of coal 
to an index for fuels, constructed from coal and oil data. The use of 
both forms of the market share model is based on the following. The 
use of the dependent variable as Q /Q . would dictate, under symmetrical
C 1
assumptions, the use of an independent variable of the form P^/P^.
However, the construction of an index fo r P  ^would involve the use of
Qf ,Q c and (the quantity of oil) and consequently, m ulticollinearity
would exist between the LHS and the RHS of the equation. The use,
however, of the ratio  P ^ /P ^  secures such independence although the
equation is no longer symmetrical. As the re la tive  price of coal fa lls
the fraction of coal consumed in proportion to the total fuel burn would
be expected to increase, therefore a p r io r i, the sign on the P c variab le
should be negative, ceteris paribus. Likew ise, ceteris paribus, a
decline in oil price would be expected to reduce the fraction Q^ /Q^ . In
effect, therefore, the assumption is made that P q is a proxy fo r
(P Q + P Q ) /Q . or -v o o c c" f
p  t/ (p Q  + p  Q  )/Q,v o o c c" f
s'.'- ■ ' • ■
Po°Cp o « V Qr> + Pc ( V QP • • • • • ( 4 )
In the limiting case as Q^" }  Q^ , fo r this approximation to hold the
(P o ,Q^) relationship must be more elastic — i . e .  unstable -  than the
(P ^,Q  ) relationship. As shown in D iagram -13 this implies that the C O *
demand curve for oil is elastic in a region such as b-a and inelastic fo r
the coal demand curve in the same region. Thus the second variable 
on the R H S  of (4) tends towards some constant k and
P 0( P (Q /Qr) + kO “  o o f
and so the proxy is valid.
The factor Z in equation (2) and (3) is included as a dummy
variable to capture Government intervention. The exact nature of this
P o
100$a
Diagram 13: Demand curves for coal and fuel oil by CEGB.
dummy is very difficult to determine as Government intervention has 
been wide-ranging. Moreover, the intensiveness of intervention
exhibits a problem of measurement itself. Should immediate impact 
parameters be considered or longer-run consequences of shocks to the 
system? If longer run parameters are considered it could be argued 
that the price relative and Z will exhibit multi-collinearity since all 
Government invervention eventually works its way through the market 
system and is ultimately reflected in price movements. Accordingly 
linking the dummy variable to impact parameters allows the removal of 
some of this interdependence. The dummy scheme used was based on 
a study of Government fuel policy instruments during the period 1954-60.
/
Dummy Matrix (1934-60) and (1954-72)
Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4 Run 5 Run 6 Run 7 Run 8 Run 9
1 9 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 9 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 _
1956 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
1957 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
1958 1 1 0 1 2 5 1 0
1959 1 1 0 2 3 6 1 . 0
1960 0 1 0 3 4 7 1 0
1961 2 2 0
1962 2 2 0
1963 . 2 2 0
1964 3 3 0
1965 • ^ 3 3 0
1966 3 3 0
1967 3 3 0
1968 3 3 0
1969 3 3 0
1970 3 3 0
1971 3 3 0
1972 2 2 0
For the period 1954-60 Run 1 carried the dummy values of (1,1) at 
(1958,1959) on the basis that the Government at that time decided to stop 
conversion of power stations from coal to oil. One may argue that the
inclusion of dummies reflects those stations which were retained in 
service burning coal rather than being taken out of service to be 
refitted. Conversions stopped in 1960 and so the dummy is relegated 
to zero but Run 2 assesses the impact of a three year dummy. Run 3 
assumes no dummy, postulating that the power station deferment of 
conversion programme had only a small effect on the Q c/Q^ ratio.
Run 4 assumes an increasing dummy of (1,2,3) in (1958,1959,1960) 
under the rationale that the deferment of the conversion programme 
along with Government ’’behind the curtain” pressure increased as coal 
markets began to contract. Run 5 is as Run 4 except that the impact of 
Government intervention in 1958 is given more weight. Run 6 takes a 
very stringent view of intervention and considers the case of steadily 
increasing bureaucratic interference throughout the years 1954-60.
(Runs 7 and 8 and 9 are discussed below p.198 .)
It may be argued that the construction of these variables is 
somewhat arbitrary. The basis for the selection is perhaps better 
explained with reference to Chapter Four which deals with other policy 
instruments. A  priori, one would expect an intervention dummy to have 
a positive sign with respect to the coal share variable. However, the 
analysis assumes that Government plans and intervention instruments 
act immediately and this may not be the case. For the CEGB Government 
intervention, which defers conversion from coal to oil-fired stations may 
lead not to an extra coal burn but a re-arrangement of the merit-order 
through which existing oil stations may be operated at a higher load 
factor. The result may even be a perverse reaction in which Government 
intervention brings forth a decline in coal usage. It is only in the longer
term when the merit-order can no longer justify increasing load factors 
in existing oil-fired stations that Government intervention may increase 
the coal burn. . This would suggest the existence of a lag in the dummy 
variable.
The dummy matrix for the years 1961-72 (see overleaf) allows 
for more variation in assessing Government intervention shocks than 
in the pre-1961 case. Five particular cases were chosen as detailed 
below.
Dummy Matrix (1961 -72)
Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4 Run
1961 1 1 1 0
1962 1 1 1 0
1963 1 1 1 1 0
1964 2 2 2 1 0
1965 2 2 3 1 0
1966 2 2 . 4 1 0
1967 3 3 5 2 0
1968 3 3 6 2 0
1969 3 3 5 2 0
1970 2 1 4 1 0
1971 2 1 3 .1 0
1972 2 1 2 1 0
Run 1 The use of dummies here is based on a normal distribution of 
dummies but skewed towards the years 1967-69 to reflect increased
protection methods as detailed in the 1967 White Paper on Fuel Policy 
(see Chapter Four ). The rising price of oil after and during 1 970/71 
is considered to have reduced the need for some Government intervention 
as opposed to the earlier period. The increase in the dummy from 
unity to two reflects the Government’s moves towards a ’’unified” and 
more intensive protection schedule for coal after the 1965 White Paper. 
Run 2 This distribution of dummies is a derivative of Run 1 with 
Government intervention falling off more rapidly after 1 970 with the 
price of fuel oil rising.
Run 3 This uses a normal distribution of Government intervention
building up from the 1964/65 White Paper, peaking in 1968, and falling
back to two before the discontinuity in oil prices in 1973/74.
Run 4 Dummies are placed at unity in all years except 1967-69 when
the protection for coal markets - especially the C E G B  - seems to have
been valued by the Government as a higher priority than in previous 
21
years.
Run 5 This case reflects the proposition that Government intervention 
had no more impact on the C E G B  coal burn than would be captured by, 
the error term in an O L S  regression.
The dummy matrix for the years 1954-72 (see Page 195) consists 
of a no dummy case (Run 9) along with a second case (Run 7) in which the
21. For an explanation of why the Government valued protection 
highly at this time see Chapter Four.
dummy is placed at unity in 1958, 1959 and 1960 to reflect deferment 
of conversion of coal to oil-fired stations; 2 in 1961 , 1962 and 1963 
to capture the ban on coal imports and Russian oil imports along with 
any non-price effects of the fuel oil tax. For 1964-71 a dummy of 3 
is used to capture the array of instruments postulated in the White 
Papers (see Chapter Four) and the dummy is returned to 2 in 1972 to 
reflect the rising price of crude oil. The third case (Run 8) accepts 
the dummies outlined immediately above for 1961-72 but assumes a 
constant degree of Government intervention in the C E G B  over the years 
1954-60.
The stability of the model is considered by looking at the results 
for a short period, 1954-60 and a longer period 1954-72. The dates 
chosen are not arbitrary but reflect in the first case the commencing 
date of known oil price data and the dilution of Korean War effects; the 
terminal date is the last full year before the imposition of the fuel oil 
tax. In the second case the terminal date is 1 972 thus allowing the 
coal mining strikes of 1972 and 1974 to be ignored. The data series 
used are taken from the Handbook of Electricity Supply Statistics 
and the total quantity of fuel burnt is taken as the sum of the quantities 
of coal and oil used, i.e.
Qj = Q q + Q c (Units million tons coal equivalent)
This ignores the various quantities of coke, natural gas and nuclear 
fuel consumed by the industries and may be justified in .the case of 
natural gas by arguing that it was only in 1971 /72 that the build-up of 
natural gas usage in the power stations began. Coke is ignored since 
only about 0.5 m.t.c.e. has been used each year since 1954 with a 
heavy usage in the early sixties and a lower amount both before and
after that date.' Likewise nuclear power did not come on stream until 
.1962 and so for the first period analysis (1954-60) the two fuel input is 
valid. For the second period analysis (1954-72), however, this 
approach is more dubious since for the years 1962-72 the average 
quantity of nuclear power consumed was 5.2 m.t.c.e. However, the 
marginal costs of electricity generation from nuclear plant are so low that 
it will always be preferred for base load. In this circumstance nuclear 
fuels are excluded from the analysis and attention is concentrated on 
competition between the fossil fuels coal and fuel oil.
3.64 Empirical Results for the Market Share Model.
Table 43. shown overleaf delineates the electricity engineering 
relationship for three periods. For the period 1950-60runs were 
attempted on an absolute, logarithmic and first difference basis. As 
expected, a priori, the coefficient on the electricity generated variable 
is highly significant at the 95$ level on a two-tailed test. The 
logarithmic regression suggests that a 1$ change in electricity generated
I '
(in kWh) is met by 0.8$ change in the fuel burn of the CEGB, in coal 
equivalent. The regressions for 1954-60 are defined so as to span the 
same time as the share regressions since the price data base commences 
at 1954. These results follow the pattern of the 1950-60 regressions 
with about the same relationship between electricity generation and the 
fuel burn.
The stability of this last relationship is perceived in the regressions 
for 1950-72 where the coefficient on the electricity generated variable 
for the logarithmic regression is 0.77.
Table 43: Engineering Relationship for Share Model.
No. of cases 1950-60.
Absolute Q f = 7328903 + 445.51E s
(64.49)
R 2 = 0.9978
Logarithmic II
aa
8.42840 + 0.81057LE
s
(51.47)
R 2 = 0.9966
First Diff. ii
a
474.3dE s
(20.82)
R 2 =  0.98
No. of cases 1950-72.
Absolute ii
a
13457910 + 370.7E s
(31.29)
R 2 = 0.98
Logarithmic L Q f = 8.89927 + 0.76882LE s
(49.55)
R 2 = 0.99
First Diff. dQf = 382.1dE s
(10.07)
R 2 = 0.84
No. of cases 1954-60.
Absolute Q. = 5922915.9 + 460.7E R 2 = 0.996f s
. - (37.86)
Logarithmic LQ, = 7.80862 + 0.86489LE R  = 0.996
1 s
(37.01)
Note: In this and all following Tables figures in brackets are t-statistics,
at the 95fo level on a two-tailed test.
3.641 Share Equations 1954-60.
a) Absolute Data input.
Although it  has been pointed out that the use of the variable
P c/P j. implies some m ulti-co llinearity  in the regressions, runs were
performed fo r both P /P .  and P /P  . Tables 44 and 45 show thec' f c o
resu lts . In Table 44 using the P c/P^ variable the coefficient has the
wrong sign in a l l  cases except 4 . However in that particu lar case the
22coefficient is highly insignificant. Regression:! without a dummy is  
significant at the 95$ level although the fit  is poor and the D-W statistic  
suggests positive auto-correlation. In cases 3 and 5 the price variable  
is strongly significant at the 95$ leve l. The dummy variab le , where it  
is significant, exhibits a negative sign contrary to a p rio ri expectations. 
The dummies in regressions 3, 4 and 5 which come into play in 1 958,
1959 and 1960 bring out a coefficient on Z which is highly significant at 
the 95$ leve l.
The results in Table 45 with P c/P q indicate a completely different 
picture for the price variab le . H ere a ll signs on the coefficients are  
negative, although in only two regressions (2 and 6) are the coefficients 
significant at the 95$ leve l. One of those (Regression 2) is fo r a 
regression without a dummy. The goodness of f it  (0 .76) leaves much 
to be desired, with the D-W statistic again suggesting positive 
autocorrelation. F o r the regressions (Nos. 1 , 3, 4 , 5), however, a
22. At the 95$ level on a tw o-tailed test. A ll other references to 
significance carry  this qualification. -
value of approximately 2 was obtained for the D-W statistic . With 
. respect to the dummy variable coefficients were a ll negative and 
significant (except 6) at the 95$ level.
Market Share Analysis for the CEGB.
Table 44: 1954-60 Regression Q ^ / Q ^ = f( P /P^,) Z)
Q c/Qj Constant P
1. -16.0034 >17.0426
(2.6351)
2. -4.75961 +5.8254
(1.3497)
3. -4.40717 +5.41516
(4.9948)
4. +1.29854 -0.31584
(0.0)
5. -7.00921 +8.02755
(5.1759)
6. -20.04356 -21.10035
(1.4318)
z R2 D-W
0.76 1.03
-0.0246 0.96 1.24
(3.963)
-0.03374 0.99 0.93
(17.045)
-0.12804 0.97 2.5
(5.2157)
-0.04313 0.99 2.2
(10.857)
+0.0296 0.77 1.2
(0.3156)
Dummy
(1234567)
(0000234)
(0000111)
(0000123)
(0000110)
Note:- ’t1 statistics in brackets at the 95$ level on a two-tailed test.
Market Share Analysis for the CEGB
Table 45: 1954-60 Regression Q c/Qf = f (p c/p 0 > z )
Q /Q . Constant P /P& i c o
1. +1.07514 -0 .10742  -0 .10538  0 .96  2 .4  (0000111)
(1 .095) (4 .336)
2 . +1.36298 -0.52021 0 .76  1 .0  (0000000)
(4 .0 )
3 . +1.13567 -0 .20705  -0 .03886  0 .94  1 .6  (0000123)
(1 .789) (3 .464)
4 . +1.08127 -0 .13098 . -0 .03283  0 .9 7  1 .8  (0000234)
(1 .581) (5.7001)
5. +0.86836 -0 .29453  -0 .04585  0 .89  1 .9  (1234567)
(0 .774) (2 .234)
6 . +1.23098 -0.33921 -0 .04987  0.91 0 .9 2  (0000110)
(2.4011) (1.5501)
2R D-W Dummy
Note:- 11T statistics in brackets at the 95$ level on a two-tailed test.
b) Logarithmic data input.
The logarithmic runs are shown in Tables 46 and 47. Fo r  
Table 46 with the variable P^/P^, the price variable is just 
significant at the 95% level with a dummy. In regression 3 , however, 
the price variable is insignificant. and of the wrong sign. The dummy 
variable maintains its negative sign, as it did with absolute data, with 
both coefficients being highly significant at the 95% leve l. Table 47 
with P c/ P q carries a negative sign on the price variables of regressions  
1 to 5 although only in cases 1, 3 and 6 are the coefficients significant 
at the 95% leve l. .On. the basis of these regressions the introduction 
i>f the dummy suggests a lowering of the price elasticity. Without and 
with a dummy the regression again exhibits positive autocorrelation.
The dummy variable carries negative coefficients, except in case 6, 
-where the coefficient is. insignificant at the 95% leve l.
Market Share Analysis for the CEGB
Table 46: 1954-60
Constant
1 . -0 .32733
2 . +0.14830
3. 40.50487
Regression L(Qc/Q f = f( L /P  /P p  . , Z )
L (P c/P f ) Z  R 2 D-W  Dummy
+0.31513 -0 .04138  0 .97  1.92 (1234567)
(1.9387) (6.6024)
-0 .12842  -0 .04143  0 .99  1 .9  (0000234)
(1.9110) (12.616)
-0 .43764  0 .48  0 .5 4  (0000000)
(1.2244)
N ote:- * t f statistics in brackets at the 95% level on a tw o-ta iled  test.
Market Share Analysis for the CEGB. ■ .
Table 47. 1954-60 Regression L(Qc/Qf) = f ( L(P^/Pq ) , Z )
L(Q  /CL) Constant L (P  /P  ) Z  R^ D-W Dummyc I c o
1. -0.15931 -0 .43753  0.71 0 .9 2  (0000000)
(3 .535)
2 . -0 .04118  -0 .08899  -0 .17152  0 .95  2 .3  (1111222)
(0 .949) (4.5167)
3 . -0 .10678  -0.27661 -0 .08405  0 .87  1 .6  (1111123)
(2 .280) (2 .121)
4 . -0 .0 449 7  -0 .09535  -0 .10657  0 .98  1 .7  (1111234)
(1.6125) (7 .328)
5. -0 .15926 -0 .43743  -0 .00002  0.71 0 .9  (1234567)
(0.5477) (0 .0 )
6 . +0.10350 +0.37542 +0.03414 0 .8 7  0 .8  (1111221)
(2.4913) (0.7481)
Note: ’t’ statistics in brackets at the 95% level on a two-tailed test.
3.642, Share Equations 1961-72.
a) Absolute data input.
2Table 48 illustrates the very poor R and D-W statistics 
obtained for this period. This may be accounted fo r by the difficulty  
of selecting a dummy which is subtle enough to capture the changes in  
the fuel sector during this period.
Market Share Analysis for the CEGB.
Table 48: 1961-72. Regression Q^ /Q.^  = f(P  /P j, , Z )
Q /Qf Constant P /P .  Z  R^c f c' f
1. +1.48304 -0 .66630  +0.00387 0 .15
(0.451) (0.1416)
2. +1.97539 -1 .2 2 7 7  +0.57054 0 .57
(0.9958) (2.0223)
3 . +1.47834 -0.66691 +0.00423 0 .19
(0.4643) (0.3725)
4 . +1.42388 -0.65491 +0.044532 0 .22
(0 .483) (1.0873)
N ote:- ' t 1 statistics in brackets at the 95% level on a two
D-W Dummy 
0 .3  (111222333222)
0 .36  (111222333111)
0 .3  (111234565432)
0 .2 2 (111111222111)
•tailed tes t.
However, the signs on both variables, fo r a ll regressions, agree with
a p rio ri expectations. The significance of the coefficients, however,
does not in most cases satisfy the 95% tw o-tailed test. Table 49
follows a sim ilar pattern with the signs on a ll variables having the
2correct, a p r io n , sign. R s are again poor with the D-W statistics  
suggesting positive autocorrelation. The coefficients on the variables  
are  generally insignificant at the 95% level except in Regression 1 .
Market Share-Model for the CEGB.
Table 49: 1961-72 Regression Q^/Q  ^ . = f(P c/P Q , Z  )
Q /Q„ Constant P /P  Z  R^
9 * c °
1. +1.08314 -0 .34382  +0.03755 0.6.6
(1.6834) (2.1559)
2 . +1.10833 -0 .29958  0 .37
' (1.2619)
3. • . +1.03431 -0 .27184  +0.03889 0 .47
. (1.1369) (0 .996)
4 . +1.10699 -0:31681 +0.00555 0 .40
(1.2738) (0.5229)
5. +1.10792 -0 .31628  +0.00785 0 .38
(1.2415) (0.3082)
D-W Dummy 
0 .56  (111222333111)
0.41 (oooooooooooo)
0 .3 5 (111111222111)
0.41 (111234565432)
0.41 (111222333222)
Note: ’ t ’ statistics in brackets at the 95% level on a tw o-ta iled  tes t.
b) Logarithmic data input .
2The results in Table 50 with P / P_ indicate better R andc' f
D-W statistics than in the absolute data input case. The introduction 
of a dummy not only makes the price variable highly significant at the 
95% level but - makes the dummy itself significant at the 95% leve l. 
This suggests that the dummy trend is predominant in the regression. 
With a dummy the price variable takes the right sign as does the 
dummy its e lf. The results in Table 51 d iffer from those in Table 50 
in  that a ll the coefficients on the variables have the wrong sign.
Market Share Analysis for the CEGB,
Table 50: 1961-72 Regression L(Q c/Q  ) = f( L (P c/P f ,
1i(Qc/Q j) Constant L (P c/P p  Z
1. +0.43493 -0 .44686  +0.04042 0 .97
(11.235) (4.3013)
2 . +0.32183 -0 .35919  +0.03236 0 .97
(9.5999) (4.2923)
3. +0.34951 -0 .3 8 8 1 8 + 0 .0 5 9 4 8  0 .96
(9.9162) (3.9381)
4 . -0 .16843  +1.02906 0 .28
(0.9265)
D-W Dummy
2 .4  (111222333222)
2 .4  (111222333111)
1 .9 (111111222111)
.6 7 (000000000000)
Note: * t f statistics in brackets at the 95$ level on a tw o-ta iled  test.
Market Share Model for the CEGB.
Table 51: 1961-72 Regression L(Q c/Q^) = f( L ’(P /P  , Z  )
L(Q / Q j  Constant L (P  /P  ) Z  R2
C I C O
1. .+0.24034 +0.37722 -0 .00714  0.41
(1.2912) (0 .537)
2 . +0.21095 +0.35316 0 .35
(1.184)
3 . • . +0.30422 + 0 .4 1 1 9 4 - 0 .0 4 7 2 9  0 .66
. (1.7183) (2.1686)
4 . . +0.23853 +0.37709 -0 .01012  0;39
(1.2576) (0.3163)
5. +0.27447 +0.32574 -0 .04866  0 .47
(1.1599) (0.9947)
D-W Dummy 
0.41 (111234565432
0 .9 8  (111111111111)
0 .5 6  (111222333111)
0.41 (111222333222)
0 .3 5 (111111222111)
Note: Tt ’ statistics in brackets at the 95$ level on a tw o-ta iled  tes t.
3.643 Share Equations 1954-72.
a) Absolute data input.
These regressions are run in order to study the stability
of the 1954-60 and 1961-72 regressions. Stability is taken to mean
that the coefficients on the variables remain of the same order and
sign as in the sub-periods. Table 52 with P c/P^ shows a perverse
sign on the price variable in two cases, both insignificant at the 95$
2le v e l. The R and D-W are poor. The introduction of a dummy does
2not help the R and D-W much although the dummy trend exhibits itse lf
in a significant coefficient of the wrong sign on the dummy at the 95$
2le v e l. With P c/P q (see Table 53) the R and D-W are again poor but 
the price variables a ll have the right sign and are significant at the 
95$ level (regression 1 nearly so). The dummy variable carries  the 
wrong sign.
Market Share Model for the CEGB.
Table 52: 1954-72. Regression Q /Q f -  f( P /P f , Z )
O I C l
Q /Qf Constant P /P .c - f  c' f
1. -0 .38092  +1.26448 0 .19  0 .25  (Zero)
(0.78385)
2 . +1.20430 -0 .25784  -0 .04349  0 .67  0 .3 4  (0000111222
(0.1929) (3.4379) 333333332)
0 .53  0 .3 6  (1111111222 
333333332)
3 . +0.73357 +0.22892 -0 .04416
(0.1522) (2.3278)
Z  R 2 D-W Dummy
Note: 111 statistics in brackets at the 95$ level on a two—tailed test.
Market Share'Model for the CEGB.
Table 53: 1954-72 Regression Qc/Q f = f (P / P Q , Z  )
Qc/Q f Constant P '/P  Z  R2 D-W Dummy
1. +1.14725 -0 .25340  -0 .02262  0 .58  0 .8  (0000111222
(1.844) (2 .074 ). 333333332)
2 . +1.23071 -0.35421 -0 .01505 0 .49  0 .8  (1111111222
(2.646) (1 .049) 333333332)
3 . . +1.35976 -0*55407 0 .70  0 .7  (0000000000
(4.0481) 000000000)
.Note: ’ t f statistics in brackets at the 95$ level on a tw o-ta iled  test.
b) Logarithmic data input.
On a logarithmic basis, see Table 54 with P / P p r i c e
C X
variables have the right sign and are significant at the 95$ leve l. 
2R are fa ir ly  good but there is evidence of strong positive 
autocorrelation. The dummies shown are not sginificant at the 
95$ leve l. In Table 55,with Pc/P q , the price variab le is of a 
perverse sign without a dummy. In both cases the price variable  
was significant at the 95$ leve l.
Market Share Model for the CEGB.
Table 54: 1954-72. ■ Regression L(Q c/Q f ) = f( L (P  /P f ), Z  )
L(Q c/Q^) Constant 
1. +0.48522
2 . +0.46905
L (P c/P f ) Z  R2 D-W Dummy
-0 .43476  +0.00641 0 .86  0 .5 7  (1111111222
(5.3647) (0.3843) . 333333332)
-0.41491 0 .86  0 .6  (Zero)
(6.8169)
Note: * t ' statistics in brackets at the 95$ level on a tw o-tailed test.
Market Share Model for the CEGB.
Table 55: 1954-72. Regression L(Q c/Q f) = f(L  (P c/P f ) , Z  )
■\
L(Qc/Q p  Constant L (P c/ P q) Z  R 2 D-W Dummy
1. -0 .14696  -0 .32170  -0 .03667  0.51 0 .85  (1111111222
(2.627) (1 .3038) 3333334332)
2 . +0.21215 +0.53215 0 .6 8  0 .6  (Zero)
(3.8533)
Note: ’ t 1 statistics in brackets at the 95$ level on a tw o-tailed test.
3.644 Summary of Share Model Results. . -
The usual econometric tests fo r regression analysis indicate 
that the results obtained are poor. F o r the period 1954-60,
(Tables 44 ,45 ,46  and 47) during which the introduction of Government' 
intervention was largely centered in the years 1958-60, the results  
indicate a perverse sign on the dummy variable in absolute and 
logarithmic form with Pc/P^ and P ^ /P ^ . The price variab le , in 
logarithmic form , is of the right sign, although in some cases where 
i t  is significant the goodness of f it  and D-W statistic leave much to be 
desired. In a ll cases, however, the introduction of the dummy ra ises  
the goodness of f it .  Th is , of course, is inevitable. Regression 2 
Table 46 and Regression 3 Table 47 are selected as the forecasting  
equations on the basis of the ir D-W statistics and the significance of 
the coefficients at the 95$ leve l. However, it  is c lear that this 
selection is  heavily dependent on the choice of dummy variables used, 
even though the dummy variable coefficients have the wrong sign.
The results for 1961-72 (see Tables 48, 49, 50 and 51) are  to
be considered against the plethora of protection instruments used in
those years. Using absolute data (Tables 48, 49) the results indicate
that Government intervention raised the consumption of coal by the
CEGB, although this remains tentative since the coefficient on the
variables was insignificant at the 95$ level in most cases. M oreover,
2the existence of positive autocorrelation and low R casts fu rther doubt 
on these resu lts . P rice variables were of the right sign but insignificant 
at the 95$ leve l. With logarithmic data the use of the variable P^/P  ^ w ith  
a dummy suggests much better results with price and dummy variables
having the right sign. The use of the price variable P c/P q proves 
inadequate for 1961-72 , because of the perverse signs on the price  
variable coefficients.
Thus fo r the period 1954-60 (see Tables 44, 45, 46 and 47) 
Government intervention, on the basis of these results, tended to be 
counter to th e ir  intentions whilst from 1961 -72  (see Tables 48, 49, 50 
and 51) the balance of evidence suggests that intervention did add to 
consumption of coal by the CEGB.
To study the stability of the model the results fo r 1954-72 are  
cited. On balance it  is permissible only to state that regressions  
fo r this period were poor. There is no equation in which the coefficients  
are  both of the right sign and significant. It  is not possible, therefo re , 
to compare these regressions with the ones fo r other periods, in order 
to draw conclusions concerning the re la tive  value of the coefficients on 
the variab les.
31645 Forecasts with the Share Model using 1954-60 period.
The fuel oil tax was imposed in March 1961 and in order to assess 
the impact of the tax in the short-run the regression results fo r the 
1954-60 period were used as a basis fo r forecasting. The rationale  
for forecasting with the share model is that having isolated a regression  
that "explains” the past it  is used to evaluate the impact of the tax by 
allowing the price variable to take tax and non-tax values. This method 
assumes that a ll other variables remain constant -  i . e .  do not vary  with 
price -  under such a scheme.
Forecasting equations:
Engineering relationship: (Table .43)
LQ , = 7.80862 + 0 .86489LE  i s
Share Model ( no dummy )
Case A; (Table 47 ) L(Q /Q  ) = -CM5931 -  0 .43753L(P  /P  )
(Regression 1) . c c °
Case B; (Table 46 ) L(Q /Q  ) = +0.50487 -  0 .43764L(P  /P  )
(Regression 3) * c
Share Model ( with dummy )
Case C; (Table 47 ) L(Q /Q  ) = -0 .10678  -  0 .27661L(P  /P  ) -0 .0 8 4 0 5 D
(Regression 3) C c °
Case D; (Table 46 ‘ ) L(Q /Q  ) = +0.14830 -  0 .12842L(P  /P  ) -  0.041431
(Regression 2) c c
The forecasts are shown in Table 55. F o r case A with P /Pc' o .
and no dummy the forecasts are poor and they are much worse with 
Pc/P j  and no dummy (Case B ). The imposition of a" dummy gives "better"  
forecasts although the results indicate an underestimate of demand for 
coal by approximately 3 million tons. Case C suggests an excess burn 
of the order of 8 million tons in 1961 and 1962 whilst Case D puts this
i
figure at 0 .5  million tons. This result emphasizes the importance of 
correctly  specifying the independent variab les. Notwithstanding these 
restrictions on the forecasts, 8 million tons is taken as an indication 
of the extra coal consumed by the CEGB by virtue of the tax . This  
choice is , however, difficult to justify rigorously. The forecast 
equations are selected on the basis of the ir D-W statistics and the 
significance of the variable coefficients although in the case of the 
dummy variable coefficients these are of the wrong sign. Selection  
among the forecasts, however, rests on the belief that dummy variables
(although of the wrong sign here) should to some extent, capture the 
process of Government intervention in the market. The choice of 
Case C, therefore, automatically encompasses Case D, and with 
negative coefficients on the dummy variables suggests that 8 million  
tons of coal should be interpreted as an upper bound of the impact of 
the fuel oil tax on CEGB coal consumption.
Table 56: Forecasts of Coal Consumption in CEGB
Actual Forecast Forecast (1 )-(2 )
with tax without
(1) tax (2)
Case A
1961 47 .7  56.06 41.95 +14.11
1962 52.8 62.27 46.33 +15.94
Case B
1961 4 7 .7  76.23 72.60 +3.63
1962 52.8 80.50 77.40 +3.1
Case C
1961 4 7 .7  44 .82  37.33 +7.49
1962 52.8  49 .52  41.16 +8.36
Case D
1961 47 .7  45.1 44 .6  +0.5
1962 52.8 47.41 46 .9  +0.51
Notes: Case A = No dummy in logarithmic forecasting equation
with price variable P /Po' o
Case B = No dummy in logarithmic forecasting equation
with price variable P /P » .c 1
Case C = Dummy with value 3 in 1961 and 1962 in logarithmic 
forecasting equation. P rice  variable P c/ P q .
Case D = Dummy with value 4 in 1961 and 1962 in logarithmic 
forecasting equation. P rice  variable P c/P j .
Note Continued for Table 56.
The choice of dummy for the years 1961'-and 1962 is debatable; 
here the I960  value is used.
The poor forecasts obtained in Case B arise from the forecasting  
equation using the price variable P /P^' with associated m ulti- 
collinearity and the absence of a dummy tim e-series .
3.646 The inadequacies of the econometric approach in analysis of 
the C.E.G.B. fuel burn.
The poor results obtained in the market share model may be 
explained by a variety of factors. The model used was based on a 
small data sample and in omitting possible explanatory variables to 
reduce problems of multicollinearity, mis-specification of the model 
occurs. Moreover, the fact that two explanatory variables were used 
with a sample of seven data points did not leave many degrees of 
freedom in the regression. In attempting to use dummies to describe 
the development of Government fuel 'policy *the mis-specification problem 
is again encountered.
Besides problems concerning the formulation of the model 
attention must also be given to the time-series data that was used. In 
this respect the model may be un-identified and there is certainly no 
guarantee that the dummy is orthogonal to the price vector. In addition 
there is likely to be increasing autocorrelation between successive values
of variables over time as the consumption of energy increases and as
23 .intevention increases. Because of this it is likely that homoscedasticity
will occur as the variance associated with the dummy variable and, perhaps,
therefore the price variable, will not be constant over time. On the
positive side one factor acting against the problem of multicollinearity
is that lagged variables were not used in specifying the model, because
the C.E.G.B. system is likely to respond very quickly to a price change.
Accordingly the share model results illustrate that the various
econometric problems are such that in terms of the model’s forecasting
ability the usefulness of the model must be classified as marginal.
23. C. Robinson, A Policy for Fuel, IEA, Occ. Paper 32.
Moreover, the share model only provides an aggregate analysis of the 
C.E.G.B.'s response to a change in the price of fuel oil. As such it 
cannot give information on how the tax affected individual stations.
3.7 The Linear Programming Model
The market share model described in Section 3.64 was an aggre­
gate analysis that produced a final data output in terms of the extra 
coal burn apparently induced by the fuel oil tax. To supplement such 
an analysis a micro-economic interpretation of the C.E.G.B. system is 
required and this is obtained through the use of linear programming.
The actual effect of the fuel oil tax on the C.E.G.B. would occur through 
a re-arrangement of the merit order of stations, as the price of fuel 
oil increased relative to the price of coal. In the previous section 
this effect was examined indirectly by econometric analysis; in this 
section it is examined by a simplified simulation of the merit-order 
system.
Consider, therefore, a system in which there are n power stations 
which can be divided into M groups depending on the fuel burn in each (i.e. 
coal, oil, nuclear, hydroelectricity or gas). Moreover, the grouping
/
constraint is further tightened so that the set of plants in each group is  
homogeneous with respect to running costs per unit of output, capital 
costs per unit of capacity and length of life . The classic lin ear  
programming problem is then to minimise the following:
T  N
C  =  X ] E  (1+i)t(° « t +.r m t >;
t=3 m=1
subject to
xN t ^  Xt,m ax.
• Km t^  0 (m = 1 ....N )
in which the investment planning horizon is  T  years. The total
present value of system costs, C , is  then the time and plant summation
of discounted total capital charges attributable to plant type m in year t
plus the discounted total running cost of plant type m in year t.-.K  ^ is
the capacity of the plant type m installed in year t .  x^ rep resen ts  total
system capacity and x , represents maximum system demand in year t .t max
As it stands this model is complex. In order to make the model 
practical some assumptions are made. F irs t ,  the model is considered 
for only one-time period. Secondly, it  is assumed that the capital stock 
before the beginning of the planning period is fixed. Such an assumption 
allows us to ignore any technological innovation. T h ird ly , the capital 
stock mix is considered to be constant through the time horizon  
considered. This implies that there is no technological change and thus 
allows us to ignore the introduction of nuclear power or North Sea gas.
On the pricing side it is assumed that the in itia l re la tive  fuel prices are  
known and remain constant fo r the duration of a ll time periods studied. 
Moreover, since transport costs are ignored, fuel prices along with 
engineering relationships w ill explain plant running costs and capital 
costs. ' Although not a necessary assumption plant life  is taken as 
being equal to the planning period and finally  it  is assumed that a ll 
plant, within that time period, is available for 100$ load. These 
assumptions allow the introduction of a m erit-o rder in which plants are  
uniquely related to the ir running costs per kWh -  the la tte r , of course, 
from the above being equal to fuel costs. ‘ ■
F o r n plants, therefore, consisting of a mix of o il-fire d  and coal- 
fired  installations the problem is w ritten as follows for a one-period  
analysis:
k m
subject to the constraints,
Uc2Xc2 V  mc2<
Uo1*o1 ^  mo1
- «
u x -C m om om om
and
k m
Z u .x . u .x . ^  KC1 C1 / 03 03 ^
i=1 j=1
where r^r^.., are the running costs per unit of input for coal and
oil-fired stations respectively. xc.,xo .^ represent the inputs of coal
and oil to coal and oil-fired stations respectively, u^yU^. represent
the load factors for stations x .,x . while m  m  . details the installedci 03 ci’ 03
generating capacity of coal and oil-fired stations in units of coal 
equivalents respectively. The last constraint states that the summation 
of all load during the one period analysis must be less than peak demand 
on the system.
The data base used was on a station to station basis for the year
31st March 1961 to 31st March 1962, that is approximately the first
twelve months of the fuel oil tax. Stations operating at less than 10^
24
load factor were excluded from the sample because data was not 
available. However, such stations tended to be internal combustion 
engine plants or pumped storage.
24. Load factor is the ratio, usually expressed as a percentage, of 
the number of kWh supplied from a generating set or group of 
generating sets during a period of operation, to the number of 
kWh that would have been supplied if the set had operated at 
maximum continuous rating throughout the period.
In a ll,  128 power stations were considered* As Table 57 shows total 
stations fo r that year numbered 233 on 202 sites. The data base is 
only 55% of a ll stations but is 86% of installed capacity.
Table 57: Data for Number of Power Stations.
Stations Below 10% Load Factor 
H ydro- Humped Storage Other 
E lectric
14 1 82
Note: Discrepancy of 8 stations due to incomplete data base.
Also 12 sets at various m ulti-set stations were operated at 
less than 10% load facto r. *
Total Stations Stations
Considered
233 128
Stations below 10% load factor numbered 82 of which 14 were  
internal combustion engines. The discrepancy of 8 stations arises  
from the incomplete data records that were available. Of the 1 28 power
stations considered twelve were o il-fire d  and the remainder co a l-fired .
25In the case of ’’jo in t” coal and o il-fire d  stations data was only 
available fo r total operating costs. However, the proportional burn 
of each fuel was available and the m icro-objective function fo r that 
plant had its total fuel mix divided into an oil and a coal component.
With respect to demand on the system a one period model can 
have only one overall demand constraint on the model fo r each computer 
run. Runs were formulated for the year 1961-62 fo r the maximum 
demand on the system (6th August 1961 at 0600 hours -  Case 2); the 
maximum demand supplied (Case 3) and for the average demand on the 
system (Case 4 ). The installed generating capacity was corrected for  
the fact that the sample used consisted of 1 28 stations by subtracting 
the output of stations operating a t , or below, 10% load fa c to r.
In practice no new plant came on stream during the time in terval 
March 1961 -  March 1962. Belvedere H .P . (2x120 MW) came on stream  
in February 1961 and Richborough (3x120 MW) in December 1962. Thus 
the assertion of a constant capital stock, as dictated by the model, is  
defensible here. However, there were some conversions from coal to 
o il-fire d  stations during the period 1958-62. The data available puts
25. By this is not meant dual fired  stations but power stations 
comprising independent coal and o il-fire d  sets.
this figure at 3052 MWso converted. A year by year breakdown was 
not, unfortunately, available.
F in a lly , mention is made of the constraint equations. As has
been stated the u ., u . represent coal and oil station load factors  
ci* 03
respectively which the Board publishes. The generating capacity 
of each power station was associated with its thermal efficiency so 
that conversion of coal to e lectric ity  units could be undertaken.
With regard to the running of the model,two problems arise  
concerning load factors and efficiency. Since the model is a one- 
period analysis the efficiencies entering into the data input should be 
the end year 1960/61 figures. However, if  these figures are used 
we then must make the additional assumption that the thermal efficiency 
of a power station is constant and, therefore, does hot depend on the 
quantity of fuel burnt. In rea lity  one would expect the thermal 
• efficiency-rfuel burn curve to be an inverted U-shape. The use of 
1961/62 efficiency figures was considered but rejected on the basis 
that such a curve would already re flect the changed fuel mix occasioned 
by the tax. The only basis fo r using 1961/62 figures would be if  
efficiency did not change much, in which case it is methodologically 
better to use the 1960/61 figures.
The choice of load factors is very important . If  a ll stations are  
considered to have a 100% load factor then the optimal solution w ill 
arrange running costs easily. However, this assumption ignores 
technological and r is k  factors and is rejected partly on that basis and 
partly because the CEGB would not. run any station at 100% load. The 
rejection of this criterion  suggests the adoption of some a rb itra ry  load 
factors and the choice made was to use 1960/61 load factors.
3.71 Empirical Results for the Linear Programming Model.
3.711 Cost of the fuel oil tax.
The choice of four demand constraints mentioned in the previous
section was combined with a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the cost
to the CEGB of variations in the fuel oil tax ra te . The results are
given in Table 58 and bring out a number of points of in terest. F irs t ,
the aggregate cost of fuel inputs rises as the level of demand on the
CEGB m erit-o rder system rises: this increase, however, is not
proportionate but accelerates as demand rises from minimum to maximum
demand. The reported figure for fuel at delivered cost to the CEGB
26during 1961 /6 2  was £252.6 m illion. The points that need to be 
stressed immediately in comparing Table 58 with this figure are that 
the aggregate cost figures obtained from the simplified simulation of the 
CEGB ’ s fuel burn are for a one-period analysis at one specific demand 
point. Accordingly, the figure of £253.5 million at maximum demand 
(Case 3) in the actual case tax is to be interpreted on a one year basis 
with the assumption that demand remained constant at 27020 MW. In  
practice, daily and yearly loads on the CEGB system are the summation 
of different point demands of varying load duration. Thus, the cost 
figures suggest that at maximum output capacity the ir values are greater  
than that which would result from a multi-time period study with varying  
load factors. As Appendix I I  illustrates the total fuel costs w ill vary
26.- CEGB Annual Report and Accounts, 1961/62.
not only as the demand level on the system but also as the proportion 
of the year spent at that demand leve l. Notwithstanding that rem ark  
the results obtained give cost figures less than that published by the 
CEGB. However, it  must be remembered that the CEGB figure is 
fo r a ll stations, whereas in the model a ll stations below a 10% load 
factor are ignored and this means that nearly 14% of installed  
generating capacity fo r 1961 /62  is removed from the model. M oreover, 
the fact that the CEGB has to face the risks  of station fa ilu res , 
breakdowns and possible sudden fluctuations in demand means that the 
number of stations on load is greater than that which would occur if 
those risks were ignored.
The second point of interest is that at actual (Case 4) and 
minimum demand (Case 2) demand levels total fuel burn costs do not r is e  
proportionately as the tax is increased. Thus at minimum demand 
(Case 2) imposition of the tax raised the cost of the aggregate fuel 
b ill by £0 .9  m illion, whilst at actual demand (Case 4) the figure was 
£3.9  m illion. At maximum demand (Case 3) and maximum output 
capacity (Case 1), however, imposition of the tax leads to an increase  
in total fuel costs of £19.4  million and £14.4  million respectively. Two 
points need to be made here. F irs t , although total fuel costs r is e  with  
electric ity  output, Table. 58, shows that at tax rates of 0 .8p /gallon  and 
2.0p/gallon the objective function has the same value for the cases of 
maximum demand and maximum output capacity. Indeed for tax rates  
O.889p/gallon and 1 .Op/gallon the objective function has a lower value, 
with a demand constraint of maximum output capacity, than in the case 
of maximum demand. These resu lts, however, are not perverse but
Table 58: CEGB Fuel Costs 1961/62.
£ Million
Tax p /  Maximum Minimum Maximum Actual Output from
Gallon Output Demand Demand Power Stations
Capacity (Average Demand)
28959MW 3831MW 27020MW 114790x1 CPkWh(13104MW)
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
0 .0 236.5 14. 5 234.1 84 .2
0 .4 245.5 15.1 243.1 86 .4
0 .8 249.2 15.3 249.2 88 .0
0 .8 8 9 * 250.9 15 .4 253.5 88.1
1 .0 252.9 15.5 255.9 88.1
2 .0 271.9 15.5 271.9 87.2
Tax Cost 14.4 0 .9 19 .4 3 .9
(Tax -  no 
tax)
Notes: 1. The actual tax rate  0 .8 8 9 *  is calculated by assuming that 
the tax ra te  was at 0 . 883p/gallon fo r four months and 
0 .9 1 7p/gallon for eight months implying an actual yearly  
tax rate  of 0 . 889p/gallon. It  was impossible to run the 
linear programming models fo r a four and eight month 
period as the data base available from the CEGB was on a
s ' ./
yearly basis.
2. CEGB stated figure fo r increase due to higher fuel prices  
1961/6 2  was £13.47 m illion. Source: Annual Report 
and Accounts, 1961/62.
3 . F o r cases 2 and 4 linear programme cost figures are  
optimal solutions. F o r Cases 1 and 3 the final iteration  
solutions are infeasible. F o r explanation of this see P . 240-^4
arise  from the fact that the figures obtained for Cases 1 and Cases 3 are
27infeasible solutions as read from the linear programme output. Since
they are infeasible they do not represent the optimal solution for total
fuel costs. However, the fact that the solutions are infeasible, ra ther
than optimal, is not of great concern. Infeasibility arises because the
constraint requiring the sum of the load on a ll coal and oil stations to
be equal to or less than demand on the system is violated. This cannot
be satisfied in Cases 1 and 3 since in those cases the equality must be
replaced by a stric tly  ’’less than” sign. The reason for this is due to
load parameters being constrained to values of less than or equal to 
28unity.
M oreover, the use of maximum demand figures -  although
corrected for power stations operated at less than 10$ loe^ d factor -
is  in a sense a rb itra ry . The aggregate installed generating capacity
29available in the model is 26833 MW so that at a ll possible load factors  
maximum demand cannot be met. It might be suggested, therefore , that 
a search procedure be undertaken for the level at which the equality 
is stric tly  valid . Methodologically this procedure would be co rrec t. 
However, if  an infeasible solution with an accompanying value of the 
objective function is known and the current level of the in feasib ility  is
27. i . e .  the constraint which relates capacity to demand is violated.
28. The definition of load factors is under given temperature and 
pressure conditions. Variations in these constraints might 
give an instantaneous load factor greater than 100$. although 
the costs of machine breakdowns and failures resulting from such 
a procedure would have to be considered.
29. Compare for Case 3 27020 MW and Case I 28959 MW.
known, then the process of searching for a solution which minimises the 
level of the infeasibility is permissible. Although it cannot be stated . 
whether the optimal solution w ill be greater or less than the current 
infeasible solution, the process towards the accepted final infeasible 
solution illustrates the step function cost changes in the current 
objective function. From the linear programming model the data shows 
that the level of the infeasibility re la tive  .to the total infeasibility is 
0 .5 $  and 7 .3 $  in Cases 3 and 1 respectively. Accordingly, the 
maximum demand case indicates that the infeasible solution is near the 
optimal solution and, thus, this case is  used in succeeding analysis. 
Moreover, since the actual tax case and the no tax case are being 
compared for a ll infeasible solutions, the fact that the infeasibility  
level is  the same in absolute terms fo r a ll tax levels, implies that the 
comparative basis f.or assessing the consequences of the tax is va lid .
F in a lly , with.the above qualifications in mind, Table 58 indicates 
that the cost of the tax ( i .e .  actual tax position minus no tax position) at 
minimum demand (Case 2) was under £1 m illion. At actual output
(Case 4) this figure was just under £4 m illion, whilst at the maximum
/
demand level (Case 3) it  was £20 m illion. Again, however, these 
figures must be interpreted with care since the load duration of each 
demand level on the system for the year 1961/62 is unknown. The 
values obtained represent the extremes of a band of possible costs of 
the fuel oil tax. The elements that make up that band may be combined 
in  various ways but in a ll cases if  an upper lim it of £20 million and a 
lower lim it of £1 million are suggested as the cost of the fuel o il tax to 
the CEGB, then a ll possible cases w ill be covered.
3.712 Coal Burn resulting from the fuel oil tax.
The linear programme results give values fo r the basic 
variables which when summed represent the fuel burn (both coal and 
oil) of the CEGB. The summation has to be carried  out over a ll 
power stations and in consequence attention is directed below to the 
cases of ”no tax” on fuel oil and tax at the actual ra te  of 0 . 889p/gallon.
Table 59: Fuel Burn in the CEGB.
No Tax  
With Tax
Million tons coal equivalent
Minimum
Demand
3831MW
Case 2
Maximum
Demand
27020MW
Case 3
Actual Output from  
Power Stations 
114790x106kWh
Case 4
3.66
3 .60
63.9
63.9
24.5
23.2
Note: Actual burn a ll fuel 1961 /6 2  was 63.2  m .t .c .e .
The results suggest that the imposition of the tax did not affect 
the total fuel burn at maximum demand (Case 3) and only marginally 
in the minimum demand case (Case 2). In the actual burn case, 
however, a greater fuel burn is indicated without the tax than with i t .  
Rounding erro rs  do not account fo r this difference. The reason lies  
in the fact that the objective function is to minimise aggregate fuel 
costs to the model. Since the optimal solution in the no tax case 
(£84.2 million) is less than that fo r the actual tax case (£88.1 million) 
the implication is that the average cost of fuel in the no tax case is less 
than that in the tax Case. This reduction in the average cost of fuel 
is inevitable upon the removal of the fuel oil tax. Consequently at 
the margin more fuel can be consumed in the no tax case fo r the same 
expenditure compared to the actual tax case.
Results are also calculated fo r the oil burn in  1961 /6 2  and this 
is tabulated below.
Table 60: Oil Burn in the CEGB.
Million tons coal equivalent.
Minimum 
Demand 
3831 MW
Maximum
Demand
27020MW
Actual Output from 
Power Stations 
114790 x l 0 6kWh
Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
No Tax 0 .94 9.1 5.73
With Tax 0 .24 9.1 0 .2 4
The data suggests that the tax effect would be to reduce oil consumption 
almost to zero in the average output case. From Table 59 and Table 60 
a profile fo r the change in the coal burn may be constructed.
Table 61: Coal Burn in the CEGB.
With ta x -  
No Tax
Million tons
Minimum
Demand
3831MW
Maximum
Demand
27020MW
Actual Output from  
Power Stations 
114790x106kWh
Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
+0.64 0.0 +4.19
The above Tables (59, 60, 61) can now be considered in the 
light of what actually happened to the coal and oil burns in 1961-62. 
The relevant data is given in Table 62.
Table 62: Actual Coal and Oil Burns in the CEGB, 1960/61 and
1961/62.
1960/61 1961/62 Change from
1960/61  -  
1 96 1 /62
Percentage 
change from  
1960/61- 
1961/62
Total Fuel 
(Million tons 
coal equivalent)
Coal
(Million tons)
Oil (Million  
tons coal 
equivalent)
57.45 63 .2
48.1
9.35
53.1
8 ,67
Output from power 104741 114790
Stations (IQ^kwqi).
+5.75
+5.0
- 0.68
+10049
+1 0.0$
+ 10 .4$  
-  7 .3 $
+ 9 .6 $
Source: CEGB Annual Report and Accounts, 1960/61 and 1961 /6 2 .
The actual rise  in the coal burn, with a 9 .6 $  increase in output
from power stations, was 5 million tons whilst the decline in oil
consumptions was 0 .68  million tons coal equivalent. Case 4 from the
linear programme gives the coal burn due to the tax, at a constant
6demand level of 114790x10 kWh, as 4 .2  million tons with an associated 
figure of 5 .5  million tons coal equivalent fo r the decline in oil 
consumption (see Appendix n ) .  At maximum demand (Case 3) the tax 
appears not to have changed the consumption level of coal or o il. This  
is  expected since every station is being used at the highest possible 
load factor in the final current objective solution. At minimum demand 
(Case 2) the results indicate a drop in o il consumption of 0 .70  million 
tons coal equivalent and a growth in coal consumption of 0 .64  m illion tons 
coal equivalent. Comparing the actual case with the rea l burn in the 
CEGB suggests that the model overestimates the decline in o il 
consumption but produces a figure fo r the change in coal which is of 
the same order as the re a l case. One possible reason for the re la tive ly  
large decline in the oil burn registered in the model may be that the 
model does not account for growth of e lectric ity  consumption. It  may 
w ell have been the case, in re a lity , that the CEGB adjusted to the tax 
partly by lowering its oil consumption in response to the tax and then, 
la te r , by partly raising its load factors fo r o il-fire d  stations, as demand 
for e lectric ity  increased. Another reason, suggested in Section 3*711 
may be that the results obtained for the burns represent a band of 
possible outcomes bounded by zero at maximum and minimum demands 
and a maximum coal burn in the region of four million tons.
3.713 The Rearrangement of the merit-order and shadow prices of
o il-fire d  stations.
30The impact of the tax exhibits itse lf in an optimal lowest 
cost result different from that without the tax through a re-arrangem ent 
of the m erit-o rder system. Tables 63, 64 and 65 illustra te  the fuel 
use at those stations occupying the firs t five positions at the top of the 
m erit-order ( i .e .  on base load) as demand and tax conditions change.
30. Fo r maximum demand and maximum output capacity the solution 
is infeasible.
Table 63. Fuel Use at Base Load Stations at. Maximum Demand. (Case 3)
No Tax .
Burn Coal or O il Name of
F ired  Station
2.1 Coal Castle Don-
ington
1 .8  Oil Marchwood
1 .54  O il Belvedere
1 .5  Coal High M arn-
ham
1 .4  • Cpal Keaddy
Total O il Burn 3.-34 
T-otal Coal Burn 5.00
Million tons coal equivalent 
With Tax
Burn Coal or Oil Name of
F ire d  Station
• 2 . 1  Coal Castle Con-
ington
1 .8  O il Marchwood
1 .54  Oil Belvedere
1 .5  Coal High M arn -
ham
1 .4  Coal Keaddy
Total Oil Burn 3 .34  
Total Coal Burn 5.00.
Table 64: Fuel Use at Base Load Stations at Output from Power Stations.
(Case 4)
No Tax
Burn Coal or Oil Name of
F ire d  Station
1 .54  O il Belvedere
1 .5  Coal High Marnham
1 .2  Coal Blyth ’A 1
d .T . O il Portishead
*B ’
1.01 Oil T ilbury 'A '
Total Oil Burn 3.65  
Total Coal Burn 2.70
Million tons coal equivalent.
With Tax
Burn Coal or Oil Name of
F ire d  Station
1 .5  Coal High Marnham
1 .2  Coal Blyth »A’
1 .07 Coal Skelton
Grange ' B ’
1 .04  Coal Northfleet
1.01 Coal Willington ’A ’
Total O il Burn 0 .00  
Total Coal Burn 5 .82
Table 65: Fuel Use at Base Load Stations at Minimum Demand. (Case 2)
Million tons coal equivalent
No Tax With Tax
Burn Coal or Oil Name of Burn Coal or Oil Name of
F ired  Station F ire d  Station
0.71 Oil Poole 0 .4 4  Coal Clarence
Dock
0 .26  Coal Leicester 0 .29  Coal Stourport
1A 1
0 .24  Oil Brimsdown 0 .26  Coal Leicester
'B V
0 .19  Coal Stourport 0 .2 4  Oil Brimsdown
’A f ' B '
0 .19  Coal Roosecote 0.21 Coal Northampton
Total Oil Burn 0.90. 
Total Coal Burn 0 .64
Total Oil Burn 0 .2 4  
Total Coal Burn 1 . 20
In Table. 63 at maximum, demand fuel use does not change with or 
without the tax indicative of the fact that a ll stations are operated at a 
high load factor. Oil stations occupy the second and th ird  positions 
in the schedule with a combined burn of 3 .34  million tons coal equivalent. 
F o r the actual output case (Case 4), with no tax, three o il-f ire d  stations 
occupy positions in  the firs t five base load stations schedule. Th e ir  
total oil burn is 3 .6 5 .million tons coal equivalent. The introduction 
of the tax banishes the o il-fire d  stations from the m erit-o rd er schedule 
shown. The coal burn increases from 2 .7  million tons in the no tax  
case to 5.82 million tons with the tax imposed. In the minimum demand 
case (Case 2, Table 65) the oil burn in the stations shown is 0 .95  million  
tons coal equivalent. This is reduced to 0 .24  million tons coal - 
equivalent with the tax*
From the above it  appears that the imposition of the tax tends to 
remove the o il-fire d  stations from the firs t five base load positions of 
the m erit-o rd er. In connection with Tables 63, 64 and 65 it is useful 
to study the shadow prices of the power stations. By this is meant the 
reduction (gain) in power station production of 1MW that would lead to a 
given loss (addition) in the objective function which is to minimise costs. 
The results (Table 66) suggest that at minimum demand with or without 
the tax a reduction or an increase in the station’ s generation of 1MW 
would make litt le  or no difference to overall cost. The values of £0.78  
fo r Poole and £3.28 fo r Brimsdown imply that a 1MW increase in 
electric ity  generation would lead to a reduction of £0 .78  and £3 .28  on 
the overall cost respectively. For ’’output from power stations” , without 
the tax, most oil stations (except South Denes, Marchwood and 
Bromborough) under a 1kW increase would lead to a reduction in overall
cost. The imposition of the tax removes this advantage in a ll cases 
except Brimsdown which has both coal and o il-fire d  burning equipment 
in  its  ’ B ’ station, setting the shadow price at zero. At maximum demand 
the tax ’’increment” is clearly  discerned as increasing the cost to the 
overall objective function of a 1kW increase in output, compared with 
the ”no-tax" situation. The exception to this is Belvedere. However, 
the shadow prices obtained at maximum demand can only be treated as a 
guide to possible optimal shadow costs, since the solution outputs are  
infeasible.
3.72 An Overview of the Linear.Programming Results.
In using a simplified linear programme to simulate the CEGB 
m erit-o rder system it must be kept in mind that the analysis is a one- 
period study for a specific demand level on the system. The "one-period” 
is  interpreted as a year and this implies that the demand level which . 
constrains the equation is a constant demand level fo r the whole y ear.
In re a lity , of course, daily and therefore, yearly demand is the summation
/
6f various demand levels of different durations. Thus the value of the 
objective function undertaken in Case 3, Table 58, with maximum demand, 
represents an upper bound to a band of cost figures derived from  
combinations of demand levels. S im ila rly , the minimum demand constraint 
(Case 2, Table 58) may be interpreted as a lower bound to the objective 
cost minimisation function.
The results obtained for the cost of the fuel o il tax put a value of 
£19.4 million as an upper bound at maximum demand to the cost function and 
a lower bound of £0.9 million at minimum demand. . However, it.needs to 
be mentioned that whilst the lower bound figure was an optimal solution
Table 66: Shadow Prices of O il-fire d  Power Stations 1961/62 for a 1MW
Change in E lectric ity  Generation.
NO TA X £
Brimsdown^
Minimum 
Demand 
Case 2
Maximum 
Demand* 
Case 3
Actual Output from  
Power Stations 
Case 4
+3.28 -3 .1 1 9 +5.58
South Denes 0 .0 -9 .2 3 5 0 .0
T ilbu ry  ’A ' 0 .0 -8 .1 1 6 +0.58
Bankside 0 .0 -8 .2 2 0 + 0 .4 8
Belvedere 0 .0 -6 .9 6 +1.74
Littlebrook ’ C ' 0 .0 -8 .4 4 +0.26
Marchwood 0 .0 -9 .0 2 0 .0
Poole +0.781 -5 .6 2 ; +3.09
Plymouth ’ B ’ 0 .0 -7 .8 2 +0.88
Portishead ’ B 1 0 .0 -6 .7 2 +1.05
Bromborough 0 .0 -9 .5 3 0 .0
Ince 0 .0 -7 .7 1 +0.99
1 This station has both coal and o il-fire d  burning equipment, and as such 
in Case 2 does not enter the optimal solution as a basic variab le .
*  N ote:- Values of objective function infeasible. The negative shadow 
prices indicate that movements towards the optimal solution would 
decrease overall costs.
WITH TAX -
Brimsdown^
Minimum 
Demand 
Case 2
Maximum 
Demand* 
Case 3
Actual Output from  
Power Stations 
Case 4
+1.257 -5 .2 8 +3.8
South Denes 0 .0 -1 6 .1 4 0 .0
T ilbury  fA ' 0 .0 -1 4 .4 4 0 .0
Bankside 0 .0 -1 5 .1 3 0 .0
Belvedere 0 .0 -6 .9 6 0 .0
Littlebrook ’ C* 0 .0 -1 5 .0 3 0 .0
Marchwood 0 .0 -1 6 .4 7 0 .0
Poole 0 .0 -10.01 0 .0
Plymouth 1B ' 0 .0 -1 3 .8 8 0 .0
Portishead 1B ' 0 .0 -1 3 .5 4 0 .0
Bromborough 0 .0 -1 7 .4 9 0 .0
Ince 0 .0 -1 4 .4 0 0 .0
1 This station has both coal and o il-fire d  burning equipment, and as such in Case 
and Case 4 does not enter the optimal solution as a basic variab le .
*  N ote:- Values of objective function infeasible. The negative shadow prices  
indicate that movements towards the optimal solution would decrease overall cb
the upper bound figure was an infeasible one. As explained in
Section 3.711 t however, the movement towards the final iteration
along with the re la tive  size of the infeasibility of the summation of a ll
current infeasibilities does not suggest that this upper bound figure
is very different from the value that would be obtained with an optimal 
31solution.
With regard to the overall fuel burn in power stations under 
varying demand levels , the maximum and minimum demand cases 
(see Table 59, Case 2 and 3) show that the total burn remains constant 
in the "tax” and "no-tax” cases. In the case of actual demand, 
however, this is not the case and may be explained by the fact that 
with no tax the average cost of fuel is lower than that in the with tax  
case. Since the objective function is to minimise costs, the fuel burn 
is  not constrained to any particular level under the given demand 
condition. Fo r the effect of the fuel oil tax on oil burn (Table 60 ) 
the maximum demand case (3) suggests no change in the oil burn whilst 
the minimum demand case (2) gives a reduction of 0 .7  million tons coal 
equivalent. In the maximum demand case this is expected since a ll 
stations are on the highest possible load in order to meet demand. The 
actual demand case (4) gives a reduction in the oil burn of nearly 5 .5  
million tons coal equivalent. Compared to the CEGB published figure  
of the reduction in the oil burn (Table 62) (0 .68  million tons coal equivalent)
31 . From the computer printout a value of, perhaps, £0.5  million  
is suggested.
the figure of 5 .5 million tons coal equivalent appears la rge . This  
appears to be due, prim arily , to the fact that the model used is a one-period  
analysis in which the dynamics of a reducing real price for fuel oil along 
with increasing electric ity  consumption, over the year 1961/62, are  ignored 
The associated increase in the coal burn by the CEGB on account of 
the fuel oil tax (Table 61) gives a figure of 4.19 million tons fo r the actual 
demand case (4); 0 .64  million tons for the minimum demand case (2) and 
zero tons for the maximum demand case (3). Thus in the maximum demand 
case the coal burn does not rise  from a "no tax" to a "tax" case, because 
the CEGB cannot shift away from higher priced oil since a ll capacity is 
in use. The associated cost of the tax is £19.4 m illion. However, at 
lower levels of demand such as actual demand, 4 .2  million tons of coal 
are burnt when the tax is imposed on the CEGB but the associated fuel 
cost is £3.9 million (Table 58). Yet again, care must be taken in 
in terpreting this proposition since as the demand constraint moves 
towards both minimum and maximum demands from actual output less 
"extra" coal appears to be burned by virtue of the tax . The cost of 
the tax increases as maximum demand is approached from actual output 
and fa lls  as demand tends towards minimum output r appears that the 
cost of the fuel oil tax and the "extra" coal burn may move in some type 
of inverse relationship. Moreover, the model does not give a single 
value fo r the cost of the tax to the CEGB or the "excess" coal burn.
Rather it is necessary to consider bands of possible outcomes fo r these 
figures. Thus whilst an upper bound of £19.4  million and a lower 
bound of £0.9 million are given as the possible costs of the fuel oil tax, 
the boundaries on "excess" coal consumption derived from the tax are
given as 4.2 million tons to zero tons.
Finally mention is made of fuel use in the first five power 
stations occupying the lowest (i.e. maximum load) positions on the 
merit-order with and without the tax. In the maximum demand case 
(Table 63) fuel use remains constant since all stations are on a high 
load factor. In the minimum demand case (Table 64) the oil burn is 
reduced from 0.95 to 0.24 million tons coal equivalent with one oil- 
fired station being banished from the merit-order schedule tabulated. . 
For the actual demand case (Table 65) with no tax three oil-fired 
stations occupy positions in the five prime places in the merit-order 
with an oil b u m  of 3.65 million tons coal equivalent. The imposition 
of the tax reduces the number of oil fired stations in the first five 
base load positions to zero.
3.8. The Consequences of the fuel oil tax on Employment in the Coal 
Indus try.
3.81. The Short Run
The share and linear programming models studied in previous 
sections have suggested a range of figures for the extra coal burn to 
the C.E.G.B. as a consequence of the fuel oil tax. Whilst these figures 
do not represent the aggregate demand consequences of the tax, they are 
taken as a sufficiently sensitive proxy for such a purpose. The 
reasons for this are two-fold. First the C.E.G.B. has a large share of 
N.C.B. output as is shown in Table 67. This implies that in studying 
the effects of the market for coal in the C.E.G.B. the assumption is being 
made that this is a reflection of the possible consequences on other 
markets, although in the case of the C.E.G.B. the response to the impact 
of the tax is much quicker than that in other sectors.
Table 67: Coal Output going to CEGB.
CEGB Consumption
(1) M illion tons
1955 42 .9
1960 51.1
1961 54.7
1962 60 .4
1963 66.8
1965 69.3
1970 67 .4
1975 67.5
NCB Output ( l ) / ( 2 )io
(2) Million  
tons
207.9 20.6
183.8 27 .8
179.7 30 .4
187.7 32 .2
188.2 35 .5
178.9 38 .7
133.8 50 .4
114.9 58 .7
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest, and CEGB Annual Report 
and Accounts.
Secondly, and related to the firs t point in that the share of coal output 
going to the CEGB is used as a proxy for the effects on other m arkets, 
the consequences of the fuel oil tax are not clearly discernible as was 
seen in Section 3 .3 .
In analysing the impact of increased demand fo r coal on the 
employment side of the NCB it  needs to be remembered that the dynamics 
of the situation revolve round a decrease (if any) in the contraction ra te  
of the labour fo rce . Such changes may not be caught by conventional 
production function models and in consequence regression analysis 
based on such dynamics must be viewed cautiously.
Consider Table 69 below which shpws the contraction ra te  of the 
labour force fo r the years 1957-65. The build up in the contraction ra te  
until 1960 is  c lear . The ra te  of contraction drops in  1961 and 1962 and 
then begins to climb again reaching 7 .8 $  in 1965. These aggregate 
figures must be treated with care as they are non-selective with respect 
to age on exit from employment and mode of leaving ( i .e .  retirem ent, 
transfers , death e tc .) as w e ll as changes in recruitment policy. The 
period since 1950 has been characterised by a re la tive  growth in the 
number of miners aged 51 -60  reflecting either an inability of the older 
man to find alternative employment, or the reluctance of young men to 
join the industry o r, indeed, an NCB decision to re cru it less miners 
than in previous years. From T a b le -68 it can be seen that the age 
structure has tended to remain concentrated in the 31-51 age group with  
a heavy weighting in the 41-51 age group. Moreover, the percentage of 
miners in the over 40s groups has risen .
Table 68: Age Structure of Wage-earners on books at Mines 
Operated by the NC B .
1o
Y e a r / ' ^18 18^25 25<30 30<40 40<50 50<.55 55<£0 60<65 >65 Total
Age
1950 3 .6 11 .6 11.8 23.1 24.1 10.1 7 .5 5.5 2 .7 100.0
1958 3 .5 15.0 8 .5 22.6  22.2 11.0 9.1 5 .0 2.1 100.0
1961 3 .6 12.3 8.1 21.6 23.2 12.5 11.6 6 .8 0 .3 100.0
1967 3 .0 9.1 6 .9 17.2 26.1 13.0 13.9 10.7 ' i0 * 1 100.0
1969 2 .7 8 .9 6 .2 17.6 27 .4 13.4 14.4 9 .4 0 .0 100.0
Source: Compiled from various copies of the Energy Digest. 
Note: ^  = less than.
^  = 1 greater than '
Table 69: Employment and other Statistics for the NCB
1957
1958
1959
1960 
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
Labour
Force
(Thousands)
Change
in
Labour
Force
703.8
692.7  
658.2  
602.1
570.5
550.9
523.8
488.5  
450.4
- 11.1 
-3 4 .5  
-5 6 .1  
-3 1 .6  
-1 9 .6  
-27 .1  
-3 5 .3  
-38 .1
Percentage 
Change in 
Labour 
Force
Output
(Thousand
tons)
1.58
4.98
8.52
5.25
3 .44
4.92
6 .74
7.80
210059
201475
195273
186052
181937
189329
189657
186800
180200
Source: Compiled from various copies of the Energy Digest.
Deaths have remained a fa ir ly  constant fraction of total labour . 
Retirements by reason of age have, however, been changeable although 
not in the years 1961-65 (8000 per year). A figure of 19000 was 
recorded for 1960. Consequently much of the change in the labour force  
is due to redundancy and dismissal or changes in recruitm ent. This  
means that the ratio  of wastage to recruitment changed over the years  
in question, Table 70 suggests that fo r .the years 1961 and 1962, when 
the rate  of contraction of the labour force decelerated, there was a 
reduction in the wastage/recruitment ra tio . This implies a reduction  
in wastage or as happened in 1962 a greater decline in wastage than in 
recruitment compared with 1959/60. Thus in 1961 wastage declined 
by nearly .20000 and recruitment rose by 10000. In 1962 wastage again 
fe ll by about 13500 on the 1961 figure but recruitment dropped, back to 
about 16500 below its 1961 figure. Wastage again decreased in 1963 
as did recruitm ent,, although in the following two years these trends 
were reversed. - . ' -
3.82 Labour/Output Ratios in the NCB.
/ *
To assess the impact of the tax on NCB employment rates  the 
labour/output ra tio  was used in two forms with labour defined in terms 
of the NCB workforce (Thousands) and output in terms of deep-mined 
coal (Thousand tons). The firs t form used the ratio  dL /d 0  in which 
output changes and labour changes were considered to take place 
simultaneously. However, for a declining market it may also be the 
case that changes in output in period t are  related to labour changes in  
period t+1. Thus the ratio  d L ^ /d O ^  was used. The method used to
Table 70: Wastage-Recruitment Ratio for the NCB.
Wastage Recruitment (W )/(R)
(W) (R)
1957 66652 72799 0.916
1958 63290 40686 1 .56
1959 74822 27671 2 .70
1960 94779 43733 2 .17
1961 75688 53866 1.41
1962 62055 37103 1 .67
1963 ' 5 1 4 6 4  . 25846 1.99
1964 .60091 34054 ' 1 .76
1965 70220 32489 2 .16
Source: Compiled from various copies of the Energy Digest.
calculate the ratios was through a simple calculation of fractions for 
1958-60. The* use of some form of regression was rejected on the 
grounds that the period under study (1958-60) was too short to give any 
coefficient values fo r the ra tios , along with the fact that only one 
independent variable would have been available. The results are  
given below only fo r the year 1961 since the actual figures indicate 
a ris e  in output in 1962 and 1963 when the demand fo r labour fe ll.
These figures w ill, therefore, have already incorporated in them the 
consequences on output of the fuel oil tax.
Coefficient Values for Ratios.
1961 dLt/dot +0.00768
1962 dLt+1/d 0 t +0.00343
Table 71: Employment versus Output in the NCB for 1 961
Employment
Increase
+5000
+10000
+15000
+20000
+25000
dLt/d°t
0.651
1.302
1.953
2.604
3.255
Million tons.
dLt + l / d0t
1.458
2.916
4.373
5.831
7.289
The results indicate that an ’’addition” to the labour force o f 
.25000 men or a reduction in.the rate of contraction of 25000 men would 
increase production by 3.25 million tons of coal or 130 tons per head 
per year. The second case suggests that in response to a desire to 
produce over 7 .25  million tons more of coal per annum, the NCB  
should reduce the rate  of contraction of the labour force by. 25000 men 
or 290 tons per head per year. It  needs to be pointed out that these 
results assume no capital/labour substitution in 1961 , although the 
ratios reflect past capital stock changes.
3.9 Conclusions on the Fuel Oil Tax.
3.91 Employment and other Resource Consequences of the Fuel Oil 
Tax.
The range of figures available fo r the extra coal produced through 
the fuel oil tax are given below.
1967 White Paper (projected 1.970 figure, a ll sectors)
Tax at 2d/gallon 5 .5  million tons -
Tax at 4d/gallon and 6d/gallon at power stations
15.5 million tons 
Select Committee 1968/69 (A ll sectors)
Tax at actual rate G reater than 5 .0  million tons
Forecasts with Share Model 1961 (CEGB)
Tax at actual rate  7 .8  million tons upper bound
Linear Programme 1961 (C.E.G.B. only)
Tax at actual rage 4.19 million tons at "output from
power station" figure - i.e. 
average demand; associated cost 
£3.9 million. Upper bound at 
maximum demand £19.4 million.
C.E.G.B. 1961/62
Tax at actual rate £8.9 million C.E.G.B. only.
Using dLt+^/dOt an output increase of 4.2 million tons is
associated with a decrease in the contraction rate of the N.C.B. labour
force of some 15000 miners. For the dL /d0 ratio the associated
t t
figure is in the region of 35000 miners. On the basis of the linear
programming results the figure of 4.2 million tons is taken as an upper
bound to the coal burn in the C.E.G.B., during the course of 1961/62, by 
virtue of the tax. As was stated in Section 3.3 the results for other 
sectors appear inconclusive with regard to the impact of the tax. Thus 
an overall figure of, circa, 4 to 5 million tons in 1961/62 of "extra" 
coal consumption due to the tax is postulated, although the basis for 
the extra million tons is sketchy. If the figure of four to five million 
tons is accepted then the tax can be stated to have reduced the 
contraction rate in the N.C.B. by some 15000-18000 miners in 1961/62, 
using the ^kt+^/d0t rati°> or some 35000-40000 miners using dL^/dO^.
This change in the labour force would, of course, be a once-and-for-all 
effect.
3.92,. The Workable Competition Alternative to the fuel Oil Tax.
For the two years 1961/62 and 1962/63 the cost of the hydrocarbon 
duty to the C.E.G.B. is given (see Table 42) as £20.7 million. For 
industry as a whole the figure for the fuel oil tax is put at £116.6 
million (see Chapter four). Bearing these figures in mind and all other 
fuel oil tax receipts in successive years, it is interesting to consider 
an alternative policy to that of the interventionist. In terms of a 
workable competition alternative the difference between the two policies 
will lay with the efficiency with which resources could have been 
utilised. Whilst it is possible that, an Interventionist rule could 
provide a similar solution?if such a policy maximised the quantity of 
electoral votes, the essential difference is the objectives of the . 
respective Governments. In the workable competition case the rationale 
for Government intervention is to provide a framework in which perfect 
competition can be simulated. Accordingly, as was discussed in Chapter 
One, it is not necessarily the case that either the Interventionist or 
the workable competition framework will endorse the same degree of 
intervention as that sanctioned by a strict Paretian seeking to meet 
the conditions for Paretian optimality. This matter is returned to in 
Chapter Five.
In pursuing this line of reasoning conventional Paretian cost- 
benefit analysis will be used and the fuel oil tax is identified as an 
Interventionist policy variable designed to meet an imposed balance of 
payments policy. In contrast, it is suggested, that a workable 
competition Government, attempting to simulate perfect competition^would 
not have imposed the fuel oil tax but would have attempted to remove the 
market failure of increasing unemployment; brought about by the
contraction of the mines, through the payment of some form of subsidy 
to redundant miners. Empirical work has suggested that 18000-40000 
miners may have been made redundant in 1961/62 if the fuel oil tax had 
not been imposed. In 1961 the average annual wage for a miner was 
£750. A lump sum payment of £5000 (nearly seven years wages) would 
have cost the Exchequer £90 million (£200 million); that is one to two 
years receipts from the fuel oil tax. Such payments would on the 1967 
White Paper (CMND. 3438) statements have been high. Under the policy 
for the transition, para. 126, the following is written. "miners aged 
55 or over who become redundant will have their incomes supplemented 
for a period of three years subject to an age limit of 65. ...The 
supplement will be based on previous earnings...in the majority of cases 
redundant miners will be able to receive about 90% of their previous 
take-home pay for a three year period. About 26000 miners are 
expected to benefit under the scheme and the total cost is estimated to 
be £35 million." (at 1967 values).
That alternative employment for redundant miners would have been 
forthcoming is considered in Chapter Four. Other associated net 
benefits to the workable competition alternative may also have accrued 
from permitting the N.C.B. to rationalise its structure thus 
lowering its overall costs in a greater proportion than its associated 
reduction in size. Moreover, the absence of the fuel oil tax would not 
have raised the whole range of primary and secondary energy. Equally, 
it could be argued, that an increased cost of fuel oil for a particular 
industrial process may have acted as a factor promoting the more efficient 
use of resources in the production process.
. Summary
This Chapter analyses the impact of the fuel oil tax on the energy 
sector in the short run. The available figures by the Government 
suggest an increase in coal consumption by virtue of the tax of some 
5 million tons, although the basis on which these calculations were made 
is  not explained. The work in this Chapter follows three strands. The 
f irs t  is through recourse to the available statistical data fo r a ll 
industries. Any conclusions drawn from such studies are treated with 
care but the suggestion is that any impact of the tax was "lost” a fter  
one or two years . . The second strand is to take one industry, the 
CEGB, and to assess the impact of the tax. The-CEGB represents an 
industry in which the fuel mix can be altered within minutes through the 
m erit-o rd er system. A share model suggested very tentatively a 
figure of 7 -8  million tons of extra coal burn due to the tax . These 
results a re , however, suspect due to the difficulties of isolating  
Government intervention through the use of dummy variab les. 
Accordingly, a third method is tried  using a linear programming model. 
These resu lts , based on certain assumptions, suggest a burn of some 
4 million tons at a cost of £3.9  million at an "average” demand level 
for e lectric ity . Taking this figure as a benchmark fo r the consequences 
of the tax on the NCB and adding another, say, one million for other 
industries, use was made of a simple .marginal labour/m arginal output 
ra tio  fo r the NCB, in order to find the reduction in the contraction ra te  
of the labour force required to meet that output. This figure is put at 
15000-18000 men. It is suggested that some form of lump-sum payment 
to the miners would have freed the energy market from the tax and the 
associated increased costs to consumers.
Appendix I.
List of Power Stations used in Linear Programming Analysis.
The data fo r this exercies was kindly provided by the C .E .G .B .  
to whom thanks must be extended.
XK1A Acton 'A ' X01 z Belvedere H P /L P XK2V Carmarthen Bay
XK1B Acton ’B ’ XK2A B lkw l. P t. XK2W Llynfi
XK1C Barking ’ B ’ XK2B Brighton !A ' XK2X Newport
XK1D Barking ’ C ’ XK2C Brighton 'B f XK2Y Rogerstone
XK1E Bdn ’A ' XK2D Croydon ’ B ’ XK2Z T ir  John
XK1F Bdn *B 1 XK2E Deptford East XK3A Upper Boat
XOIF Bdn ’B ' XK2F Kingston XK3B Uskmouth ’A ’
UK1I Brunswick Wharf XK2G Littlebrook ’A ’ XK3C Uskmouth ’ B '
XK1J C liff Quay XK2H Littlebrook ’ B ' XK3D Drakelow ' A ’
XK1K Fulham X 0 2 I Littlebrook ' C ' XK3E Drakelow 1B ’
XK1L Goldington '• XK2J Northfleet XK3F Hams H all ’ B ’
XK1M Hackney ’ B ' XK2K Woolwich XK3G Hams H all ’ C ’
XK1N L ittle  Barford XK2L Cowes XK3H Meaford 1A 1
X K IO Norwich H .P . XK2M E arley XK3I Meaford ’ B !
XK1P Rye House X02N Marchwood XK3J Necchells TB*
XO IQ South Denes X 0 2 0 Poole XK3K Ocker H ill
XK1R Tay Lane H .P . XK2P Portsmouth XK3L Rugeley
X O IS Tilbury ’ A ’ XK2Q East Yelland XK3M Stourport ' A ’
XK1T L ittle  Barford 'A 1 X02R Plymouth XK3N Stourport ’ B 1
XK1U West Ham. ’B ’ XK2S Portishead ' B ’ X K 30 Walsall
X O IV Banksiae X02S Portishead ' B ' XK3P Castle Donington
XK1X Battersea 'A ’ XK2T Aberthaw XK3Q High Marnham
XK1Y Battersea ’ B* XK2U Cardiff XK3R Leics .
XK3S Northampton 
XK3T Nottingham 
XK3U Str.ythorpe 1A 1 
XK3V Staythorpe ’B ' 
XK3W Willington ’A ' 
XK3X Blyth ’ A ’
XK3Y Dunston »B’
XK 3Z North Tees ’ C ' 
XK4A Stella North 
XK4B Stella  South 
XK4C Blackburn Meadows 
XK4D Bradford  
XK4E Doncaster 
XK4F Elland  
XK4G Ferrybridge fA r 
XK4H Ferrybridge lB 1 
XK 4I Grimsby 
XK4J Halifax  
XK4K Huddersfield 
XK4L Keaddy 
XK4M K irksta ll 
XK4N Mexborough 
X K 40 Neepsend 
XK4P Rotherham 
XK4Q Sculcoates 
XK4R Skelton Grange 'A '
XK4S Skelton Grange rB ’
XK4T Thornhill
XK4U Wakefield
XK4V Agecroft B and C
XK4W Blackburn
XK4X Bold 'A 1
XK4Y Bold 1B.1
XK4Z Bromborough
XK5A Carrington
XK5B Chadderton ’B '
XK5C Clarence Dock
XK5D Connah’ s Quay
XK5E Fleetwood
XK5F Hartshead
XK5G Huncoat
X05H  Ince
XK5I Kearsley
XK5J Padiham »B»
XK5K Ribble ’BV
XK 5L Roosecote
XK5M Stockport
XK5N Stuart S t.
X K 50 Westwood
XK5P C arlis le
Appendix II
.Illustration of fuel costs varying with electric ity  demands for different 
load durations.
Consider a three year profile in which power stations are operated 
at various demand levels fo r a given number of years as shown below in 
the time distribution m atrix.
Minimum Maximum Average (Actual)
Demand Demand Demand
3 0 0
0 3 0 .
.0 0 . 3
2 1 0 .
O' 2 1
0 - 1 2
1 2 0
V 1 1
The associated fuel cost matrix (in £ million) is , using Table 58, as follow s,
Minimum Maximum Average (Actual) Total Y early
Demand Demand Demand Fuel Costs
46 .2  0 0 15 .4
0 1267.5 0 253.5
0 0 264.3 88.1
30.8  253.5 0 9 4 .8
0 507.0 88.1 198.4
0 253.5 176.2 143.2
15 .4  507.0 - 0 174.1
15.4  253.5 88.1 119.3
The final column of ’’total yearly fuel costs’’ illustrates that as the 
number of years spent on a given demand level change so do aggregate 
fuel costs. The same results hold fo r the a rb itra ry  division of any 
time period. It needs to be remembered, however, that fuel costs 
do not r ise  proportionately with increases in e lectric ity  demand. 
S im ilar remarks may be made concerning the total fuel burn figures  
given in Section 3.712.
CHAPTER FOUR
OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS OF PROTECTION.
4.1. Introduction
Chapter Three suggested that}with the assumption that the 
Interventionist policy of the imposition of the fuel oil tax only 
affected the rate of contraction of coal output, the tax led to a 
once-and-for-all decrease in the rate of contraction of the N.C.B. 
labour force during 1961/62. It was argued that on a comparative 
statics basis more efficient use of resources would have been obtained 
with a workable competition energy policy alternative designed to pay 
lump-sum redundancy payments to miners.
The fuel oil tax was not, however, the only policy instrument 
imposed by Interventionist Governments on the fuel sector^" and Chapter 
four therefore considers the qualitative evidence available on the 
impact of these other policy instruments of protection.
To quote both the 1965 and 1967 White Papers and Fuel Policy 
these instruments were designed "to assist the coal industry to improve
its competitive strength by supporting its re-organisation and concentration
' . ' 2 on the most efficient colleries."
In regard to the coal industry attention will be primarily 
directed at the labour force, although consideration will be given to 
the factors of capital and management. Secondly attention will be 
directed to the various opportunity costs of labour, capital and 
management. To assess these opportunity costs is must be possible to 
know the mobility of factors and their productivity in other industries.
1.
2.
See chapter Two.
Fuel Policy, Cmnd. 3438, Para. 54. HMSO.
Difficulties will arise, however in trying to compare "productivity" 
between industries. Finally, consideration will be given to the 
link between Government policy and payments to factors of production.
4.2 Protection Instruments.
4.21 Restrictions on Coal Imports.
The ban on coal imports was one of the ad hoc policy measures
produced by the Government in 1959 to bolster up the declining domestic
consumption of coal which led to mounting stocks of coal (35 million tons
in 1959, see Table 15). This followed a period in which coal had been
imported even though it was relatively more expensive than U.K. coal,
due to supplies of domestic coals being inadequate to meet demand at the
prevailing Government controlled price.
The N.C.B. sold imported coals at the same price as domestic
coals and in consequence estimated that during the 1950s this pricing
3
policy cost £28 million. However, in the late 1950s the pithead prices 
of foreign coals, along with freight rates fell and in order to prevent 
a relative shift from domestic to foreign coals, against the background of 
declining coal markets, the Government refused the N.C.B. licenses to 
import American coal. This ban remained in force until 1970 when the 
inability of the coal industry to meet demand from domestic sources at 
current prices and productivity levels led to coal imports. In 1971 
in anticipation of the shortage of U.K. coal the C.E.G.B. arranged contracts 
for 4 million tons of foreign coals. Likewise in March 1974 contracts 
were arranged with such diverse countries as Poland, Czechoslavakia, 
Australia and the U.S.A. Table 72 shows the imports of coal following
3. P.E.P. Report. 1965 ap. cit.
Table 72: Coal Imports, Prices and Deep-mined output
Deep-mined 
Production 
(Million Tons)
Imports
Million
Tons
Import 
Value £ 
c.i.f.
Average c.i.f. 
import price 
per ton
1960 186 0.013 100000 7.4
1961 182 0.041 300000 7.4
1962 189 0.022 100000 4.5
1963 189 0.033 n.a. n.a.
1964 186 0.001 n.a. n.a.
1965 180 0.003 n.a. n.a.
1966 168 0.030 200000 6.6
1967 165 0.007 100000 14.6
1968 157 0.002 n • cL • n.a.
1969 144 0.002 n.a. n.a.
1970 135 0.079 900000 11.6
1971 134 4.174 3930000 9.4
1972 107 4.919 4906700 9.8
1973 118 1.649 2135500 12.95
1974 94 3.491 6205300 17.78
Source: Energy Digest 1973, Table 20 and Statistical Summary of
the Mineral Industry (institute of Geological Sciences, 
Mineral Resources Division).
a.a. data not available.
the "virtual ban" on imports. Also noted are the available 
figures for the value of coal imports (c.i.f.) along with the 
average c.i.f. import price per ton.
It is difficult to draw any conclusions about the effect on 
the coal industry from time-series data with its associated identification 
problems. Since the import of coal under Government direction is a 
residual mainly dependent on demand conditions for U.K. domestic coal 
one cannot argue from the standpoint of pr‘e-1959 trends, because during 
the fifties coal was imported at a higher price than domestic coal but 
sold at prevailing domestic rates. The Select Committee Report on the 
Nationalised Industries, Session 1968/69 reported through a witness from 
the Ministry, of Power "that a complete withdrawal of the ban might have
a. greater effect on demand for home produced coal than the fall in demand 
of 5 million tons which might be the effect of abolishing the fuel oil 
duty".'* However, the basis for this conclusion remained unspecified.
By 1968/69 standards, 5 million tons represented 3.3% of deep-mined 
production. The other point to be remembered is that coals are not 
homogeneous and if industry cannot burn a desired level of domestic or 
imported coals, substitution to fuel oil may occur.
In the absence of any relevant statistical evidence it cannot 
be argued that the banning of coal imports did or did not protect the 
coal industry. From the Interventionist viewpoint, however, certain 
assumptions need to be made if the banning of coal imports is to protect 
the coal industry. The most fundamental of these, remembering that 
the market share of coal in total energy consumption is the variable 
Government Interventionists will most likely wish to affect is that
4. Fuel Policy, 1965, para. 44.
5. Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries. 
Session 1968-69, Vol. 1, para. 120. (Subsequently referred to 
as "Select Committee")
imported coals and domestic coals are perfect or at least close 
substitutes. Moreover, differences in the quality of coals are ignored. 
Such assumptions are loose because if the energy market is growing in 
terms of overall fuel consumption and, if it is accepted that a ban on 
coal imports may lead to some substitution by domestic coals, it is not 
necessarily true that the increase in fuel consumption that would have 
gone to imported coal will go to domestic coals - it may well go to fuel 
oil. Secondly, it may be the case that imported coals and domestic - 
coals are not perfect substitutes and are also differentiated by quality 
and handling characteristics. If this is the case than a ban on coal 
imports will not, necessarily, lead to an equivalent rise in domestic 
coal consumption but may lead consumers to turn towards some other fuel
such as fuel oil (or later in the 1960s natural gas).
4.22 Excess coal burn in the C.E.G.B.
Under the Coal Industry Act 1967 provision was made for the 
reimbursement of the electricity generating Boards and the gas industry 
for the extra costs incurred in using additional coal in place of 
other fuels. These costs were in addition to the costs incurred by the 
C.E.G.B. through the fuel oil tax .Table 73 below notes the volume of the
excess coal burn for the years 1967/68 to 1969/70 and the payments made
from the Exchequer. The data is taken from various copies of the C.E.G.B 
VAnnual Report and Accounts".
The Coal Industry Act of 1967 stated that the electricity 
industry, with perhaps some support from the gas industry, should burn 
more coal per year than they would take if left to make their own 
decisions regarding-fuel imputs. The C.E.G.B. stated in its Annual 
Report’and Accounts for the financial years 1967/68 - 1969/70 inclusive, 
that yearly excess coal burns were 4.5 million tons, 6.0 million tons and
2.2 million tons respectively.
Table 73: Excess Coal burn in the CEGB
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70
Source:
Excess burn (1) Total burn (2) (l)/(2)^ Reimbursements
Million tons Million tons £ million
4.5 64.4 6.99 3.4
6.0 68.7 8.73 7.4
2.2 68.7 3.20 3.8
Energy Digest and C E G B  Annual Report and Accounts for 
1967/68 - 69/70.
Note: Limit for reimbursements for four year period beginning
1967 was put at £45 million.
In 1969, with oil prices beginning to rise, this burn declined
to 2 million tons.. In 1970/71 there was no extra coal burn. In March
6
1970 the Labour Government presented a Bill to Parliament which 
recommended the continuation of extra burns in the C.E.G.B. However, 
following the June 1970 General Election the Conservative -Coal Industry 
Bill removed this clause since its "usefulness" was considered to be 
obsolete. The 1973 Coal Industry Act, however, re-introduced the concept 
of an excess burn by the C.E.G.B. Grants*were to be given "to meet the 
cost of extra coal burn to a limit of £50 million over the three years to
7
March 1976". Such legislation became unnecessary following the relative
price shift away from fuel oil to coal in late 1973. However, the 1974
Plan for Coal implicitly re-introduced the concept of excess coal burns
by the C.E.G.B. in discussing the belief that fluctuations in "short-run"
demand for coal must.be smoothed.
With respect*to financial compensation for excess burns the 1967
White Paper on Fuel Policy removed the onus from the electricity consumer
and placed it on the taxpayer. From the Governments point of view the
benefit to the^N.C.B.1s accounts from this form of protection could be
regarded as the difference between the sales of the excess coal burn and
the value of that same coal as stocked. The value as stocked would not
have been high, for, as the Ministry of Power stated "stocks which exceed
9requirements ...may ...not be saleable for a long time". This argument, 
by the Government, presupposes that the coal would have been produced in the 
absence of an excess burn. If an artificial market for coal had not been
6. Coal Industry Bill, March 1970
7. Coal Industry Act, 1973
8. Plan for Coal, op. cit.
9. Select Committee Report on the Nationalised Industries,
1968/69, para. 13, Vol. I.
created, resource savings would have accrued to the C.E.G.B. in the form 
of a less costly aggregate fuel bill, to the N.C.B. in terms of reduced 
labour and stocking facilities and to the economy if the factors were 
re-employed elsewhere. In practical terms these payments may be 
regarded as direct assistance to the N.C.B.fs financial position, for, 
assuming that the Boardfs current level of stocks had made it necessary 
that this quantity of coal should be sold at the best price obtainable, 
the sums paid by the Government to the electricity and gas industries 
represent the minimum price reduction which the Board would have had to 
make if the coal was to be sold. For the C.E.G.B. the resource costs of 
the excess burn are greater than the value mentioned above since the excess 
burn implies a merit-order ranking of power stations other than that 
based purely on the marginal cost of each station. In as much as the 
burning of excess coal prohibits at the margin the burning of cheaper 
priced oil, there is a corresponding resource cost to be born by the 
C.E.G.B.
The Ministry of Power, regarded the "excess burn" scheme as
preferrable to a general subsidy on coal because a general subsidy would
support coal against natural gas and nuclear power as well as against
oil.^ The object of the scheme was to raise coal consumption quickly,
a general subsidy being considered unlikely to do this. "In the short
term there would not be the necessary capacity to burn the coal outside
the electricity and gas industries, which alone have sizeable alternative
capacity available. An advantage of the present scheme is the clear and
. . .  11
direct benefit which could be readily identified." The actual accounting 
cost to the C.E.G.B. was identified by running the C.E.G.B.fs merit-order 
programme with and without an element reflecting the re-imbursement available.
10. This does not imply that this was a rational or planned policy 
because the Government also protected coal against gas by 
refusing to let the C.E.G.B. burn more than only a small quantity 
of gas.
11. Select Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, para. 17, Chapter VI.
4.23- Excess coal burn in Public Administration.
With regard to excess coal burns in public administration the 
time-series data in Table 75 shows that the percentage share rates of 
the total heat supplied to public administration provide little 
evidence that Government energy policy had any effect on the coal burn 
in public administration. The percentage reduction in coal’s market 
share appears to heve declined during the years 1965-67, although the 
evidence for this is not strong. The total demand for coal in public 
administration was four million tons in 1960 and three million tons in 
1970, with consumption remaining fairly stable in the region of 3.5-3.2 
million tons during the years 1964-67. Arguably this stability was 
derived from the excess burn of coal in public administration, in which 
case any conclusions regarding contracting consumption rates in this 
sector would be purely speculative. Moreover, this form of contraction 
occurred in markets where intervention did not take place (e.g. commercial 
sector). Given these constraints it is not possible to discern from the 
time-series data how many tons of coal were used in excess burns undertaken 
by public administration.
4.24 Conversion of C.E.G.B. stations.
The rising demand for oil in the late fifties coupled with the
' ' '’V1
decline in coal consumption led to the Government’s wishing to influence 
the C.E.G.B. market for coal. In 1958 the Government, through the N.C.B., 
in consultation with the oil companies temporarily deferred conversion 
of Littlebrook B and Brunswick Wharf power stations, thereby allowing 
them to remain coal-fired for a further twelve months. It was also
Table 7 As Share of Coal and Fuel Oil in Public Administration.
Million Therms
Coal Oil Total Coal: Total Oil: Total
(*) W )
1957 1147 318 2193 52.3 14.5
1958 1174 460 2372 49.5 19.4
1959 1044 543 2221 47.0 24.4
1960 1079 668 2370 45.5 28.2
1961 1030 545 2180 47.2 25.0
1962 1040 703 2458 42.3 28.6
1963 1055 815 2637 40.0 30.9
1964 931 896 2606 35.7 34.4
1965 940 1015 2781 33.8 36.5
1966 947 1139 2944 32.3 38.7
1967 915 1288 3079 29.7 41.8
1968 843 1420 3182 26.5 44.6
1969 879 1 531 3351 26.2 45.7
1970 819 1742 3452 23.7 50.5
1971 689 1905 3421 20.1 55.7
1972 586 1950 3488 16.8 55.9
1973 552 1886 3542 15.5 53.2
1974 523 1683 3317 15.7 50.7
Source: Various copies of the Energy Digest, H MSO.  
Note: Other fuels used in Public Administration are 
Coke and Breeze, Electricity, Town Gas and 
sine© 1969 Natural Gas.
agreed that certain boilers at Portishead B should not be converted
to oil. The N C B  estimated that this conversion stoppage involved
a "saving” in oil consumption of 5.7 - 4.5 million tons by 1960/61 .
This implies that over the years 1958 - 1960/61 coal consumption was
held up by approximately 8.5 million tons. Most of the decisions in
this period to stop coal-fired stations being converted to oil-fired
were a reversal of decisions taken in 1954/55 to convert 17 stations
to oil within a short time period. In 1957 this number was reduced to
fourteen and in 1958, as described above, to eleven. The defaulting
on conversion plans proceeded with difficulty as contractual obligations
with the oil companies had been made during the period of the coal
shortage. The imposition of the tax in 1961 did not hamper the long
run aim to convert to oil as by 1965 the C E G B  decided to convert two
more power stations to oil. To quote their yearly report "despite the
continuing tax, the cost of heat from fuel oil under these conditions is
12
below that of heat from coal anywhere in the south of the country."
During 1969/70 plans for converting Northfleet and Hams Hall 'Cf 
power stations from coal to oil-fired units were deferred. Measuring 
"deferment" in terms of coal consumed the burn in these two power 
stations was 1 .7 million tons per annum. In 1971 /72 the Government 
also deferred conversion to oil of the remaining four boilers at 
Aberthaw ’A ’. An interesting measure of the extra capital cost 
involved in building a coal rather than an oil station is derived from the 
1965/66 C E G B  Annual Report and Accounts with respect to the provisional 
plan to build Littlebrook ’D f. "Examination of the economics of this
12. C E G B  Annual Report and Accounts, 1964/65.
project in the light of present trends in the relative costs of coal and
oil established the case in the Board’s view for a change to oil burning
of two 60MW boilers. This was estimated to reduce the capital cost
by £5 million and to result in a saving in operating costs of £2 million
in the early years of the completed station, the latter figure being
13based on the 1965 fuel price."
13. C E G B  Annual Report and Accounts, 1965/66.
The power stations which were converted in the period after
1965 are listed below.
1969/70. Permission was given to convert from coal to oil-fired 
the following stations: Fulham, Littlebrook ’B ’, 
Brunswick Wharf, Portishead ’B ’(delayed since 1957), 
Braehead, and Dalmarnock in Glasgow. It was agreed 
to convert Hams Hall ’C' to dual-firing with gas on 
condition that coal-burning could be resumed at short 
notice should surplus coal become available.
Conversion plans for Tilbury ’B ’ were rejected.
1970/71 . Permission was given in the summer of 1970 to convert 
Richborough, Aberthaw ’A ', Northfleet and before 
' . Dec. 1971 Portsmouth and Kirk stall. The conversions
for Aberthaw ’A ’, Northfleet and West Thurrock 
provided for dual firing.
1971 /72. The C E G B  deferred conversion to oil of the remaining 
four of six boilers at Aberthaw’A '.
By deferring conversion plans for coal-fired stations to oil- 
fired ones, the Government forced the C E G B  to operate the merit- 
order system with "non-deferred" stations. Necessarily, therefore, 
resource losses were incurred since the decision to invest in conversion 
from coal to oil-fired stations implies that the converted oil-fired stations 
would have occupied a position nearer to base load in the merit-order 
system than their non-converted coal-fired station counterparts.
4 .25  Opencast M ining.
The curtailment of opencast mining activities provides a rather
interesting insight into views of fuel policy as seen by the N C B  and'the
Government. The Government decided in 1967 that authorisations for
opencast workings should be restricted, thereby keeping opencast1
production levels down to their 1966 values. The Board on the other
hand had originally intended to increase production "to improve their
14
proportion of cheap coal in an increasingly competitive market." The 
Board, moreover, considered that the restrictions came at a particularly 
unfortunate time since they were just bringing to fruition a number of 
joint projects with local planning authorities to combine opencast 
workings with the clearance of derelict areas and the improvement of 
infrastructure in mining areas in order to improve employment prospects. 
The N C B  also expressed concern that the civil engineering industry would
14. Select Committee 1968/69 op. cit. para. 83.
suffer from m ultiplier effects since one of c iv il engineering's basic
markets was the machinery used in the Board's opencast operations.
F in a lly , although opencast mining provides under 10$ of total production
of coal, production climbed from 6.1 million tons in 1960 to 7.1 million
tons in 1967 and 10.0  million tons in 1973 (see Table 7 5 ). To use the
N C B ' s words this "supplements deep mined supplies of special coals
such as anthracite and coking coals and because of its low and stable -
price it is  invaluable in helping to secure long-term contracts fo r  
15industrial coals." The Board considered, therefore, that opencast 
mining did not compete with deep-mined coal production and in cases 
where it did, the Government need not w orry fo r the NCB would not apply 
fo r authorisation to develop opencast sites. However, the Select 
Committee cites one case between July 1967 and July 1969 where a 
proposal fo r opencast mining had been rejected by the M inister on the 
grounds that the coal produced could be sold only in competition with 
deep-mined output. Indeed it  is  hard to see, with the NCB 's  pricing  
policy and faced with a declining market, how the NCB made the policy 
choice between slowing the rate  of contraction by pressing fo r protection  
instruments to hold up the consumption of deep-mined coal or by encouraging 
a lowering of unit costs by substituting opencast for deep-mined coal 
production. The statement that "we are only putting forw ard applications 
where we are convinced that it  is the national interest to do so and where
15. Memorandum by Chairman of the NCB on Opencast Mining, May 1969. 
Select Committee, op. c it.
we consider that there will be no harmful effects on our deep-mined
markets"^, seems to imply a decision to reduce opencast output in favour
of the "national interest" defined as reducing the contraction rate for
deep-mined coal output.
In order to slow down the declining market for deep-mined coal,
production of opencast coal (which substitutes very easily for deep-
mined coal) was deliberately kept down. This was during a period in
which the profit per ton of opencast coal*was £1.07 (1966) compared
with a profit (before interest) for deep-mined coal of £0.13 per ton for 
171966/67. One could argue that with increasing output, increasing 
scale economies would, have met-thereby increasing profits per ton.
The pursuit of an interventionist fuel policy led to the loss of a 
relatively' cheaper source of coal. Once again the automatic assumption 
that a reduction in opencast mining activities will lead to a slow down 
in the contraction rate for deep-mined coal, given both are substitutes, 
assumes that consumers are indifferent to prices. As the N.C.B. said, 
the attraction of opencast coal was that its low, stable price attracted 
long-run contracts. In these circumstances, the reduction in opencast 
mining production may well have led not to a marginal increase in­
deep-mined coal consumption but to a marginal increase in fuel oil 
consumption.
4.26 Financial Provisions.
The 1965 and 1967 Coal Industry Acts have been discussed in 4.22. 
Here, for completeness, a summary of financial assistance to the coal 
industry is detailed. In general, such financial assistance falls into
16. See 15.
17. This figure is calculated by deducting profit (1966) from opencast
mining (see Table 76) from overall NCB profits (1966/67) for all 
activities and dividing by deep-mined coal output in the years 
1966/67.
Table 75: Production and Profits in Opencast Mining.
Opencast Deep-mined P ro fit from
Mining Coal Opencast Mini:
(M illion Tons) (Million Tons) (£ M illion)
1963 6.1 189.7  6 .3
1964 6 .8  186.8  5 .8
1965 7 .3  180.2 4 .8
1966 7 .0  167.6 7 .5
1967 7.1 165.0  6 .3
1968 6 .9  157.2 5 .0
1969 6 .3  144.2 7 .3
1970 7 .8  134.5 16.4
1971 10.5 134.3 14.3
1972 10.3  107.3 19 .4
1973 10 .0  118.1 15 .7
1974 9.1 98 .4  n .a .
Source: Energy Digest and NCB Reports.
Note: n.a. = Not available.
three categories. The first is costs borne by the tax-payer of 
Government protection of the coal industry’s market. Into this 
category would fall postponing pit closures and the excess coal burn.
The second category concerns payments to redundant or early retirement 
miners which are a consequence of the decline in output which occurs 
despite protection. Finally, there is the writing-off of debt by the. 
Exchequer. The Sums involved in the last category are large compared 
to the other figures under consideration. Moreover, they represent 
sums of money raised through taxation which are used to alter the capital 
debt structure of the N.C.B. By this method the debt can be kept 
"reasonable11 in the Minister’s and the N.C.B.*s eyes since interest 
charges will be reduced. Protection of the industry is only gained in 
the short-run by a lowering interest charges on debt but may in the 
longer run detract from the resource savings that need to be made and 
not encourage the removal of "slack" in the industry. In such 
circumstances the reduction of debt does not in the long run necessarily 
provide or guarantee protection for the coal industry.
Under the 1965 Act, £415 million was written off the Board’s 
debt to the Exchequer, some £115.6 million of this being used to cover 
revenue deficits and the remaining £300 million being applied to writing 
of the residual value of closed pits and the writing down of other over­
valued assets. The reduction in the debt brought down interest charges 
by over £20 million per year.
The 1965 Act also authorised the Minister to contribute up to £30 
million towards social costs incurred by the Board up to March 1971 in 
connection with the accelerated closure of uneconomic pits. The 1967 
Act made provision for the following further financial assistance for 
the industry in the "transitional" period up to March 1971. (See Table 76).
Table 76: Provisions for Financial Assistance to the Coal Industry.
Social costs as defined in 1965 Act: 
increased total contribution 
Reimbursement of losses incurred in 
postponing pit closures 
Reimbursement of additional cost of 
using coal in e lectric ity  generation 
and producing gas
Reimbursement of additional cost of . 
early  retirem ent benefits to mine- . 
workers made redundant a fter age 55+
Costs of supplementing for 3 years incomes of 
mine-workers made redundant at age 55+
Source: Coal Industry Act, 1967.
£ million
up to 45 
up to 8
up to 45
7
37
The 1965 and 1967 Acts made provision for the cost of the
benefits provided by the N.C.B. in respect of redundancy payments,
%
loss of superannuation and employment prospects, removal and 
resettlement expenses, including housing, subsidised transport 
and supplementation of earnings for men transferred and the 
maintenance of social welfare and other benefits in kind. The 
estimated expenditure by the Board qualifying for reimbursement and 
payments made by the Ministry for the years 1966/67-68/69 are given 
in Table .77 along with Exchequer contributions to 1973/74.
Table 7 7: Grants in Connection with pit closures
£ M illion
Expenditure by NCB Payments made by
qualifying for reimbursement the Exchequer
1966/67 1 .7  1 .3
1967/68 6.1 5 .2
1968/69 12.0 10.8  
1969/70 n .a . 9 .2
1970/71 n .a . 8 .5
1971/7 2  n .a . 9 .3
1972/73 n .a . . 9.1
1973/74 n .a . 17 .0
Source: Compiled from Annual NCB Reports and Trade and Industry, 
7th March 1975.
Note: n .a . = not available.
The 1967 Act made provision for the reimbursement to the NCB 
of losses incurred in postponing pit closures, within a lim it of 
£5 million (which was flexible by Order up to £8 m illion). The 
following data is therefore recorded in Table 7
Table 78: Reimbursement of losses incurred in Postponing P it C losures.
"Losses incurred Payments made by
Exchequer
£m
1967/68 1.9 1.0
1968/69 0.5 1.4
;Source: Compiled from Annual NCB Reports.
With respect to the social benefits mentioned in the two Acts, 
the early  retirem ents scheme began from July 1967 but no payments 
were made by the M inistry in 1967/68 because the detailed 
negotiations were not completed before the end of the year. The total 
cost incurred up to March 1969 was estimated at £4.5 m illion. The 
second part of the scheme, supplementing for three years the incomes 
of m ine-workers made redundant at age 55 or over, cost £3.3  million  
in  1968/69 of which about £0.5  million related to liab ilities  in 1967/68. 
The various social costs arising under the Coal Industry Acts to 1971 
are  aggregated and tabulated in Table 79 .
The 1971 Coal Industry Act was a continuation of previous A cts, 
providing for part of the social costs of co lliery  closures to be met 
by grants from the Exchequer up to an amount not exceeding £24 m illion  
fo r the three years ending 30th March 1974. The Act also extended 
fo r  three years the power of the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry to make redundancy payments to workers in the industry.
The accumulated deficit lim it was increased from £50m to £75m with  
provision for further extension, with Treasury approval, to £100 m illion .
F inally  in 1973 another Coal Industry Act was passed, the 
principal components of which are listed below:
l )  The book value of the N C B ’ s assets was reduced and the 
accumulated deficit was w ritten off, which gave a benefit 
of about £40 million per annum in the form of reduced 
depreciation and interest charges.
The grant regarding co lliery  closures and m ine-w orkers1 
pensions was raised to £85 million over the three years  
to March 1976 with a possible extension to March 1978 
and a lim it of £140 m illion.
The Redundant M ine-workers payments scheme was extended 
to March 1976 (or to March 1978) with a lim it of £60 million  
on aggregate payments under it  (£100 million i f  period  
extended).
Government grants were given to meet the cost of extra  
coal burns to a lim it of £50 million over the three years  
to March 1976 (this w ill be increased by Order to not 
more than £100 m illion).
Government grants were raised to £210 m illion over three  
years to March 1976 to help the NCB moderate the 
contraction of its  activ ities , bearing in mind the heavy 
concentration of coal mining in high unemployment a reas . 
Grants to cover coking coal production and costs of 
stocking coal and coke above a certain level were ra ised  
to £85 million over three years to March 1976 (or to 
March 1978 with a figure of £145 m illion).
Total borrowings were to be limited to £550 m illion, 
although the lim it could be raised to £700 m illion.
Perm itted accumulated deficits were to be restric ted  to 
£50 million (or £100 million by O rd er).
Table 79 : Costs arising under the Coal Industry Acts comprising
i)  Accelerating redeployment of employees
ii )  elimination of uneconomic co lliery  capacity ( i .e .  in 
closing pits).
i i i )  benefits in respect of early  retirem ent.
£ M illion
Total Expenditure Grants from
Exchequer towards 
Total Expenditure
1966/67 6 .8  1 .5
1967/68 9 .8  6 .6
1968/69 17 .6  13.0
1969/70 15 .7  11.0
1970/71 15.1 10.3
1971/72 15.1 10.3
Total 80.1 52.7
Total Grants as a percentage of Total Expenditure:- 6 5 .8 $
Source:- Compiled from copies of N .C .B . Reports.
A brief conclusion is in order here, although in Section 4.3 
the least possible aggregate financial assistance given by the 
Government in terms of grants and reduction in interest is considered.
Here, attention is directed to two points. First, financial assistance 
to the N.C.B. was both large and wide-ranging during the years 1965-74. 
Secondly, it is noted that assistance was paid throughout the period 
even though coal became more competitive with respect to other fuels 
after 1971 (see Table 8D which gives expenditure on other policy 
instruments per ton of deep-mined coal output).
4.27 Institutional Control.
Three points need to be noted here. One regards the degree of 
Ministerial control over the actions of the N.C.B. The objective function 
of the N.C.B. will not be the same as the Government’s, since in terms 
of Breton’s model the supply of policies in dependent on the relative 
power of bureaucrats and politicians. The case of opencast mining 
suggested that the N.C.B. was interested in maximising its market share 
whilst the Government was also concerned with the social and political 
implications of a contracting coal industry.
In the Select Committee Report the following statement is made;
"the Chairman (NCB) regretted that he had not always been able to persuade
the Minister and his advisers to accept the industry’s judgement in
matters where the Board were acting from their own technical ana
18managerial knowledge”. The Minister has the power to influence the 
investment and pricing programme of the Board not only in its content 
but in its timing. This feature is of extreme importane, for intervention 
in the timing of decisions in the N.C.B. or other energy industries can 
be a form of protection if it leads to more coal being on the market and/ 
ormore coal-fired stations being available than would be the case without 
protection.
18. Chapter VII, Select Committee, para. VII. 4, p.55, op.cit.
This leads to the second point. The Government may time 
the sanctioning of investment decisions in other industries so as to 
provide for a Government prefered contraction rate for the coal 
industry. For example, following the successful conversion to and 
operation of one of the 65MW coal-fired boilers at Hams Hall *C* 
on dual firing, the C.E.G.B. applied in May 1968 for the Ministerfs 
consent to convert to natural gas the other five boilers at that 
station and the: whole of the 252MW oil-fi.red station at South Denes.
In October 1968 the Minister decided not to approve the conversion of 
the remainder of the Hams Hall ’G’ station. South Denes itself was 
never converted. In 1970 consent was given to convert the West Thurrock 
station to gas on "interruption on seller’s option", i.e. used when 
required and available but liable to be interrupted at short notice.
As the C.E.G.B. pointed out in analysing the strength of this, protection 
instrument for coal "it is invidious that natural gas cannot be purchased
-direct from producers and that the C.E.G.B. have to rely on a supply
. 19controlled by their major competitor in the energy field." Excepting
the Miners’ strike periods, gas consumption by the C.E.G.B. has been
negligible.
4.3 Labour Allocation under Interventionist and Workable Competition 
Fuel Policies.
The. three basic questions asked in evaluating the consequences of 
protection instruments included an inquiry into which extra resources 
were used due to protection and their associated opportunity costs.
Interest was also to be shown in whether, protection pushed up 
.pactor .payments in mining. . The .foregoing analysis in Section .4 ,2 ^ argues,
19. C.E.G.B. Annual Report and Accounts, 1973/74,
on the incomplete evidence available that the protection instruments 
used may not have had relatively large effects, compared to the fuel 
oil tax, on the reduction in the contraction rate of deep-mined coal 
output. To argue in this vein, however, does not mean that the 
costs of using protection instruments were relatively small. It 
merely reflects the fact that the "benefits" obtained from protecting 
the coal industry may have been far less than the overall "costs" to 
the economy.
In turn this implies that those men who were kept on in the 
industry to produce the marginal coal output derived from protection 
instruments, were imputed with relatively high resource costs (see 
Table 80). Seen in this light and ignoring issues of distribution, 
the fuel oil tax stands out as the instrument that reduced the 
contraction rate in the labour force (see Chapter Three). Tentatively, 
it appears that policy instruments involved a further commitment of 
factors to the coal industry at a relatively high cost compared to the 
benefits received. As suggested in Chapter Three a possible workable 
competition alternative would have been to make lump-sum payments to 
miners on their being made redundant. Resources could also have been 
directed to increasing regional aid to those areas where the rate of 
contraction of the mining labour force was above national unemployment 
levels. In this connection Table 80 illustrates the various 
expenditures and receipts that are relevant to the discussion.
These figures indicate that for the period 1961/62-1972/73 nearly 
£1800 million was spent on regional aid, while at least £222 million was 
spent on other policy instruments. The revenue raised by the fuel oil 
tax accumulated to £1145 million for the same period. It is 
interesting to note that during the period 1961/62-19,66/67 the labour 
force of the N.C.B. fell by nearly a factor of twice that for the period
Table 80: Regional Aid Expenditure, Fuel Oil Tax Receipts and Other
Protection Instruments Expenditure* £ million
Total
Expenditure
on
Regional Aid
Receipts 
from fuel 
oil tax
Expenditure 
on other 
policy 
instruments**
Expenditure (£) 
on other policy 
instruments per 
ton of deep-mined 
coal output.+
1961/62 32 .8 56.4 - -
1962/63 23.9 60.2 - -
1963/64 16.6 68.2 - -
1964/65 30.3 73.2 - -
1965/66 74.1 80.1 20.0 0.11
1966/67 68.3 89.8 2 .8 0 .02
1967/68 159 .5 * 93.0 12.8 0 .0 8
1968/69 268 .7* 100.0- 25.2 0 .1 7
1969/70 293.0 116.0 11.0 0 .0 8
1970/71 301.6 133.0 10.3 0 .0 8
1971/72 269.0 133.0 1 1 0 .3 ** * 1 .01
1972/73 261.3 142.0 40 .0 0.31
Source: H .M . Begg & C o ., ’’Annual Expenditure on Special Regional 
Assistance to Industry in Great B rita in  1960 /1-1972/3 ;
A N o te .” ,
*
**
V  V V 
+
Economic Journal, Dec. 1975 and various copies of the 
Energy Digest.
Trade and Industry, 7th March 1975.
due to increase in Regional Employment Premium.
These figures include only the tabulated figures in Section 5 .2 .  
and are thus an underestimate of protection.
Including £100 Million in grants to meet deficits on Revenue Acco 
Compare in .
1967/68-1972/73 and regional aid spending was much less than in the 
later period. This implies that regional aid was given less priority 
by the Government for providing alternative job opportunities for 
ex-miners during the former period. However, whether the money is 
channelled into regional aid or to individual miners the question that 
ultimately remains is "could the miners who were kept in work by the 
protection instruments have found employment elsewhere?" That is
was there a real resource cost in keeping* men in mining? If they
would have been unemployed if they left the pits, there was no 
opportunity cost in keeping them there. Certainly the 1964-70 
Labour Government’s National Plan for Growth assumed this to be the 
case. However, consider the data in Table 81 regarding unemployment 
and vacancy rate in Great Britain during the 1960s.
The figures for unemployment are twelve month averages,. while 
the vacancy rates are given for June and January. .As the column of 
the-percentage of the work force unemployed shows unemployment rates 
were relatively low throughout the 1960s. Unemployment rates fell 
from 1963 to 1966 and then climbed to 3% in 1967 and 3.2% in 1968.
The vacancy rates enable two points to be made. First, during the 
period 1963-66 the number of vacancies rose from, circa, 77000 to 
160000. Secondly, although the unemployment rate rose in 1963, the 
period 1959-61 was characterised.by declining': unemployment rates and 
increasing vacancy rates. In Chapter Three it was suggested that, in 
the absence of the fuel oid tax, 40000-20000 miners may have been made 
redundant in 1961. Even with this size of increase, unemployment rates 
in the economy as a whole would have been relatively low. Coupled with 
re-training schemes (see below), the mobility afforded by redundancy 
payments and the conditions of nearly "full employment" in the economy 
during the 1960s, it is likely that ex-miners would have found employment.
Table 81: Registered Unemployment and Notified Vacancies 
in  Great B rita in .
(Males in Thousands; Twelve Month Average)
Unemployment Unemployed Vacancies Vacancies
as a per (June) (Jan .)
cent of the 
total labour 
force ($ )
1959 343 .8  2 .4  9 3 .4  65 .8
1960 259.8  1 .8  133.5 101.1
1961 249.6  1 .7  146.5 ’ 110.9
1962 344.9 2 .3  89 .4  87.1
1963 440.1 3 .0  77.1 4 9 .3
1964 286.2 1 .9  128.4  83 .3
1965 250.3 1 .7  162.2  118,1
1966 285.1 1 .9  160.9 132.1
1967 451.2  3 .0  9 8 .0  8 8 .7
1968 473.7  3 .2  9 7 .7  7 9 .7
Source: B ritish  Labour S tatistics, H istorica l Abstract 1 886—1968, 
Department of Employment, HMSO, 1971.
Table 82 enlarges on this point by showing the decrease in
the labour force of the N.C.B. in each year coupled with the number of
miners who remained unemployed at the end of each year.
During 1961 when the fuel oil tax was imposed there was an
dxcess of,vacancies over unemployment of 5000 men. The highest 
figure for the difference between unemployment and vacancies during 
the period 1961-65 was 9000 men. However, this same perid.d is 
characterised by a relatively low enemployment rate in the economy as 
a whole. By paying miners lump-sum redundancy benefits individuals 
would have been able to seek alternative jobs without financial concern 
for a number of years (suggested as seven). Coupled with re-training 
schemes and the increasing vacancy rate in the economy during the period 
1963-66 it is again likely that ex-miners would not have been unemployed 
for a long period of time. Indeed the 1968/69 Select Committee Report 
values re-training costs for workers affected by colliery closures in 
1967/68 and 1968/69 at £216,000 and £814,000 respectively. These 
figures may partially reflect the miners* desire not to train for other 
jobs or a relatively small amount of money going to training from 
Government funds. This last category may in turn reflect either a low 
ranking of regional aid in the Government’s policy preference function 
or a Government belief that re-employment rates were at a level at which 
relatively high re-training inputs were not necessary. It does not 
follow, of course, that higher regional aid will secure more employment, 
unless firms are committed to spending that money only on labour.
However, whether assistance to unemployed miners is given on an 
individual basis or through the Regional Aid Scheme attention must be
directed to re-employment rares. As Appendix I shows, the analysis of
20 ~Lehmann suggested that for those immobile miners who were made redundant
Table 82: Registered Unemployment and Notified Vacancies in
\*Mining and Quarrying ( U .K . )
Thousands
Decrease in Unemployment Vacancies
NCB l abour (Q uarterly (September
force ( - )  January Adult
figures) labour)
1959 6 .6  * 1.6
1960 51.0 7 .9  7 .0
1961 5 .6  10.6
1962 25 .0  • 5 .0  2 .4
1963 . 25 .6  9 .8  0 .8
1964 26 .0  8 .5  2 .4
1965 37 .7  • 6 ,6  4 .0
1966 32 .4  ' ; 6 .6  5 .7  .
1967 32 .0  8 .7  1 .7
1968 57.3 13.3  1 .5
Source: B ritish Labour Statistics, H istorica l Abstract 1886-1968, 
Department of Employment, HMSO, 1971'.'
Digest of Energy S tatistics, HMSO, 1970.
Notes: *  Based on 1958 Standard Industrial C lassification.
* *  Taken as net intake (+) or outflow ( - )  fo r the
industry. The figures tabulated are less than the 
wastage derived from ’’redundancy and dismissals” 
and ’’other wastage” alone.
between July 1967 and October 1968 re-absorption into the active labour 
force was very likely to occur within twelve months.
Finally the question regarding the pushing up of factor payments- 
wages - to miners is considered. The suggestion above is that the fuel 
oil tax slowed down the contraction rate of the labour force, whilst the 
other instruments increased the costs of protection with only a relatively 
small contribution to that protection rate. In these circumstances it 
is possible that marginal job security may be increased and add to union 
pressure for higher wage demands. However, the argument really hinges 
on the definition of wages. If the "protection" wage paid by the Gov­
ernment to the miners is considered then indeed factor payments have risen. 
If they are not included it is possible to argue that wages may be pushed 
upwards as miners feel more secure. In either case the political-economic
power of the NUM has been increased, and will exhibit itself in the union’s
21 . 
wage bargaining activities. In the context of an industry running down
its labour force that security may not exhibit itself until the rundown
is very low under the assumption that the protection instruments still
exist. -
20. P. Lehmannj Coal Prices, Second Report, Cmnd. 4455 - I, 
H.M.S.O., 1971, Report No. 153.
21. See C, Robinson, "The Energy Crisis and British Coal", Hobart 
Paper No. 59, IEA 1974, especially the second part.
Summary
Chapter Four qualitatively assesses the impact on resource 
allocation of thepolicy instruments, other than the fuel oil tax, used 
to protect the coal industry. On the evidence available, a tentative 
conclusion is reached that whereas these other instruments contributed 
little to the slowdown in the contraction rate of the N.C.B. labour
force, the associated costs of protection were relatively high.
In Chapter Three it was suggested that lump-sum payments to
redundant miners would have utilised resources more efficiently than
the Interventionist policy of imposing the fuel oil tax. Chapter Four 
develops this analysis in the context of all the coal protection instru­
ments and concludes that during the 1960s redundant miners would have 
been re-absorbed into the active labour force within a period of one 
year. The suggested scale of lump-sum payments to miners of seven 
years their 1961 annual wage would have provided the miners with support 
during their period of temporary unemployment.
Finally, Annex I provides a short discussion on the impact of 
macroeconomic Government Interventionist policies on energy policy. In 
the context of the CEGB’s generating plant ordering programme, the period 
of price restraint from 1967-74 is seen to have resulted in new invest­
ment being undertaken in an earlier period than would have been the case 
without price restraint.
Appendix I
Resource Costs of Mining Labour.
P . Lehmann in Coal P rices , Second Report, Cmnd. 4455-1 (HMSO) 
1971 , Report No. 153, attempted to measure the resource cost of mining 
labour. On a prim itive level it is assumed that there is a linear  
relationship between regional unemployment rates, re la tive  to national 
unemployment levels , and the re-employment ra te . If  it  is further 
assumed that the regional unemployment rate  is less than the national 
average then the re-employment is taken as 100$. If  the regional 
unemployment rate  is approximately two and a half times the national ra te  
then re-employment is assumed to take place at 3 0 $ , a figure chosen by 
the report to represent induced migration. Between these lim its the 
relationship is taken to be lin ear. In the diagram below fo r the case of 
a region where unemployment was expected to be 75$ above the national 
average the re-employment rate  would be about 67$ . If  it  is assumed 
that those ex-miners who found work would be worth as much to th e ir  
employers as the ir total cost has been to the NCB then the resource cost 
of mining labour in this case would be taken as 67$ of the c o llie ry ’ s 
labour costs. Since, however, this method lacks the utilisation of 
available data the Report followed a more sophisticated approach in  
which the net present worth of delaying pit closures was quantified.
The theory of this is now described. The diagram overleaf shows 
improving job prospects for those who are thrown out of work through a 
pit closure. From the diagram it can be appreciated that the longer the
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potential redundancies are postponed the higher will be the proportion 
of redundant people who are re-employed immediately and shorter will
be the period until all are re-employed. Thus unemployment caused by
a given number of redundancies would be highest starting at tQ 
(triangle AOR); and would be progressively less at t^ and tg. Effect 
of delaying closure from tQ to t^ would be to deny to undustry other
than coal mining the labour represented by the area t^ARSBt^. The
cost of the delay would then be the marginal value product of this labour.
Lehmann studied the behaviour of workers following the closure 
of 33 collieries between July 1967 and October 1968 was studied. Unem­
ployment and subsequent re-employment was traced over twelve months foll­
owing redundancy and the data was used in regression analysis. The re­
sults were as follows (standard errors in brackets below coefficients)•
95.8 + 5.68C - 3.63U + 0.25R
(4.9) (2.1) (0.8) (0.06) r 2 = 0.624
R2 = 0.412
E3 « 79.42 - 0.91D - 4.79U
(7.2) (0.38) (1.7)
where is the percentage of redundant miners aged under 55 who worked 
within twelve months of being made redundant.
Eg is the corresponding percentage re-employed within 6 months.
Eg is the corresponding percentage re-employed within 3 months.
R2 = 0.373
Eg = 98.16 - 5.94U
(7.1) (1.6)
/
E12
D is the distance in miles from the nearest major employment
centre.
C is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if redundant
miners live in or near a conurbation and zero otherwise.
U is the male unemployment rate in the region measured at the
last unemployment count before the pit closed.
R is the number of under 55s made redundant from a pit as a 
percentage of the pitfs total labour force.
The results indicate a negative relationship between the number 
of redundant miners who worked within a given time period and the re­
gional unemployment rate. For those ex-miners who lived in large towns 
it was probable they would gain employment in a period of twelve months. 
These results are to be treated carefully, however, since they only deal 
with the period 1967/68 for a sample of 33 colliery closures.
Annex I
Macroeconomic and Energy Policies; Price Restraint in the CEGB 1967-74
Besides Government formulated policies for the energy sector 
based on electoral and/or other power group preferences, energy policy 
will itself be ranked within a global macroeconomic Government policy 
bundle. It has been seen in Chapter Three that the fuel oil tax was 
originally imposed for revenue reasons. Annex I, accordingly, considers 
the consequences of the Government imposing a particular policy on the 
economy to which the energy sector must conform. In particular the im­
pact of the 1967-74 period of Government price restraint on the CEGB*s 
power station ordering programming is briefly discussed.
The Government considered that the direct accounting costs of 
price restraint could be taken as the loss in revenue arising from sell­
ing electricity at a price below that which the electricity industry 
would have chosen without Government intervention. The shadow (or re­
source) costs involved are, however, larger as shown in Table 83. Be­
cause electricity prices were held down, the demand for electricity is 
higher than it would have been in the absence of restraint. In order 
to meet this increased demand the CEGB had two options. First, it could 
have operated higher cost plant within the existing system. Secondly 
the CEGB may be required to build new capacity which would not have been 
needed if electricity prices had been higher. This means that the extra 
resource costs to the CEGB are the aggregate generating and capital costs 
that would not have been incurred if the pre-restraint marginal cost 
pricing relationship had been maintained. Another cost that should be 
mentioned is that arising from managerial inefficiency. Faced with 
price restraint managers are no longer sure whether it is to the CEGB's 
“benefit11 to sell less or more electricity I
Table 83: The Costs of Price Restraint to the Electricity Industry
1970^73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
Source:
Shadow Cost 
(Electricity Council 
figures)
195.0
n.a.
e l . a .
£ million
Accounting Cost 
(Government figures)
92.3
176.3
257.6
56.5n.a.
Electricity Council Annual Report and Accounts for
various years.
As an example.of the cost of price restraint in the CEGB 
consider the following price and investment model in which the time 
stream of costs and benefits is as described below. It is assumed
that the CEGB attempts to equate prices with marginal costs. Three
main variables are isolated in the analysis:
a) the rate of technological progress over time in new CEGB 
plant design, installation and equipment is given by^JL.
b) the rate at which the efficiency of the new power station 
brought into the merit order will fall away over time £  .
This is due primarily to the aging process of burning
equipment with the accompanying failure rate.
c) the likely future movement of real fuel costs, <9*.
These variables are all considered in terms of the long-run, and the life 
of the power station is uniquely determined by the pace of convergence of 
«X)Land £  . Using a Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) approach and.assuming Cq 
is a proxy for operating costs; continuity of the cost and benefit 
curves and ignoring taxation, the net present value (NPV) is simply;
T T
e o f e -(d - O - t K t  
o o
whence
N P V  = P  (1 - e _ d^ +^ - ^ ) T ) 
ov_________________ _
d + J ^ - ^
where d is the rate of discount, taken as given by the Government and 
P Q is the initial price of electricity produced per kW by the CEGB.
At the end of the economic life of the power station with no final product 
value, the following condition holds:
( 0 - i O T (©-+£■ )T
P  e = C  eo o
(M+£)T (2)
or P  = C  E  * • •o o
(1) and (2) are a pair of simultaneous equations and given a value of
P q, C q can be calculated accordingly or vice versa. The P q variable
will be associated with long-run marginal costs. The discount rate,
operating and capital cost of the new power plant along with
and £  need to be known or estimated.
Consider the case illustrated (see Diagram 16) where the
price of electricity is held at a value P ^ . With the factors and M -
held constant and the cost curve static, the life of the power station
is shortened from T to T ’ and the N P V  reduced from P X C  to
0 0
P^X'C. Moreover, if the future movement of costs is expected to be
upwards the P  curve will rotate towards the left and the C  curve r  . o o
Prici/cost
Lifetime
Diagram 16: Cost and Benefit Streams for a single Power Station
Project
will rotate towards the left thus bringing in either case a shortened
life of the power station. If the power station’s life is taken as a
fixed variable then with a decrease in initial price, for a constant <9-
ant* JH, f the cost curve can only meet this requirement if the rate
at which efficiency deterioration occurs can be lowered. This may
come from increasing skill in using equipment but typically it is
expected that £  and M .  are fairly stable. Thus a change
downward in P q with. I©' constant, leads'to a change in the power
station’s life with a loss of net present value (NPV) of P oX ’X ”P£.
(See Diagram 17.) With T constant a gain in N P V  is obtained of
X * X ”C o but the improvement must come from a decline in the
future expected movement in costs. For the C E G B  over the period
studied ' @  ^  1. and 1 for all t and so investments undertaken
during the period of price restraint would be valued at an N P V  rating
x>f P ”X ”C with a loss of project life-time of T T 1. The N P V  is an o o
immediate loss but the shortened life-time of the project implies 
that future investment will be undertaken earlier than would have been 
necessary^without price restraint.
Price/Costs
C»
x»
X ”
x»
co
T ! T Power Station
Lifetime
Diagram 17: Variations in benefit and cost streams arising from a 
decline in fuel costs
Example of Price Restraint on Model for the case of the CEGB 1 967-74
Technical progress is given by JSJL ■ This is looked at in 
terms of the differential rate of thermal efficiency advance between 
existing plant and new plant in which £  , operating deterioration
is small. From values of thermal efficiency for the years 1967/68 - 
1974/75 /JL is taken as between 3$ and 4$ p.a., d is taken as the 
Government discount rate at 12$ p.a. © r is the rate of advance in fuel 
costs and is taken as a chosen value between 7$ and 12$. (See C E G B  
fuel for generation costs 1968/69 - 1973/74). Initial fuel costs are 
taken at 0.244p/kW and capital units of one are used.
Key: Q r = 0.08, K  = 1, Cq = 0.244, JU^ , = 0.03, £ = 0 . 0 1 ,  d = 0.1
The search method used is to take equation (l) (Page318) with a chosen
life-time T and calculate P q . Equation (2) (Page318) is then used and
if P Q is greater or less than P Qeq 2 Process is repeated until a
value of T is found such that P = P  _.o oeq.2
P  Po o eq.2
T = 5 0.5 0.29
T = 10 0.42 0.36
T  = 15 0.42 0.44
The implication is that the life-time of the project undertaken with
the key variables mentioned above is approximately 15 years. If,
however, Q *  — 0.2 with all other key variables held at the same value
then the life of the project is shortened by approximately five years.
%
P Po oeq.2
T  = 10 0.34 0.36
The implication of this is that although the C E G B  may receive 
compensation for price restraint - i.e. its accounting losses - 
in terms of resources the Board would have the life of its projects 
shortened by approximately five years and would, under the existing 
key variables, have to enter into new investment appraisal at a far 
earlier stage than previously encountered.
Note:
It should be mentioned here that the Government paid the following 
sums in compensation for "accelerated investment" after 1973. (Source 
Trade and Industry, 9th April 1976, p.83).
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76 £9.6 million
£4.4 million
£0.7 million
The exact meaning of "accelerated investment", however, was not 
specified.
CHAPTER FIVE
LIBERAL FUEL POLICY ALTERNATIVES
5.1 • Introduction
Chapter Five reviews the empirical work of Chapters Three and 
Four and makes clear the restrictive domain in which the results can 
he interpreted. The.partial nature of 'the study is traced back to the 
use of Paretian welfare economics. In turn workable competition 
is dismissed as an operational tool, although the necessity for an 
alternative market configuration to that of the interventionist 
remains. Such an alternative is identified as liberal welfare 
economics. The confusion that arises between Paretian and liberal 
economics is discussed and the "intuitive" appeal of workable 
competition developed into the liberal*s view of Government behaviour 
within the economy. It is seen that the workable competition model 
could equally well provide a form of Government intervention 
greater or lesser than that of its Interventionist counterpart.
Finally the consequences of liberal welfare economics for 
fuel policy is discussed along with suggested areas for further 
research.
5.2 The Empirical Results.
The analysis of Chapter Three suggested that the impact of the 
fuel oil tax in all sectors, except the C.E.G.B., was difficult to 
determine and measure for the period unde^ study. A market share 
model of the C.E.G.B. was constructed in an attempt to determine the 
excess coal burn by virtue of the tax. The econometric result proved
of marginal use. Specification problems were overcome through a 
linear programming model of the C.E.G.B.fs merit-order system. The
I
model suggested that, for the year 1961/62, the excess coal burn in 
the C.E.G.B. via the tax was of the order four million tons. A 
study of labour-output ratios for the coal industry indicated that, 
assuming equi-productivity among miners, the excess coal burn in the 
C.E.G.B. may have left 20000-40000 miners redundant. This range, 
while large, is associated with an upper cost limit to the Government 
of £200 million at 1961 prices on the assumption that lump-sum redundancy 
payments of £5000 in 1961 had been made. Redundancy payments of this 
magnitude would have been in excess of the suggested Government grants 
made in the 1967 White Paper on Energy Policy. Study of the available 
data on unemployment and vacancy rates during the 1960s suggests that 
ex-miners would have been likely to have found alternative employment 
within a year from redundancy.
The qualitative analysis of Chapter Four does not allow 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the extra coal consumed by virtue 
of the other coal protection instruments implemented by the Government. 
The costs of imposing the instruments were, however, large. Finally, 
in Annex I of Chapter Four it was illustrated that Government price 
restraint in the C.E.G.B during the period 1967-74 accelerated the 
power station ordering programme relative to the level in would have 
been in the absence of price restraint. The shadow costs of Government 
intervention are, accordingly, evaluated at a higher level than the 
Government’s accounting estimates.
In aggregate the empirical results do not allow strong
conclusions to be made. In the case of the linear programming results,
which provide a possible indication of the impact of the fuel oil tax
«
on the C.E.G.B. in 1961, the restrictions of the model must be kept 
in mind. It is likely that a dynamic integer programme would be more 
in accord with the real-life situation. More important is the suggestion 
that lump-sum redundancy payments would have used existing resources more 
efficiently than the arrangement achieved through the imposition of the 
fuel oil tax. Both empirical and theoretical qualifications need to 
be made here.
Empirically the analysis is restricted to a ceteris paribus, 
comparative statics approach in which the benefits obtained through 
Government intervention are invariant between the two cases.
Effectively this implies a marginal decrease in the rate of contraction 
of the NCB labour force is met by a linearly proportional marginal 
increase in the fuel oil tax. Simply, any benefits accruing from 
increased taxation and its resultant expenditure coupled with decreasing 
the rate of contraction of the NCB labour force i:s equivalent to the 
aggregate benefits accruing from the Government raising less taxation. 
Clearly this assumption is very sensitive not only to those projects 
on which taxation was spent but the Government decision rule for 
allocating funds between projects. -
This brings into question the theoretical qualification that 
needs to be discussed in reviewing the results. Essentially the 
Paretians endorse a change in the allocation of resources if the 
welfare of at least one individual is increased without reducing the 
welfare of any other individual. The partial study of the impact 
of the fuel oil tax suggests that lump-sum redundancy payments would 
have been more efficient in the Paretian sense. However, the 
statement is made that the fuel oil tax is considered as an 
Interventionist device whilst the lump-sum redundancy payments are 
taken as a workable competition alternative. Since both market
configurations are sufficient but not necessary to fulfill the 
Paretian optimality conditions a strict interpretation of the Paretian 
conditions does not allow the difference in Government intervention 
in markets to be considered. Moreover,, it was seen that to have 
any operational content the neo-Paretian has to invoke a Social 
Welfare decision rule. The ordering of this rule is undertaken by 
the Government. The results for the linear programme, however, 
strictly interpreted require that no distinction between Governments 
be considered. In essence, therefore, one of the important variables 
in the model - the continuing interventionary role of Government - has 
to be excluded. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the Interventionist 
will not recommend less intervention in the market than his workable 
competition alternative. . .
In summary* therefore, the empirical results from the fuel oil
tax have to be interpreted in a restricted theoretical and empirical
domain. The partial nature of the study assumes away the costs and
manner of Government intervention, although the operational divergence
between Interventionist and workable competition frameworks stresses
the importance of defining the Governmentfs role. Logically, therefore,
/ * 
the restrictions imposed by Paretian welfare economics lead to its
operational impotency and the search for a comprehensive welfare theory.
5.3 A Critique of Paretian Welfare economics
In Chapter One the exposition of Paretian welfare economics noted 
the severity of some of the assumptions made. Here, however, for 
completeness these assumptions are re-stated.
The first assumption is that concern was to be with the welfare 
of all members of society. This assumption is entirely distinct from 
the second value-judgement that an individual is to be considered the
best judge of his own welfare. Individual preferences may not be 
imposed on other individuals. Finally, interpersonal comparisons 
are denied in the judgement that a change is treated as improving 
social welfare if a change in the allocation of resources increases 
the welfare of at least one individual without reducing the welfare 
of any other individual. Quite simply the Paretian assumptions 
give primacy to individual’s preferences. The third assumption does 
not allow conclusions to be made regarding circumstances in which a 
change improves the welfare of some at the cost of a reduction in the 
welfare of others. In consequence the operational use of the model 
is in doubt. Any rejection of the initial value-judgements will, 
of course, lead to the collapse of the Paretian welfare model.
To "overcome11 the sterility of the Paretian system interpersonal 
comparisons are re-introduced, initially through the concept of 
compensation and later via a social welfare decision rule. Strictly 
speaking the value-judgements of the Paretian model are consequently
>
violated. Conventional neo-Paretian analysis assumes this problem 
away and argues for piecemeal changes in welfare whilst ignoring the 
implication of the Theory of the Second Best.
5.4 Interventionist and Workable Competition Social Welfare
Decision Rules
The operational inconsistency of the Paretian model initiates 
its demise. An attempt is made to save the analysis through 
introducing two alternative social welfare decision rules, the vectors 
of which are ranked by an interventionist and workable competition 
Governments. As suggested above, however, the results obtained 
ignored the methods and costs of both types of Government intervention.
The Interventionist social welfare decision riile based on 
Breton’s Economic Theory of Representative Government^ served as a
1. See Chapter Two,
useful model for interpreting the evolution of post-war energy policy.
The Government is assumed to retrospectively adopt policies favoured
by the electorate in order to maximise its possible share of
electoral votes. However, the decision rules upon which
representation is based, the length of the election period and the 
. 2
degree of full-line supply are factors that shield political parties 
from the preferences of votes.
Given the interventionist case an attempt is made to isolate an 
alternative market configuration in which the characteristic role of the 
Government is distinct from that of the Interventionist. A workable 
competition alternative is identified although a number of problems are 
apparent. First, while the Government is assumed to enact market 
tests to allow the simulation of perfect competition there is on, a 
prior, assumption that the Government will necessarily play a "minor”
role in the market vis-a-vis individuals. However, the rules for
. . 3 .workability drawn up by the Government do not indicate which particular
qualities of the competitive market are to be preferred on economic 
groupds. Consequently a paradoxical situation may ensue in which a 
Government increasingly intervenes in the market to "preserve the 
levels" of perfect competition. The intuitive appeal of the workable 
competition alternative is therefore seen to be based on the false 
belief that the Government acts as a benevolent referee in the market 
place.
5.5 The Liberal Alternative.
5.51 The Definition of Liberalism
The fundamental value-judgement of liberalism is that; 
man has the capacity to choose. The implication is.that if capacities
2. See R.7
3. See Chapter One
are to be developed individuals must be granted the widest possible 
freedom. Concurrent with freedom is responsibility for one's actions.
Two distinct types of freedom may be considered. Positive freedom is 
displayed by individuals who make use of circumstances which may or may 
not result in opportunities. As such it involves not only a 
manipulation of those circumstances but the power, ultimately, to 
coerce other individuals. This tends to reduce the other category 
of freedom known as negative freedom. Essentially negative freedom 
is increased as the area of non-interference grows. It represents
the absence of constraints on the individual.
• 4 .Following the work of Machlup the distinction between negative
and positive freedoms can be made distinct through considering the 
words "free to" and "free from". To be free from something is to be 
rid of it (e.g. freedom from want), whereas to be free to so something 
implies that people have the right to do something (e.g. freedom of 
speech) "Freedom to" implies that individuals are under no coercion 
or more accurately under a degree of coercion which they understand 
and are willing to bear. "Freedom from" requires a group, usually 
the Government, to undertake positive steps to remove the something 
individuals wish to be free of. Machlup, however, goes one stage 
further and notes the confusion between "I may" and "I can". To 
quote Machlup, "Capacity to act, having the power and the means to do 
something, is surely not the same thing as having the freedom to do it.
The fusion of the idea of effective power with the idea of freedom was 
obviously proposed by those who held that freedom in the sense of 
non-interference was of no practival value to those who lacked power, 
chiefly the buying power".^
Liberalism may, therefore, be considered as t^e "maintenance
4. F. Machlup, Liberalism and the Choice of Freedoms", in E. Streissler, 
Roads to freedom, London 1969, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
5. F. Machlup, op. cit.
and extension of individual freedom, defined as that condition of
mankind in which coercion of some individuals by others is reduced to
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the minimum possible degree". Consequently the pursuit of freedom 
is a search procedure in which individuals are encouraged to make 
choices, albeit the wrong ones in retrospect, since this offers the 
possibility of self-improvement. Responsibilities are apportioned 
to individuals in connection with the choices they make. Freedom 
therefore becomes the objective of society with the mechanics of 
society encouraging and assisting the exercise of free will and 
assigning responsibility to individuals for their decisions.
5.52 MachlupTs List of Freedoms.^
Besides the distinction between positive and negative 
freedoms, freedom can also be subdivided into various categories. 
Machlup divided freedom into three main categories; the economic, 
the political, the moral and the intellectual. Inevitably there is 
some overlap between these. In the economic freedoms listing the 
freedom of work, enterprise and trade is conditioned by institutional 
devices such as contracts or by Government legislation. Freedom of - 
travel and of migration is usually not allowed between countries and 
in many states not internally. Freedom of contract would mean that 
everybody is free, without restraint, to make any sort of binding 
contract with anyone except under duress or with deceit or fraud.
This freedom can be in conflict with those of work, enterprise, trade 
and competition and entry. Freedom of markets implies that everybody 
is free to buy or sell any quantity of a commodity at any price 
agreeable to him and to any other party. These freedoms are 
frequently restricted to exclude items such as narcotics, tobacco, 
arms etc.
6. C.K. Rowley and A.T. Peacock, Welfare Economics: a Liberal 
'Restatement, Martin Robertson, 1975
Freedom of competition and entry would mean that everybody 
is free to enter any industry, market or trade and compete in any way 
except with the use of violence, deceit and fraud. This freedom 
can be in conflict with those of contract and coalition. Freedom 
of choice of consumption means the individual can use his buying 
power for any good or services he chooses with prices reflecting the 
demand for them and the supply of resources required for their 
production. Finally, freedom of choice of occupation means the 
individual can use his labour power and skills in any occupation he 
chooses with wages reflecting the supply of labour in question and 
the demand for the products to which it contributes. This class of 
freedom is usually violated either by legislation or as a consequence 
of the freedoms of contract and coalition.
• i
In the intellectual and moral spheres there are four classes 
of freedom. Freedom of nonconformanity and eccentricity means that 
everybody is free to be different in appearance, habits and ways of 
life however foolish, perverse or wrong it may look to others.
Freedom of teaching, research and learning respectively means that
everybody is free to teach any subject, facts, ideas or methods;
/
investigate any subject by any method, or study or attend lectures on 
any subject. Freedom of religion means the freedom to worship in 
any way or not at all whilst freedom of conscience means that everybody 
is free, without restraint, to refuse to do things against their conscience
The classes of political freedom involve the freedom of 
coalition and association to combine with anybody for any purpose not 
involving harm to others. Freedom of assembly means the right to 
convene or attend gatherings for discussion and aeliveration of any 
subject whatsoever. Freedom of vote means that individuals may cast 
their votes in free and secret balloting in periodic elections and
•referenda. All societies exclude miners and lunatics from this class. 
Freedom of revolution means that a Government can be overthrown that 
denies essential freedoms. Freedom of expression, speech and privacy 
are limited in many countries through censorship. Finally, freedom 
of privacy means that any individual can work, play, rest, converse 
and correspond unexposed to the view of knowledge of any uninvited 
person. This freedom can be reduced in many ways by such actions as 
pressure to testify on matters which individuals may.not wish to 
disclose.
5.53 The Trade-off Of Freedoms
The range of negative freedoms outlined above may not 
be compatible with one another and in certain circumstances may be 
mutually exclusive. Given the conflicts that exist between freedoms 
liberalism cannot imply the absence of coercion. . The degree of 
coercion sanctioned will be that which avoids subjecting individuals 
to the arbitrary will of others. Clearly legal procedures should 
determine the degree of coercion, although the laws themselves must 
conform to a set of principles. Laws must be prospective, known and 
certain and apply with equal force to all individuals without exception 
or discrimination. The judiciary would be counterbalanced by Appeal 
courts, trial by jury.and habeas corpus. .
The establishment of the rule of law provides a method of 
deciding the coercion required to remove the conflict between freedoms. 
Such conflicts will, however, arise only when the preference orderings 
of liberals has been established. Such a preference scheme can vary 
between liberals and may only be resolved, ultimately, through the 
legal process with the full range of possible alternatives being 
expressed. All liberals will place paramount importance on the 
individual being able to choose his preference scheme. Any method of
persuasion, short of coercion, can be used to alter the preferences 
of others and will attempt to illustrate various possible outcomes 
from the situation under discussion.
A possible ranking of negative freedoms would give priority 
to the intellectual and moral freedoms on the belief that access to as 
wide a range as possible of views, alternatives and ideas in a pre­
requisite for political and economic freedoms. These classes extend 
into the political sphere to stress the importance of the freedoms 
of expression, speech, press and assembly. Political freedom of vote 
is also viewed as essential to the maintenance of freedom. A lower 
ranking would be given to the freedom of revolution on the belief that 
it is rare for a revolutionary regime to extend negative freedom. If 
they do so, history suggests it is for a strictly limited period. 
Similarly freedom of coalition and association is viewed with 
reservation because it implies the ability to build-up a power base in 
the political sphere which can enter into conflict with other freedoms.
In the economic sphere the ranking of freedom is primarily 
ordered through the fear of the growth of power groups within the 
economic structure. Consequently, the freedoms of markets, of 
competition and entry and of freedom of choice in consumption and 
production are considered to rank above the freedoms of contract and 
coalition. The concentration of political and economic power in 
any group’s hands - be it Government, firm or private individual - 
affords the opportunity of giving effective power to those groups. 
Ultimately this will conflict with the maintenance and preservation of 
freedoms. On this basis a liberal economy favours a system in which 
voluntary exchanges through market processes occur and in which no 
individual can excercise effective power to impose his will 
arbitrarily on others.
The trade-off of freedoms will also give reference to social 
objectives such as materalistic welfare and distributive justice. 
However, in those cases where material advances are in conflict with 
negative freedom the liberal will discount the economic benefits more 
sharply than would non-liberals. The role of the Government will be 
extremely important for two reasons. First, as stated above, a 
manopoly of effective power implies the ability to coerce individuals 
and reduce negative freedoms. Moreover, effective power will mean 
increased intervention in the economy and liberals are not neutral 
as between instruments of intervention.
The mechanics of Government intervention have been explained
in Chapter Two with reference to Breton’s Economic Theory of
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Representative Government. Intervention was rationalised on the 
basis that Government’s retrospectively formulate policies so as to 
maximise their share of electoral votes. During the interval 
between elections, politicians do not value policies at the same 
rate-of-time discount as the electorate. Accordingly, they are able 
to deviate from electoral preferences. The growth of political power 
is viewed by liberals as a source of erosion of negative freedoms.
5.54 The New Left
In discussing liberalism it is worth while to digress 
slightly and mention an alternative theory of welfare attributable to 
the New Left. Although there are substantial differences between 
the New Left and liberalism, both reject the Paretian assumptions. 
Moreover they both share the view that concentration of power in the 
hands of a particular power group leads to corruption and a growth of 
bureaucracy. _ ■
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Within the New. Left school welfare is not defined in terms of 
an existing state of the economy but in some futuristic concept yet
to be realised. The path by which this (undefined) goal is attained 
will only become clear by breaking various institutional relationships. 
For example, changes in production and consumption alter the "true" 
preference structure of individuals. In addition individuals’ 
preference systems are considered to be interdependent with ability 
being not only a function of market relationship but also of their 
social and political relationship with others. The ultimate welfare 
goal is classified by negative statements- such as the.absence of a 
medium of exchange, which at present distorts individuals’ "true" 
preferences for goods and services. Similarly the hierarchical 
organisation of production is rejected.
This last statement forms a facet of the main divergence 
between liberals and the New Left. The latter school of thought 
reject any form of organised markets based on profit-taking as a 
major element in the-objective function of firms. .Preference systems 
.are, therefore, hot only changed by consumption and production but 
are distorted by the profit maximising principle with, its accent on 
materalistic gains. In addition the New Left assumes that human 
motivation is a function of economic organisation. In consequence
i
the hierarchical control of industry constrains the individual from
altering the work situation although his preferences are manipulated
by the work environment.
Whilst the New Left and liberals agree that Paretian analysis
must be rejected as an operational device for welfare analysis and
that large power groupings are associated with corruption and X- 
. . 9inefficiency , any similarity between the two theories ends there.
In contrast three main differences remain. First the existence of 
power groups does not lead the liberal to reject orgaijised markets.
9. See 5.6
Secondly the liberal does not believe that economic organisation is 
the sole stimulus for human motivation. Thirdly liberals argue that 
the problem of allocating scarce resources will remain disregard 
of the market system that society or some power group favours.
5.6 A liberal fuel Policy
5.61 Introduction
Having identified liberalism as an alternative welfare 
theory to Paretian welfare economics it is as well to make the rejection 
of the Paretian value-judgements explicit. There is no disagreement
on the value-judgement that concern is to be with the welfare of all 
members of society. The second value-judgement that an individual 
is the best judge of his own welfare is, however, endorsed only with 
strict limitations. Certain individuals may not value freedom as 
highly as a liberal would. Unnecessary coercion cannot be condoned 
because the liberal restricts himself to persuasion short of coercion. 
Finally, liberals reject the third Paretian value-judgement because 
interpersonal utility comparisons are implicit in the trade-off of 
freedoms.
A liberal fuel policy alternative takes as its central maxim
the maintenance and extension of negative freedoms defined as the
absence of some individuals on others. Distributive justice and
material welfare are incorporated into the analysis by trading off
freedoms in return for improvements in efficiency or changes in
justice. However, liberals will discount material welfare and
distributive justice at a higher rate than non-liVerals because
they do not wish to see freedoms irreversibly eroded. Distributive
justice will accord with the definition of liberalism through the
♦
concept of equality before the law. Thus any collective decision
rule should require equal provision of collective goods to all 
individuals. In the case of the poor redistribution of wealth 
may be justified, although a decision rule for a minority should not 
be imposed on a majority. Redistribution should be in cash 
rather than in specified goods or services. This formulation 
carries the merit of leaving individuals free to choose their 
consumption patterns.
5.62 .The Fuel Oil Tax
With this background the imposition of the fuel oil 
tax described in Chapter Three can be reappraised. Its imposition 
transgressed the freedom of markets and the freedom of choice of 
consumption to which the liberal gives a relatively high ranking.
While the initial imposition of the tax was part of a general fiscal 
package its retention was rationalised as a means of reducing the 
rate of contraction of the NCB labour force. The empirical work 
of Chapter Three suggest that a more efficient alternative would have 
been to make lump-sum redundancy to miners. The analysis was, 
however, concerned only with studying the price relatives between 
coal and oil and coal output, and the resulting impact on the mining 
labour force. All other variables were assumed constant. The 
distinction between workable competition and interventionist 
Governments was only apparent through the ordering of the social 
welfare decision rule. Consequently the costs and methods of 
Government intervention were ignored. By rejecting Paretian analysis, 
however, and adopting the liberal approach the cost of Government 
intervention is seen to have been underestimated. A liberal energy 
policy alternative enacting redundancy payments to miners would have
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not only allowed freedom of markets and the freedom of choice of
consumption but would have placed the responsibility of choice on 
redundant miners. This was at a'time during which redundant 
miners could have found alternative employment.
5.63 Power Groups
In more general terms the question of the build-up 
of power groups within the energy sector (and the economy) would 
receive considerable scrutiny under a liberal fuel policy. At 
least three distinct power groups may be isolated within the energy 
sector; the Government, the unions and the nationalised industries. 
Following Breton’s model of Representative Government^ it is possible 
that these groupings may not be separate policy formulating entities 
in practice. The arbitrary nature of Government intervention has 
been adequately covered in Chapter Two. The recent Energy Policy 
Review ^ clearly illustrates the point that Interventionists assume that 
the costs of Government intervention are very low compared to any form 
of market failure efficiency losses. Moreover, its presupposes a 
Government ability to realistically assess market failures.
The liberal acknowledges, however, that the Government has an 
/ ' * 
important role to play in the economy. Where freedoms are in conflict
liberals will endorse coercion in so far as it is required to maintain
the liberal hierarchy of freedoms and always provided that it does not
vidate the rule of law. The role of Government is therefore mainly to
be restricted to policing established property rights, maintaining an
efficient monetary system, providing national defence and law and order.
An important contribution to liberal policy would be made through the
Government providing the public with ease of access to information.
10. See 2.7
11. Energy Policy Review Energy Paper No. 22, 1977, HMSO
In terms of prescribed standards of safety, of health and of weights 
and measures the Governments’ role is to make these known and applicable 
to all.
The Government, following the concept of equality before the law, would 
be answerable to the court thereby restricting not only their effective 
power but their administrative discretion in the implementation of 
policy. Courts would be subjected to Appeal Court decisions and 
decisions by juries.
The second power group which acts against the liberal order is 
the unions. While freedom of coalition and association is endorsed 
by liberals it is given a lower ranking than freedom of markets or 
freedom of choice of consumption and of occupation. Unions do not 
at present uphold equality before the law because of their power to 
form closed shops, picket, boycott companies and form contracts with 
employers which are applied to all individuals. The effective power 
of unions to coerce other workers to comply with union restrictions 
or to coerce employers into dismissing "troublesome,,workers reduces 
individuals* negative freedoms. Under a liberal policy unions would 
be required to be registered thereby exposing themselves to full 
equality before the law. Finally, although the right to strike would 
remain, all public subsidies to strikers and their families would have 
to be withdrawn as this contravenes equality before the law. Union­
isation would still have a place in a liberal policy because it is 
readily understood that labour does not have the capital reserves which 
capital possesses. Moreover, by each individual employee signing a 
labour contract for a given period of employment each side would be 
free to re-negotiate his contract.
Besides the Government and the unions, monopolies with the 
energy sector (public or private) confer a degree of effective power on
corporations which reduces negative freedoms. Such power is likely 
to be translated into political power with important implications 
for freedom of markets, competition and choice of consumption and 
occupation. In Chapter One it was seen that the Paretian solution 
to monopoly in the energy sector was to automatically invoke the 
assistance of the Government which nationalised the industries 
concerned.
The natural monopoly problem is one in which production is 
associated with a falling long-run marginal cost curve throughout 
the output range under consideration. As shown in Chapter One a 
policy of laissez-faire results in monopoly and an unambiguous 
loss of welfare to consumers. This result is shown in Diagram 18 
with an output-price relationship (OQ^, OP^) . Point A represents a 
point on the monopolist’s short-run X-inefficient cost curve. The 
theoretical optimum is identified as the combination (OC^j ^ 2  ^ on"t^ ie 
short-run cost curve AC^. Consumer welfare loss resulting from 
monopoly in AHAC^ with X-inefficiency loss P^P^CH. The Paretian 
solution of nationalisation aims to reduce the loss in consumer 
welfare by introducing a Government rule designed to encourage 
marginal cost pricing. At output OQ^ and price OP^ long-run X- 
inefficient marginal costs are equated with prices with a gain to
consumers of ACAC., over and above the laissez-faire solution.
M
Depending on the degree of anti-trust fragmentation required by the 
law the curve AC^/ will shift. For the case shown in the diagram 
it is arguable whether there is a welfare loss/gain compared to 
laissez-faire. However, there is a welfare loss compared to 
public regulation. Finally, combination (OQ , OP ) shows a
D ■ s
Output
competitive solution with X-efficient long run average costs
equated with prices. Whilst there is a welfare loss compared to
the theoretical optimum the bidding solution appeas on the static 
trade-off model to be more efficient than the other three alternatives. 
This suggestion remains sensitive to the ranking of the average 
cost curves.
A liberal fuel policy would, accordingly, weigh any benefits 
arising from a movement towards large scale production against the costs
of increasing the corporation’s effective power. The benefits from
• . 13
large scale production would be discounted by a factor which took
account of the corporation’s potential power,, The Government’s 
role would be restricted to making the discount factor known to the 
public.
5.64 Pollution Externalities
Finally in this section consideration is given to the
problem of pollution externalities. Chapter One discussed the
Buchanan-Stubblebine thesis under the assumption that the level of
14pollution was known. The conventional pricing solution suggests 
that having adopted some arbitrary point on the pollution scale the 
increment in prices needed to internalise pollution will be achieved
12. H. Demsetz, "Why Regulate Utilities?" Journal of Law and 
Economics, 1968.
A.T. Peacock and C.K. Rowley, "Welfare Economics and the 
Public Regulation of Natural Monopoly", Journal of Public 
Economics, 1972.
13. The Hierfindahl Index, H = i = n
r  s*2
1 = 1
where Sj* is the market share of the ith firm in an industry 
comprising n firms. For pure monopoly H would have a value 
of unity.
4
14. C.K. Rowley, "Pollution and Public Policy", Economic Policies and 
Social Goals, edited by A.J. Culyer, Martin Robertson, 1974
through an iterative procedure in which producers of pollution make 
their preferences known. Whilst producers may lie about their 
preferences^"^, hoping that the eventual equilibrium price will be 
below the price they are ultimately prepared to pay, the pricing 
solution places emphasis upon uniformity of effluent charges. This 
satisfies the liberal precept of equality before the law while 
simultaneously minimising the discretionary power of the regulatory 
body. Possible liberal alternatives to regulation might therefore 
be to re-negotiate properly rights or}following Dalesy^ create a 
parallel market in pollution rights.
Essentially Dales considered a water control board which 
surveyed the quantity and nature of effluent pollution in a river 
having established some common denominator of pollution units.
Depending on the level of pollution shares are issued allowing the 
water board to indirectly influence water quality improvement, The 
shares are given a market value determined at an auction attended by 
all potential polluters. Each polluter would have to own enough 
shares to match his annual effluent discharges and would be required 
to bid shares away from other firms if this appeared to be less costly 
than implementing pollution abatement measures. However, the auction 
requires that producer collusion be absent and that the polluters are 
not dominated by one corporation (e.g. the C.E.G.B.)
5.7 Suggested Areas for Further Research.......
The outline of a liberal energy policy alternative given above
points to a wide range of topics for further research. The list below 
suggests a few of these.
15. P. Burrows, "Pricing Versus Regulation for Environmental
Protection", in A.J. Culyer, op. cit.
16. J.H. Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices: An Essay in Policy
Making and Economics, University of Toronto Press, 1968.
i) Invention and innovation.
Collective choice currently places research and- development 
for new energy sources mainly in the hands of the nationalised fuel .
industries. In terms of the liberal ranking of freedoms this not
only carries implications for negative freedoms but suggests X-
inefficiency. Moreover, as recently witnessed by the nuclear power
R and D programme, invention and innovation can be highly susceptible 
to environmental pressure goup activity.*
ii) Auction/Allocation of North Sea Blocks
Dam* s ^  recent work on auctions suggests that the present 
allocative system is inefficient. However, the analysis fails to 
discuss the effective power implications of Government intervention, 
ii) • Pollution.
The Dales solution outlined in Section 5.6 suggested that 
alternatives to discretionary Government may be realised through 
setting up a market which simulates competition. ' The various forms 
these markets could take needs to be studied, 
iv) Institutional changes.
Alternatives to nationalisation need to be studied. In the
/
context of present nationalised fuel industries^X-inefficiency, control 
loss and organisational methods need to be considered. Similarly 
the effective power.of unions within the nationalisation framework 
deserves careful scrutiny.
v) Costs of a liveral energy policy.
While Government intervention is associated with various costs 
and increases in effective power, the policing of liberal policies 
requires a series of checks and balances that need to be costed.
17. K.W. Dam, Oil Resources, Who Gets What How?, University 
of Chicago Press, 1976.
vi) The role of Government.
The exact role of Government within liberal energy policy 
formulation needs to be studied along with methods of improving the 
flow of information to the public.
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Appendix I
Machlup’ s L is t of Some Important Freedoms
Freedom of would mean that everybody is free , without res tra in t to
Work work in any kind of occupation, or not to work at a ll
Enterprise apply any kind of resources to any kind of business in
any fie ld  of production 
Trade transport, import, or export any kind and quantity of
commodities
T ra ve l travel abroad and everywhere in the country
Migration move and make his residence abroad or anywhere in
the country
Contract make any sort of binding contract with anyone, except
under duress, or with deceit or fraud  
Markets buy or sell any quantity at any price agreeable to him
and to any other party 
Competition enter any industry, trade or market and compete in any
and entry way except with use of violence, deceit or fraud
Choice of use his buying power fo r any goods or services he
consumption chooses with prices reflecting the demand fo r them and
the supply of resources required fo r th e ir production 
Choice of use his labour power and skills in any occupation he
occupation chooses with wages reflecting the supply of labour in
question and the demand for the products to which it  
contributes
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Coalition
and association
Assembly
Vote
Revolution 
Thought & 
Expression  
Speech
Press
Privacy
Nonconformance 
& eccentricity
Teaching
Research
Learning
Religion
Conscience
combine with anybody for any purpose not involving 
harm to others
convene or attend gatherings for discussion and 
deliberation of any subject whatsoever 
cast his vote in free  and secret balloting in periodic 
elections and referenda
overthrow a government that denies essential freedoms 
think, w rite , and express in a r t , music or any other 
way
speak privately and publicly on any subject and in  
any vein whatsoever
print and publish anything and distribute it  in any way 
work, play, res t, converse and correspond unexposed 
to the view or knowledge by any uninvited person 
be different in appearance, habits and ways of life  
however foolish, perverse or wrong it may look 
to others
teach any subject, facts, ideas or methods 
investigate any subject by any method 
study or attend lectures on any subject 
worship in any way or not at a ll,  if  he so wishes 
refuse to do things against his conscience
Taken ver batim from F . Machlup, ’’L iberalism  and the Choice of 
Freedoms” , in E . S tre iss ler (ed) Roads to Freedom, London 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
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